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Generations of historians have looked to Bengal, Bombay, and Madras to detect the 
emergence of the legal and administrative mechanisms that would underpin Britain’s 
nineteenth-century empire. Yet this focus on ‘British’ India overshadows the very different 
history of nearly half the Indian subcontinent, which was still ruled by nominally independent 
monarchs. This dissertation traces the increasingly asymmetrical relationships between the 
East India Company and neighbouring Indian kingdoms during a period of intensive British 
imperial expansion, from 1798 to 1818. In so doing, it sheds fresh light on the contested 
process through which the Company consolidated its political predominance over rival Indian 
powers, setting a precedent for indirect rule that would inform British policy in Southeast 
Asia and Africa for years to come.  
 The relationship between the Company and Indian governments was mediated 
through the figure of the Resident, the Company’s political representative at Indian courts, 
and the Residents therefore lie at the heart of this dissertation. Given their geographical 
distance from British administrative centres and their immersion in Indian political culture, 
the Residents’ experiences can be used to chart the growing pains of an expanding, 
modernizing empire, and to elucidate the dynamics of cross-cultural interaction and exchange. 
Based on the letters and papers of the dozen Residents stationed at major Indian courts, this 
dissertation shows how practical and ideological divisions within the Company regarding the 
appropriate forms of imperial influence were exacerbated by mutual suspicions resulting from 
geographical distance and the blurring of personal and public interests in the diplomatic line. 
This process was further complicated and constrained by the Residents’ reliance on the social 
and cultural capital of Indian elites and administrators with interests of their own. 
The Company’s consolidation of political influence at Indian courts was fraught with 
problems, and the five thematic chapters reflect recurring points of conflict which thread their 
way through these formative years. These include: the fragility of information networks and 
the proliferation of rumours; questions about the use of force and the applicability of the law 
of nations outside Europe; controversies surrounding political pageantry and conspicuous 
consumption; ambivalent relationships between Residents and their Indian state secretaries; 
and the Residents’ embroilment in royal family feuds. Ultimately, this dissertation concludes 
that the imposition of imperial authority at Indian courts was far from smooth, consisting 
instead of a messy and protracted series of practical experiments based on many competing 
visions of the ideal forms of influence to be employed in India.  
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Glossary  
akhbar News, intelligence, a newspaper; especially the written intelligence of the 
proceedings of native courts and princes circulated to other courts and princes 
by their appointed agents. 
 
arzee Persian petition.  
 
aumil A collector of revenue; a farmer of revenue invested with chief authority in his 
district.  
 
bai A lady of rank, Hindu. 
 
begum A princess, a mistress, a lady of rank; usually Muslim.   
 
Brahmin Hindu priestly caste. 
 
dak Post, post-office, or establishment for the conveyance of letters and of 
travellers. Relays of men or cattle along the road for these purposes. 
 
darbar A court, a royal court, an audience or levée. 
 
diwan In Muslim governments, the head financial minister; in Maratha polities, the 
chief minister. 
 
fakir  Religious ascetic or mendicant monk. 
 
harkara Runner, messenger, intelligence agent.  
 
insha  Creating, producing, composing; writing, composition; style, elegance of style, 
especially in letter-writing; the belles lettres.  
 
jagir A tenure common under the Mughals, in which the public revenues of a given 
tract of land were made over to a servant of the state, together with the powers 
requisite to enable him to collect and appropriate such revenue, and administer 
the general government of the district.  
 
khilat A dress of honour; any article of costume presented by the ruling or superior 
authority to an inferior as a mark of distinction.  
 
mahal A place, a house, an apartment, a seraglio.  
 
mir Title given before a name usually signifying that the holder is a lineal descent 
of the prophet Mohammed. 
 
Mirza Prince or gentleman.  
 
munshi A writer, scribe or secretary. 
 
musnud Throne, usually low arrangement of cushions and bolsters.  
 
nautch A kind of dance performed by women; also any kind of stage entertainment. 
 
nazr A ceremonial present, an offering from an inferior to a superior. 
xi 
 
 
 
  
 
paan The aromatic leaf of the betel, rolled round a few small pieces of the astringent 
Areka nut with a little caustic lime, a few heads of spice, and sometimes a little 
catechu, for the purpose of being chewed, acting as a carminative and antacid 
tonic. It is presented to guests and visitors, and sometimes sent to friends and 
relations, especially at family festivals, enclosed in gold or silver paper leaf.  
 
palankin Covered litter usually for one passenger carried by means of poles resting on 
the shoulders of several men.  
 
peshkash Tax, tribute; a fine or present to the ruling power on receiving an appointment 
or assignment of revenue, or on a renewal of a grant or the like.  
 
Pindaris Bands of mounted plunderers.  
 
purdah A veil, a screen, a curtain, especially one which excludes the women of a 
family from the gaze of men.  
 
sirdar Leader, a commander, a chief or lord.  
 
vakil  Ambassador or representative.  
 
zamindar Landholder or local ruler. 
 
zenana The women’s apartments of a house in which the women of the family are 
secluded. Also used for the women of the family.  
 
Glossary compiled using Henry Yule, Hobson-Jobson: A glossary of colloquial Anglo-Indian 
words and phrases, new edn., ed. William Crooke (London, 1903) and H. H. Wilson, A 
glossary of judicial and revenue terms, and of useful words occurring in official documents 
relating to the administration of the government of British India (London, 1855). 
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Introduction 
In conventional accounts of Britain’s empire overseas, one event persistently looms 
large: when, on 20 October 1764, the forces of the East India Company and the combined 
armies of Bengal, Awadh, and the Mughal Emperor clashed at Buxar in north-eastern India. 
The story that follows is a familiar one. The Company’s decisive victory made them masters 
of Bengal, after several years of ruling through a puppet nawab following the Battle of 
Plassey in 1757. The legacy of Buxar was confirmed when in 1765 the Company accepted the 
diwani, making them the undisputed governors of what was then one of the richest provinces 
in Mughal India. The Company’s assumption of direct territorial control in Bengal is 
generally considered one of the founding moments of the so-called Second Empire.1 As a 
result, generations of historians have looked to Bengal, ‘the British bridgehead’, to trace the 
development of the ideologies and legal and administrative mechanisms that would underpin 
Britain’s nineteenth-century empire.2 While historians like David Armitage, P.J. Marshall, 
and Philip J. Stern have suggested the fruitfulness of situating empire in the east within a 
longer time-span encompassing conquest in Ireland and colonialism in the Atlantic world, 
events in Bengal nevertheless continue to be understood as a point of rupture.3 For the first 
time, Britons were governing over an extensive non-European, non-Christian population, and 
ever since historians have been enticed by the question of how they sought to justify and carry 
out this unprecedented ‘domination of strangers’.4  
Yet the Nawab of Bengal was not the only Indian ruler to rally his forces on that 
long-ago October day. For the Mughal Emperor and the Nawab Vizier of Awadh, the 
Company’s victory at Buxar certainly heralded the Company’s growing political and military 
ascendancy in the subcontinent, but neither rescinded their political autonomy and both 
remained at least nominally independent until the 1850s. Events in Awadh and the Mughal 
heartlands around Delhi therefore followed a rather different trajectory than that which 
historians have documented for Bengal. Meanwhile, for the Marathas gathering force in the 
                                                     
1 Vincent T. Harlow, The founding of the Second British Empire 1763-1793, 2 vols. (London, 1952-
1964), p. 3;63; P.J. Marshall, ‘The First British Empire’, in The Oxford history of the British empire, 
ed. Robin W. Winks (Oxford, 1999), vol. V, p. 51; C.A. Bayly, ‘The Second British Empire’, in The 
Oxford history of the British empire, ed. Robin W. Winks (Oxford, 1999), vol. V, p. 60-62.  
2 P.J. Marshall, Bengal: The British bridgehead – Eastern India 1740-1828 (Cambridge, 1988), p. 70-
92; Robert Travers, Ideology and empire in eighteenth-century India: The British in Bengal 
(Cambridge, 2007), p. 31-66; Jon E. Wilson, The domination of strangers: Modern governance in 
eastern India, 1780-1835 (Basingstoke, 2008), p. 2.  
3 David Armitage, The ideological origins of the British Empire (Cambridge, 2004), p. 3; P. J. 
Marshall, The making and unmaking of empires: Britain, India, and America c. 1750-1783 (Oxford, 
2005), p. 379; Philip J. Stern, ‘British Asia and British Atlantic: Comparisons and connections’, The 
William and Mary Quarterly, 63:4 (2006): 693-712.  
4 Wilson, The domination of strangers, p. 182.  
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plains of central India, the story of their confrontation with the Company had just begun. 
Their decisive defeat would come only in 1818, and arguably not even then; while the Peshwa 
of Poona was forced into exile, his lands absorbed by the Company, the territories around 
Nagpur and Gwalior would continue to be administered by the Sindhia and Bhonsla dynasties 
for years to come. Further south, the Mughal successor state of Hyderabad and the Hindu 
kingdom of Travancore would remain independent until the mid-twentieth century. The focus 
on Bengal and ‘British’ India thus overshadows the very different history of nearly half the 
Indian subcontinent. These kingdoms would continue to be governed by Indians, but would 
gradually become bound to the Company by unequal alliances whereby their freedom of 
action on the Indian stage was increasingly circumscribed. Their relationship with the 
Company was mediated, not through judges or revenue officers, but through the figure of the 
Resident, the Company’s political representative who lived in a great house, hunted tigers 
with the king, and paraded through city streets on the back of a richly caparisoned elephant. 
This thesis will examine how the Resident consolidated his position of influence at Indian 
royal courts, as well as how this process was resisted and negotiated within the Company and 
by Indians at court.  
The development of the Residency system would have a profound impact, both in 
India and around the globe; whether as a model or a cautionary tale, the Indian Residencies 
set a precedent for indirect rule that would inform British policy in Southeast Asia and Africa 
for years to come. Nevertheless, the princely states have been relatively neglected in the 
historiography of the British empire. Their secondary place reflects a scholarly tendency to 
privilege histories of direct rule, thereby obscuring the varied repertoires of power available 
to British agents overseas. While Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher famously popularized 
the idea of ‘informal empires’ and ‘the imperialism of free trade’ in the 1950s, and in so 
doing brought to the fore British influence in places like Argentina and Brazil, the areas 
‘coloured red on the map’ continue to exert a magnetic force on scholarly attention.5 Ann 
Stoler and Lauren Benton have recently issued a call to redress this imbalance, suggesting that 
by focusing on clearly bounded and defined colonial territories historians have downplayed 
political and territorial ambiguity as defining features of imperial intervention in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.6 Building upon the theories of Giorgio Agamben, they 
argue that one of the dominant characteristics of imperialism is its production of, and 
                                                     
5 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The imperialism of free trade’, The Economic History Review, 
6:1 (1953): 1-15.   
6 Ann Laura Stoler, ‘On degrees of imperial sovereignty’, Public Culture, 18:1 (2006): 125-146; 
Lauren Benton, A search for sovereignty: Law and geography in European empires, 1400-1900 
(Cambridge, 2009), p. 2.  
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dependence upon, exceptions: the suspension of rights, deviations from rule of law, and 
political and territorial vagueness.7 In this light, the Company’s ill-defined and asymmetrical 
relationship with nominally independent Indian kingdoms can be seen as setting the example 
for the kind of informal influence so critical to Britain’s position as the dominant world power 
of the nineteenth century.  
Some historians have recognized the princely states as ideal sites for exploring 
changing conceptions of state, sovereignty, and empire, but in addressing these questions they 
have focused almost exclusively on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.8 Rather 
than considering the Residency system in its formative years, historians like Barbara 
Ramusack and Iain Copland begin their analysis with the British empire in India at its peak, 
depicting a period when the forms of Indian political culture were already apparently divested 
of their power and meaning, reduced to empty theatre carefully managed by agents of the 
Company.9 The existing scholarship thus seeks, not to understand how this form of imperial 
influence emerged in the first place, but instead to recover the agency of princes ruling under 
conditions of apparent thraldom. Though Nicholas Dirks argues that ‘[t]he death of the old 
regime came not with the swift slice of the guillotine, but with the slow and blunted chops of 
colonial contradictions,’ this slow and uneven transformation is generally excised from 
historical accounts.10 My aim is to delineate the contested and contingent processes which 
historians have heretofore largely passed over.  
Michael Fisher’s Indirect rule in India: Residents and the Residency system 1764-
1858, in addition to being the most significant and widely cited book on the subject, is also 
the only one to analyse the Residents as a group during this period.11 In it, Fisher outlines, in 
impressive detail, the Residency’s defining features and modes of operation. At the same 
time, Fisher’s monograph is a straightforwardly political and administrative history of the 
Residents, one which identifies broad institutional trends rather than scrutinizing individual 
experiences and accounts. Consequently, Fisher leaves many questions unanswered. By 
                                                     
7 For the influence of Agamben in this field, see Yehouda Shenhav, ‘Imperialism, exceptionalism and 
the contemporary world,’ in Agamben and colonialism, ed. Marcelo Svirsky (Edinburgh, 2012), p. 17-
31. For the Indian context specifically, see Nasser Hussain, The jurisprudence of emergency: 
Colonialism and the rule of law (Ann Arbor, MI, 2003), p. 31-32.  
8 Examples include Barbara Ramusack, The Indian princes and their states (Cambridge, 2004) and her 
The princes of India in the twilight of empire: Dissolution of a patron-client system, 1914-1939 
(Columbus, OH, 1978); Iain Copland, The princes of India in the endgame of empire, 1917-1947 
(Cambridge, 1997); Caroline Keen, Princely India and the British: Political development and the 
operation of empire (London, 2012); Waltraud Ernst and Biswamoy Pati (eds.), India’s princely states: 
People, princes and colonialism (London, 2007).  
9 The most influential expression of this view is Bernard S. Cohn, ‘Representing authority in Victorian 
India’, in The invention of tradition, eds. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge, 1983).  
10 Nicholas Dirks, The hollow crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian kingdom (Cambridge, 1987), p. 404.  
11 Michael H. Fisher, Indirect rule in India: Residents and the Residency system 1764-1858 (Delhi, 
1991).  
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focusing on official negotiation, Fisher’s account omits much of the social and cultural 
content of the Resident’s work, thereby neglecting to engage with questions of encounter and 
exchange. Fisher also draws almost exclusively on official, public correspondence and, in so 
doing, does not consider the possible dissonance between public statements and personal 
interests and convictions, eliding the resentments and uncertainties which Residents rarely 
expressed in public. There are therefore many aspects of the Residency system which remain 
to be elucidated, facets of the Residents’ work and experience which will not only help us 
better understand the nature of imperial influence as it developed at Indian princely courts, 
but will also shed light on the nature of empire, governance, and cross-cultural interactions at 
a formative moment in the history of the British empire.  
The remainder of this introduction will provide essential context for understanding 
the Residents and their work, as well as illustrating how the Residents as a group pose 
interesting questions connected to broader themes in world history. Section 1 will further 
elaborate on the Residency system’s significance within Britain’s expanding empire in India. 
Section 2 will explain how a focus on the Residents helps foreground important tensions 
within the growing imperial administration of the early nineteenth century. Section 3 will 
show how an analysis of the emerging Residency system contributes to a recent efflorescence 
of scholarship on the problems and possibilities of interstate negotiation outside Europe. 
Finally, Section 4 will situate the study of the Residents in relation to a broader interest in 
‘contact zones’ and connected histories, showing how this dissertation builds on existing 
scholarship by placing race, class, gender, and violence at the centre of analysis.  
1. The origins of the Residency system: A vital chapter in a global story  
The Residency as an institution developed in tandem with the Company’s growing 
political predominance in India, and was crucial to the Company’s project of consolidating its 
hold over the subcontinent. In its early years, the Company’s activities were largely restricted 
to its coastal enclaves, and its primary concern was with trade; accordingly, the earliest 
treaties concluded with Indian powers in the 1730s pertained to commercial and maritime 
affairs. By the mid-eighteenth century, the Company enjoyed rights over territory in Bengal, 
Bombay, and Madras; in these places, they collected taxes, administered justice, and raised 
armies. To defend their territorial acquisitions, the Company began to conclude agreements 
with neighbouring states, and posted their first political Residents to the courts of the Mughal 
successor states of Bengal, Awadh, and Hyderabad in 1764. This was part of a ‘ring fence 
policy’ whereby the Company endeavoured to secure its frontiers by using Indian kingdoms 
as buffers against possible attack. In line with this philosophy the Company began to loan the 
use of their troops. The most notorious early instance of this was when Warren Hastings 
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dispatched a subsidiary force to aid Shuja ud-Daula, the Nawab Vizier of Awadh, in his 
expansionary war against the Rohillas in 1773, a war which would figure prominently in 
Hastings’s subsequent impeachment hearings. 12 
These early alliances with Indian powers were broadly agreements between equals, 
treaties of friendship wherein Indian kingdoms were recognised as more or less independent 
political actors. In consequence, the Residents’ activities were generally limited to mediation, 
negotiation, and information-gathering.13 Some Indian powers even requested Residents for 
their capitals, which they viewed as a sign of prestige as well as a valuable channel for 
negotiation with the Company.14 The Company’s representatives were purposely designated 
as Residents rather than ambassadors, a humble office ranking relatively low in the European 
diplomatic hierarchy. This title reflected both the Company’s status as a chartered 
corporation, and the determination of the Directors to sidestep questions of precedence and 
custom and to minimize the cost of ceremonial.15  
The composition of this political line fluctuated significantly over time. Since 
military officers were cheaper to employ and more readily available, at first many of the 
Residents were soldiers who had learned Indian languages in the course of their military 
service.16 With the foundation of Fort William and Haileybury Colleges in 1798 and 1806, 
respectively, the Governor-General-in-Council increasingly preferred to appoint college-
educated bureaucrats, instructed in mathematics, natural philosophy, law, history, political 
economy and the classics, as well as Indian languages, history, and culture.17 Retrenchment in 
the 1820s, however, meant that Residents were thereafter more likely to be military officers.18 
Either way, Residents tended to belong to the aristocracy or the landed gentry, often with 
kinship ties to the Company; they drew on these connections to secure appointments to the 
Residencies, usually starting out as secretaries or assistants.19  
                                                     
12 For the contents of this paragraph see Ramusack, The Indian princes and their states, p. 65.  
13 Though the Resident at Lucknow briefly experimented with more direct administrative intervention 
in 1783, this experiment was deemed a failure and seemed to prove the importance of shoring up 
Indian administrations. Richard Barnett, North India between empires: Awadh, the Mughals, and the 
British 1720-1801 (Berkeley, CA, 1980), p. 218-22.  
14 These included Delhi, Lucknow, Poona, Gohud, Berar, Tanjore, and Gwalior, many of whom also 
sent their own diplomatic agents to the Presidency capitals. Fisher, Indirect rule in India, p. 54-55.  
15 Keen, Princely India and the British, p. 6; Fisher, Indirect rule in India, p. 49. For a discussion of the 
expense and trouble of ceremonial (albeit for the late nineteenth century), see Dick Kooiman, ‘Meeting 
at the threshold, at the edge of the carpet, or somewhere in between? Questions of ceremonial in 
princely India’, IESHR, 40: 3 (2003): 311-333.  
16 For the figure of the ‘gentleman-officer-scholar’, see Douglas Peers, ‘Colonial knowledge and the 
military in India, 1780-1860’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 33:2 (2005): 157.  
17 Fisher, Indirect rule in India, p. 77-81.  
18 C.A. Bayly, Imperial meridian: The British empire and the world 1780-1830 (London, 1989), p. 210.  
19 Ibid., p. 88-89.  
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Over time, the number of Residents posted to local courts, and the scope of their 
activities, expanded. The year 1798, when Richard Wellesley arrived in the subcontinent to 
take up his position as Governor-General, is a watershed in the history of the Company’s 
relations with the major Indian kingdoms and therefore marks the starting point of this 
dissertation. As C. A. Bayly observed, ‘the political theory and practice of the Wellesley 
circle represented the first coherent imperial policy in British Indian history.’20 Significantly, 
Wellesley engaged more intensely with the politics of regional powers, making controversial 
annexations and alliances and eventually leading the Company into a war with the Marathas 
in 1803. While Wellesley’s recall in 1805 constituted something of a renunciation of this 
process on the part of the Court of Directors and Board of Control in London, Wellesley’s 
legacy had a lasting impact, particularly in the political line which he had overseen so 
rigorously; the period 1798 to 1818 roughly encompasses a generation of Residents who spent 
their formative years under Wellesley and were heavily influenced by him.21 While 
Wellesley’s immediate successors in office repudiated his expansionary aspirations, 
Governor-General Marquess Hastings (1813-1823) essentially picked up where Wellesley left 
off. The developments which Wellesley set in motion culminated in 1818 when the East India 
Company defeated the Marathas and their allies, the Pindaris, in the Third Maratha War, 
thereby becoming effectively the undisputed political and military power in the subcontinent.  
Central to Wellesley’s project of political consolidation was the concept of subsidiary 
alliances; according to these treaties, the Company agreed to defend their Indian allies against 
attack by stationing Company troops in their dominions, on the condition that their Indian 
allies financed these troops (whether through subsidies or the lease of productive lands) and 
consulted with the Company on their foreign policy decisions.22 Another stipulation of these 
agreements was the establishment of a political Resident at the courts of the Company’s 
Indian allies. With time, the Resident would increasingly become the exclusive medium for 
political communication between courts, as the Company sought to isolate and divide the 
Indian powers. At the point at which this thesis begins, however, the subsidiary alliance 
system was still in its infancy; its underlying principles and mode of operation were still in 
the process of being worked out, and certain key Indian powers, notably the Marathas, 
remained outside its remit. By 1818, the subsidiary alliance system had brought most of 
central India under the Company’s influence, but only after many years of debate within the 
Company, and resistance on the part of Indians of various backgrounds. It is this contested 
process that this dissertation seeks to unravel.  
                                                     
20 C. A. Bayly, Indian society and the making of the British empire (Cambridge, 1988), p. 81.  
21 Fisher, Indirect rule in India, p. 57.  
22 Keen, Princely India and the British, p. 5.  
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2. Viewing imperial expansion through the eyes of its agents   
The Residents considered in this thesis lived through tumultuous times, and their 
letters and papers, official and unofficial, reveal much about how imperial policies were 
enacted and experienced on the ground. While not strictly biographical, this project does 
cover intimate details relating to the careers of a small group of roughly a dozen men, inspired 
by the ways in which historians of empire have lately used biography as an avenue for 
understanding the lived experiences of people swept up in the currents of historical change.23 
Much of this literature has analysed biographical fragments concerning convicts, captives, 
sailors, slaves, traders, and indentured labourers for an alternative view of empire from 
below.24 Meanwhile, Margot Finn has argued for the value of a biographical approach as a 
means of bringing to the fore the family dynamics which often drove imperial officials to seek 
their fortune overseas in the first place.25 In a related fashion, Emma Rothschild has used the 
thick archive of correspondence between members of a Scottish family called the Johnstones 
to pin down what she terms ‘the inner life of empire’ during the mid-eighteenth century. 
Beginning with a broad overview of the lives of the sisters and brothers, Rothschild situates 
these biographies within a wider imperial context, using them to illustrate the effects of 
changing ideas and geopolitical alignments on the lives of ordinary people. Rothschild’s book 
demonstrates that Enlightenment ideas and debates had tangible effects on individuals who 
were not themselves philosophers.26 Her achievement is to construct a bridge between the 
world of ideas and the lived experience of the people upon whom the operations of empire 
depended.  
Nor were the Residents just witnesses of empire; rather, they actively fashioned it. As 
Michael Fisher so aptly put it, the Residents stood ‘at the cutting edge of British expansion.’27 
They were the ‘central yet slender thread that bound the Indian states to the British 
Government of India,’ men who powerfully shaped the developing relationships between the 
East India Company and what would come to be called the princely states.28 Taking a 
                                                     
23 Natalie Zemon Davis, Trickster travels: A sixteenth-century Muslim between worlds (New York, 
NY, 2006), p. 11-12; Linda Colley, The ordeal of Elizabeth Marsh: How a remarkable woman crossed 
seas and empires to become part of world history (London, 2007), p. 200.  
24 Clare Anderson, Subaltern lives: Biographies of colonialism in the Indian Ocean World, 1790-1920 
(Cambridge, 2012), p. 12-17; Miles Ogborn, Global lives: Britain and the world, 1550-1800 
(Cambridge, 2008), p. 8-14, though Ogborn’s collection covers a range of lives including those of the 
governing elite; Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, empire and the world, 1600-1850 (London, 2002), p. 
12-17.  
25 Margot Finn, ‘Anglo-Indian lives in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries’, Journal for 
Eighteenth-Century Studies, 33:1 (2010): 54.  
26 Emma Rothschild, The inner life of empires: An eighteenth-century history (Princeton, NJ, 2011), p. 
4.  
27 Fisher, Indirect rule in India, p. 29.  
28 Ibid., p. 61.  
 
8 
 
 
prosopographical approach to the Residency system, one can therefore examine how the 
attitudes and dispositions of agents on the ground contributed to broader imperial patterns. 
My interest in individual agency is informed by Frederick Cooper’s warning against narrating 
the history of colonial institutions as though they were ‘agentless abstractions’. Such an 
approach, Cooper argues, obscures the ways in which people confronted the possibilities and 
constraints of particular colonial situations, and acted accordingly.29 I have, furthermore, been 
compelled by Ann Stoler’s invitation to attend to ‘how power shaped the production of 
sentiments and vice versa,’ to ‘dwell in the disquiets, in the antipathies, estrangements, 
yearnings, and resentments that constrained colonial policies and people’s actions’.30 While in 
this instance Stoler was particularly concerned with the constitution and consolidation of 
racial boundaries through attempts to regulate interracial sex and procreation, her proposition 
seems equally relevant to the study of imperial governance more generally. The policies of 
the British East India Company were mediated in large part through the activities of 
individual officials in distant places, and feelings of loss, loneliness, jealousy, or contempt 
informed how these men perceived India as well as how they behaved there.  
On the surface this kind of analysis of the Residents might seem like a ‘history of 
great men’, mirroring the triumphal imperial accounts of the nineteenth century which 
focused on the activities of a select group of elite Europeans. Given that Residents during 
these years were often men distinguished for their knowledge of Indian languages specifically 
and their acuity and learning in general, many influential statesmen did indeed make their 
name in this branch of the Company’s service. Mountstuart Elphinstone and Charles 
Theophilus Metcalfe both worked as Residents before going on to have illustrious imperial 
careers: Mountstuart Elphinstone would become Governor of the Bombay Presidency, while 
Charles Theophilus Metcalfe would have an important advisory role in the administration of 
Governor-General William Bentinck and would later be Governor of Jamaica (1839-1842) 
and Governor-in-Chief of British North America (1843-1845). These men inspired 
nineteenth-century hagiographies and continue to feature prominently in modern histories of 
the British empire in India.31 To quote the nineteenth-century Company historian John 
William Kaye, ‘there are some men who appear to be born ever to be in the thick of the 
world’s action – ever on the great high road of History, pressing forward, with their loins girt 
                                                     
29 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in question: Theory, knowledge, history (Berkeley, CA, 2005), p. 25.  
30 Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal knowledge and imperial power: Race and the intimate in colonial rule 
(Berkeley, CA, 2002), p. 12.  
31 Prominent examples include John William Kaye, The life and correspondence of Charles, Lord 
Metcalfe, 2 vols. (London, 1858); Edward Thompson, The life of Charles, Lord Metcalfe (London, 
1937); T.E. Colebrooke, Life of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone (London, 1884).   
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about.’32 Beyond their practical role in the Company’s expansion, Elphinstone and Metcalfe 
forged a distinctive intellectual legacy; both were leading figures in the ‘conservative 
Orientalist’ school, and Elphinstone’s History of India: The Hindu and Mohametan periods 
(1841) would become stock reading for young Company recruits for decades.33  
Far from adulating the professional and personal qualities of men like Metcalfe and 
Elphinstone, however, this project will examine how these individuals self-consciously 
constructed themselves, in varying ways and multiple theatres, to appear powerful and 
authoritative. Such self-fashioning was a means of securing status and influence both at 
Indian courts as well as in the eyes of the Company’s central administration; it involved far 
from laudable tactics, usually amounting to methodical and systematic attempts to 
disempower and discredit Indian political actors. One important site in which this process of 
self-fashioning played out was in letters, and my reading of the Residents’ correspondence 
will therefore be highly critical, informed by recent scholarship on epistolarity which 
emphasizes the extent to which letter-writing was a performance, ‘an ‘act’ in the theatrical 
sense as well as a ‘speech-act’ in the linguistic.’34 Letters were written with an audience in 
mind; their language and contents were tailored for a purpose. An important consideration for 
letter-writers was the probability that their letter would become public, given that it was 
common practice at the time to forward letters of interest to friends, kin, and colleagues, or to 
read them aloud in company. Even when writing to family in Britain, then, Company men 
might engage in understatement, misrepresentation, or embellishment; Sarah Pearsall, 
describing the correspondence of trans-Atlantic families in the late eighteenth century, argues 
that many letter-writers used emotive and sentimental language as a means of manufacturing 
intimacy with geographically distant friends and family, as well out of a desire to conform to 
the literary and epistolary conventions of the time which emphasized spontaneity and 
sensibility.35 Letters were therefore instruments through which Residents endeavoured to 
represent and thus in a sense produce identities and relationships. Accordingly, this 
dissertation will approach the Residents’ testimony with caution; their activities will be 
dissected and deciphered instead of applauded.  
                                                     
32 John William Kaye, Lives of Indian officers, illustrative of the history of the civil and military 
services of India (London, 1867), p. 235.  
33 Martha McLaren, British India and British Scotland, 1780-1830: Career building, empire building, 
and a Scottish school of thought on Indian governance (Akron, OH, 2001), p. 246.  
34 Bruce Redford, The converse of the pen: Acts of intimacy in the eighteenth-century familiar letter 
(Chicago, 1986), p. 2. Recent studies have emphasized the importance of the familiar letter was a way 
of producing and performing individual identities; see the essays collected in Rebecca Earle (ed.), 
Epistolary selves: Letters and letter-writers, 1600-1945 (Aldershot, 1999).  
35 Sarah Pearsall, Atlantic families lives and letters in the later eighteenth century (Oxford, 2008), p. 
15.  
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It is also important to note that not all the Residents were as professionally successful 
as Elphinstone and Metcalfe. These overachievers were outnumbered in the political line by 
men who inspired controversy or dispute, men who earned the disapprobation of the central 
administration, and, of course, men who merely seem to have plodded along unremarked. 
Some of these Residents, viewed from Calcutta, were disturbingly or frustratingly blind to the 
imperatives of civilised society; they were men who could not negotiate the paradoxes of the 
British empire in India, men who arrogated power to themselves at the expense of the 
Company’s interests. The Residency records are replete with stories of failure and mediocrity, 
nor were apparent success stories like Elphinstone and Metcalfe exempt from these strains, as 
their letters and diaries make plain. These pragmatic difficulties, though particularly acute in 
the political line, reflect the broader problems confronting the Company as a whole. The 
Residents’ experiences speak powerfully to the ways in which large-scale changes, 
disruptions, and ideological tensions produced practical as well as conceptual dilemmas. They 
remind us that the Residencies were in fact arenas in which struggles for power and status 
unfolded, though how exactly the Resident was meant to establish and express his authority 
was far from clear and therefore apt to be misjudged.  
Some of the most heated debates of this kind centred around the extent to which the 
Company’s representatives should assimilate into Indian political culture, reflecting broader 
anxieties about imperial governance and transculturation. On the one hand, Residents and 
their superiors believed, to varying degrees, that it was important to express political power in 
ways that would be intelligible to the surrounding population and that resonated with Indian 
ideas about political legitimacy. On the other, the Residents’ superiors feared that the 
adoption of certain purportedly Indian styles of rule would have a corrosive effect on their 
imperial agents, as well as potentially undermining the reputation for British moral probity 
and rule of law which they desired to cultivate in India. The Residents were thus put in a 
double-bind. To establish themselves at Indian courts they had to engage, to some extent, with 
Indian political culture; in so doing, however, they threatened to subvert the carefully 
constructed differences, between ‘civilized’ Britons and barbarous Indians, upon which the 
legitimacy of the British East India Company’s administration was believed to rest. Because 
of this paradox, Residents were in regular disagreement with their superiors about issues 
ranging from the purchase of gifts to corporal punishment. A general feature of modern 
imperial administrations was the endeavour to construct distinctions between colonised and 
colonising populations to bolster imperial rule.36 Through the Residents, we can see not only 
how fragile but how contested that rule of colonial difference was.  
                                                     
36 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in world history: Power and the politics of difference 
(Princeton, NJ, 2010), p. 12.  
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The tensions which erupted within the political line were also symptomatic of the 
problems associated with an expanding empire. Suspicions about the corruptibility of the 
Resident’s character were intensified by the geographical distance separating the Residencies 
from the scrutiny of government headquarters in Calcutta. As Duncan Bell has observed, from 
the perspective of nineteenth-century commentators the problem of distance inhered, not 
simply in the practical, administrative difficulties posed by travel and communication, but 
also the attenuation of crucial bonds of loyalty and citizenship.37 Meanwhile, The Residents 
resented the feeling of labouring away in obscurity. Though Residents were closely bound up 
with the government in their capacity as diplomatic representatives, they nevertheless tended 
to regard the Company’s central administration with a measure of acrimony, perceiving it as a 
distant entity from which one could expect little support or recognition. Geographical distance 
vested the Residents with significant discretionary power, but this power was double-edged; 
while Residents had the independence to act according to their interests, they were easily 
scapegoated if problems emerged at the court where they were stationed. It has become a 
truism that the Court of Directors had little knowledge or control over the management of 
empire in the everyday sense, and historians increasingly emphasize the distance between the 
Company official on the ground and the Governor-General ensconced in his offices in 
Calcutta.38 Given their political significance the Residents exemplify in perhaps their most 
acute form the consequences which geographical distance could have, and the distrust and 
suspicion which it could generate. Through the Residents, then, we can probe an important 
division running through the Company’s operations.  
These problems intersected with concerns about good governance and administrative 
efficacy which were attracting growing attention in Europe during the period under study. 
Beginning in the late eighteenth century, as historian Philip Harling has pointed out, a series 
of small reforms combined to create a concerted push for greater accountability and 
transparency in the British civil service.39 Although government critics of the time accused 
Pitt the Younger and his followers of exploiting the wartime context to raise taxes as a means 
of funnelling money into the pockets of office-holders and government administrators, 
historians have since suggested that the Pitt administration made tentative steps towards 
abolishing sinecures and regulating the profits of office, introducing salaries in place of fees 
                                                     
37 Duncan S.A. Bell, ‘Dissolving distance: Technology, space, and empire in British political thought, 
1770-1900’, The Journal of Modern History, 77:3 (2005): 531-2.  
38 H.V. Bowen, The business of empire: The East India Company and imperial Britain, 1756-1833 
(Cambridge, 2006), p. 180; Martin Moir, ‘Khagazi Raj: Notes on the documentary basis of Company 
rule, 1773-1858’, Indo-British Review, 21 (1993): 185-93.  
39 Philip Harling, The waning of ‘Old Corruption’: The politics of economical reform in Britain, 1779-
1846 (Oxford, 1996), p. 22.  
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in an attempt to discourage exploitative activities on the part of government officials.40  Under 
Pitt, government departments were reorganized and more rigorous standards of proficiency 
were applied to government officials.41 This is part of what historian Peter Jupp has identified 
as an emergent professional ethic, a trend which gained momentum following the Napoleonic 
Wars.42 A position in the civil service was beginning to be considered as a public trust, rather 
than personal property; in principle, official activity was increasingly dissociated from private 
life, and public money and business assets were being more sharply distinguished from 
private wealth.43  
This push for accountability and merit was equally visible within the East India 
Company, manifested, for instance, in the foundation of colleges in Calcutta and 
Hertfordshire.44 The Residents too were affected by this larger pattern, their expenses subject 
to the harsh scrutiny of the public auditor, their every act rigorously recorded in writing (or so 
they claimed) and dispatched to their superiors in Calcutta. Yet administrators in Calcutta had 
reason to fear that the Residents were not respecting the line between public and private as 
they ought to have done, and indeed within the Company at large the distinction between 
public and private domains, though acknowledged, was uncertain and contested. After all, 
most men in the Company’s service were bound together through ties of blood and friendship, 
and were liable to use these connections for personal and professional advancement. There 
was likewise a long tradition within the Company of officials using their public positions to 
secure private emolument, and the Residents were particularly suspect in this regard given 
their geographical distance from administrative centres, and their proximity to wealthy Indian 
elites.45 Recurring controversies within the political line suggest that this messy 
interpenetration of private and public life was recognized to be a critical problem without an 
easy solution. Through the Residents, then, we can consider issues which might be classed as 
the growing pains of an expanding, modernizing empire; doubts relating to the uncertain 
boundary dividing colonizer and colonized, the burgeoning geographical distance separating 
the agents of empire from centres of calculation and control, and, finally, the blurred line 
between public servant and private individual.  
                                                     
40 Philip Harling, ‘Rethinking “Old Corruption”’, P&P, 147 (1995): 131.  
41 Michael J. Turner, British politics in an age of reform (Manchester, 1999), p. 38. 
42 Peter Jupp, ‘The landed elite and political authority in Britain, ca. 1760-1850’, JBS, 29:1 (1990): 64. 
See also Philip Harling and Peter Mandler, ‘From “fiscal-military” state to laissez-faire state, 1760-
1850’, JBS, 32:1 (1993): 54-55.  
43 For a general account of this trend see Boyd Hilton, A mad, bad, and dangerous people? England 
1783-1846 (Oxford, 2006), p. 120-124.  
44 Callie Wilkinson, ‘The East India College debate and the fashioning of imperial officials, 1806-
1858’, HJ, forthcoming (DOI: http://doi.org/10/1017/S0018246X16000492), p. 6.   
45 For corruption in the Company in the eighteenth century, see Travers, Ideology and empire, p. 211; 
Bowen, The business of empire, p. 182.  
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3. Diplomatic culture beyond treaty-making and courtly ceremonial 
 Although Residents embody broad patterns evident in other parts of the Company’s 
service, they were also subject to unique pressures and expectations because of their place at 
court. Comparisons with diplomats can therefore help to elucidate certain aspects of the 
Residents’ experiences. Although the Resident’s role was not that of an ambassador in the 
traditional sense, the two shared certain important features in common: both had a 
representative function, and both were situated at an interstitial position between cultures. In 
the diplomatic service, the lines between private and public could become even more 
contested than in other branches of the civil service, since the diplomatic representative was 
in a sense supposed to physically embody the state, meaning that his appearance and 
behaviour were politically charged. The distinction between public and private in the 
diplomatic service was especially blurred in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
when diplomacy was still in an uneven state of professionalization, and played out in royal 
courts rather than government offices. 46 Moreover, while it is precisely the diplomat’s role to 
link two states, this in-between position could expose the diplomat to scrutiny and suspicion 
on both sides, since his attachment to one or the other was in doubt.47 Fears of ‘going native’ 
applied to diplomats as much as to imperial officials, as the model of resident diplomacy 
developed into a global phenomenon in the early nineteenth century.48  
These underlying tensions at the heart of diplomatic practice have received renewed 
attention by historians in recent years in the form of what some commentators have dubbed 
‘New Diplomatic History’. This approach is interdisciplinary in ideas and methods, as history, 
anthropology, and international relations studies converge to bring to the fore previously 
neglected or taken-for-granted aspects of international diplomacy. One of the dominant 
features of this new approach is a broadening of the definition of diplomacy to encompass a 
range of activities through which contemporaries attempted to mediate and persuade; in so 
doing, many of these studies emphasize the interventions of unofficial actors, bringing the 
role of merchants, sailors, and border populations into view.49 Also characteristic is a 
conscious attention to the practice and process of diplomacy, focusing less on the principles 
enshrined in texts and treaties and more on the norms and conventions enacted on the ground. 
                                                     
46 D.B. Horn, The British diplomatic service 1689-1789 (Oxford, 1961), p. 12; Keith Hamilton and 
Richard Langhorne, The practice of diplomacy: Its evolution, theory, and administration (London, 
2010), p. 2.  
47 Noé Cornago, Plural diplomacies: Normative predicaments and functional imperatives (Leiden, 
2013), p. 31; 28.  
48 Markus Mosslang and Torsten Riotte (eds.), The diplomat’s world: A cultural history of diplomacy, 
1815-1914 (Oxford, 2008), p. 4.  
49 For current state of the field, see special issue on ‘Everyday diplomacy’ in The Cambridge Journal of 
Anthropology, 34:2 (2016). 
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Iver B. Neumann, a theorist of international relations with practical experience in diplomacy, 
has been particularly influential in calling attention to the institutionalized practices which 
make up international relations.50 In history, the definitive figure is probably Daniela Frigo, 
particularly in her edited collection of essays, Politics and diplomacy in early modern Italy: 
The structure of diplomatic practice, 1450-1800.51 
 The field has experienced an additional jolt of rejuvenation as students of global 
history have begun to recognize the attractiveness of diplomacy as a site for studying cross-
cultural interactions. Rejecting the notion prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s that diplomacy 
occurred within a mutually agreed and universally understood intellectual and cultural 
framework, anthropologists and global historians have become increasingly attentive to the 
ways in which diplomatic ideas and practices varied across space and time. Far from arguing 
for any kind of cultural incommensurability, historians working in this vein have emphasized 
how even in contexts where different diplomatic traditions appeared to be in conflict, 
diplomatic agents on both sides of the encounter often managed to make themselves 
understood and to negotiate and forge lasting relationships. A well-known instance of this 
approach is Christian Windler’s study of changing Franco-Tunisian relations from the Ancien 
Régime to the Restoration, a history which emphasizes how Christians and Muslims 
developed a common diplomatic culture during a revolutionary century. 52 Accounts of 
diplomatic mediation across religious and linguistic lines are particularly prevalent in 
scholarship on the Mediterranean, but the appeal of this kind of project has resonated with 
early modernists more generally, who focus on the development of diplomatic norms and 
conventions during an age of exploration and intensifying global contacts and connections.53 
In the Indian context, this is reflected in the preponderance of work on the mission of Sir 
Thomas Roe, the first English ambassador to the Mughal Emperor.54 
                                                     
50 Iver B. Neumann, ‘Returning practice to the linguistic turn: The case of diplomacy’, Millenium: 
Journal of International Studies, 31:1 (2002): 651; Iver B. Neumann, At home with the diplomats: 
Inside a European foreign ministry (Ithaca, NY, 2012), p. 2.  
51 Daniela Frigo, ed., Politics and diplomacy in early modern Italy: The structure of diplomatic 
practice, 1450-1800, trans. Adrian Belton (Cambridge, 2009), p. 6.  
52 Christian Windler, La diplomatie comme experience de l’autre: Consuls français au Maghreb (1700-
1840) (Genève, 2002). See also his article, ‘Diplomatic history as a field for cultural analysis: Muslim-
Christian Relations in Tunis, 1700-1840’, HJ, 44:1 (2001): 79-106.  
53 See for example essays collected in special issue on ‘Diplomacy and cultural translation in the early 
modern world’, Journal of Early Modern History, 20:4 (2016).  
54 Recent studies include Colin Paul Mitchell, Sir Thomas Roe and the Mughal Empire (Karachi, 
2000); Mehreen M. Chida-Razvi, ‘The perception of reception: The importance of Sir Thomas Roe at 
the Mughal court of Jahangir’, Journal of World History, 25:2/3 (2014): 263-285; Rupali Mishra, 
‘Diplomacy at the edge: Split interests in the Roe embassy to the Mughal court’, Journal of British 
Studies, 53:1 (2014): 5-29.  
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My project applies many of the insights of the New Diplomatic History to the study 
of the Residency system, but seeks to improve on the existing scholarship by transcending a 
widespread fixation on courtly ceremonial.55 Historians of diplomacy have perhaps 
understandably been drawn to the performative aspect of diplomatic ceremonies and civilities; 
as de Wicquefort pointed out in his famous diplomatic manual, ‘There is not a more 
illustrious Theatre than a Court; neither is there any Comedy, where the Actors seem less 
what they are in effect, than Embassadors do in their Negotiation’.56 This interest in ritual 
encounters, particularly gift-giving, is well established in Indian historiography, to the point 
that it has tended to obscure other aspects of the Residents’ work. The vibrancy of this field of 
research is probably traceable to the influence of Bernard Cohn, who famously brought his 
anthropological training to bear in an essay concerning British appropriations of Indian court 
ceremonial and gift-giving as a means of constructing and representing British authority in 
India.57 Cohn’s ruminations have inspired a spate of work which reflects on the minute 
aspects of ceremonial as a barometer for relations between the Company and the Indian state, 
for instance whether the Resident removed his shoes in the royal presence, or whether the 
ruler rose to embrace him in court.58  
Yet, by focusing on brief encounters circumscribed in space and time, these historians 
have produced a somewhat myopic picture of Residency life. For one thing, they reduce ritual 
encounters to a bilateral interaction between Resident and ruler, even though these forms of 
ceremonial and display were at the center of vitriolic and long-running debates which pitted 
Company employees against each other, as Chapter 3 will illustrate. Even more seriously, by 
emphasizing the theatrical, the existing scholarship misrepresents the practical work which 
Residents were expected to do. While the etiquette which developed at Indian courts and 
Residencies might present an interesting example of creative cultural fusion, it is important 
not to let the Residents’ practical function slip into the background.59 Residents did devote a 
great deal of energy to orchestrating ritual performances (thereby attesting to their political 
importance), but the bulk of the Residents’ time was nevertheless spent seated at their desks 
with a pen in hand. Many Residents made only occasional appearances in open court; they 
                                                     
55 Examples of recent studies in this vein include Maija Jansson, ‘Measured reciprocity: English 
ambassadorial gift exchange in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’, Journal of Early Modern 
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56 Abraham de Wicquefort, The embassador and his functions (London, 1716), p. 294.  
57 Cohn, ‘Representing authority in Victorian India,’ p. 623.  
58 Kooiman, ‘Meeting at the threshold,’ p. 311. See also the special issue on ‘Civil ritual in India’, 
MAS, 24:3 (1990) on royal ceremonial and Indian princely states.   
59 David Reynolds, ‘International history, the cultural turn and the diplomatic twitch’, Cultural and 
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spent far more time with their Indian scribes and secretaries than they did with the ruler or his 
ministers. This is where we can locate meaningful exchange and knowledge production, and 
begin to consider the nature and effects of cross-cultural encounter, as my examination of 
Indian state secretaries in Chapter 4 will show. The objective of this thesis is thus to strip 
away some of the allure of the Residencies, to penetrate past the lavish exteriors of their 
palatial courts and the decorous, ceremonial forms and practices which Residents adopted to 
get at the heart of the Resident’s work. This work involved espionage, patronage, war, and 
coercion as much as it did spectacle. 
Finally, while much of the new cultural history of diplomacy delights in explicating 
how seemingly intractable cultural differences were bridged, the Anglo-Indian political 
encounter is perhaps just as interesting for commonalities as it is for differences. Although 
there were important distinctions between British and Indian political culture in the early 
nineteenth century which this dissertation will elucidate, there were also aspects of Indian 
courtly etiquette, patronage and service relationships, and gender and the family which 
aligned with British habits and assumptions. Contemporaries tended to remark more on the 
contrasts and compromises than on the concordances, seemingly because many of the things 
that Britons and Indians had in common were also things that were taken for granted or 
assumed to be natural on both sides; yet these commonalities provided a foundation upon 
which understandings and agreements could be reached. Residents often drew stark 
oppositions between British and Indian society, but their assertions on this point should be 
read critically. In so doing, these men were effectively engaging in what legal historian 
Anthony Anghie has termed the ‘dynamic of difference’, the ‘process of creating a gap 
between two cultures, demarcating one as universal and civilized, and the other as particular 
and uncivilized’.60 Rather than necessarily taking the Resident at their word, this thesis makes 
its own comparisons to better contextualize the dynamic process of mutual interaction and 
exchange which took place. In this respect, my project is inspired by ‘histoire croisée’, which 
emphasizes the creative, changeable and sometimes asymmetrical nature of processes of 
intersection.61  
4. Cultural borderlands and the space between resistance and collaboration  
Given their position at the interstices of British and Indian society, the Residents are 
indeed alluring sites for historians interested in transfers, contact zones, and entangled 
histories. The Residents were generally learned and liberal men, familiar with Indian 
                                                     
60 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, sovereignty, and the making of international law (Cambridge, 2004), p. 
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61 Michael Werner and Benedicte Zimmerman, ‘Beyond comparison: Histoire croisée and the challenge 
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languages, whose job required them to immerse themselves to an almost unmatched extent in 
the swirling currents of courtly life. They partook of the traditional, symbolic exchanges 
which formed an essential part of Mughal ritual, offering nazr (gold coins, the presentation of 
which symbolised a recognition of the ruler as the source of all wealth) and accepting khilat 
(ceremonial clothes which symbolically incorporated the recipient into the body of the 
monarch).62 Residents chewed paan (a psychoactive combination of betel leaf and areca nut) 
and were christened with attar of roses. They smoked hookah and attended nautch dances. In 
a context in which interracial liaisons were increasingly discouraged by the Company 
administration, some Residents had zenanas of their own and some even took native wives.63  
Residents not only dined with the Indian elite, they employed an army of Indian servants and 
worked in close collaboration with Indian scribes, secretaries, and ministers. On the surface, 
at least, the Residencies were thus oases which, for a time anyway, escaped what Sudipta Sen 
has characterised as the growing social and political distance separating Britons from Indians 
during this period.64   
 In consequence, the most well-known scholarship on the Residencies tends to 
romanticize them as sites of cultural intersection and fusion, as hybrid spaces on the margins 
of British India. In White Mughals: Love and betrayal in eighteenth-century India, William 
Dalrymple depicts these native courts as ‘the borderlands of colonial India’, as ‘spaces where 
categories of identity, ideas of national loyalty and relations of power were often flexible, and 
where the possibilities for self-transformation were, at least potentially, limitless.’65 This 
language is echoed in Maya Jasanoff’s study of imperial collectors, Edge of empire: Lives, 
culture, and conquest in the East, 1750-1850, where Lucknow is portrayed as a city which 
furnished its inhabitants with ‘genuinely multicultural possibilities’, offering ‘the promise of 
reinvention in its cosmopolitan embrace’. According to Jasanoff, ‘who you were, with whom 
you associated, and how you wanted to live were not either-or choices. You could bridge the 
boundaries.’66 As the wording of the preceding quotes suggests, this strain of historiography 
resonates with a postmodern intellectual tradition which uses the concept of border in a 
metaphorical sense to highlight the juxtaposition of cultures in particular places, tending to 
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64 Sudipta Sen, Distant sovereignty: National imperialism and the origins of British India (New York, 
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p. 16.  
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represent such spaces as ‘zone[s] of cultural play and experimentation’.67 Dalrymple and 
Jasanoff’s contributions have also served to reinforce a vision of the eighteenth-century as a 
golden age of cross-cultural harmony, an argument which derives its force from the historical 
commonplace that eighteenth-century understandings of human difference were more fluid 
and contextual than nineteenth- and twentieth-century conceptions of race.68  
Both Dalrymple and Jasanoff explicitly presented their projects as attempts to unearth 
historical connections which suggested the possibility of mutual respect and exchange.69 
Taking exchange as a starting point rather than as a conclusion, I will build on Dalrymple and 
Jasanoff’s accounts by exploring how exchange was structured along asymmetric lines of 
race, gender, and class. In so doing, this dissertation muddies the dichotomies which are 
sometimes constructed around notions of ‘collaboration’ and ‘resistance’, and critically 
reflects on the concepts of agency and selfhood which are sometimes applied to 
understanding imperial encounters. The Subaltern Studies group probably represents in its 
most acute form the desire on the part of historians of India to give agency to previously 
marginalized populations of peasants and workers, and to emphasize resistance over 
collaboration (as Ranajit Guha framed it in his scholarly intervention, Dominance without 
hegemony: History and power in colonial India).70 Although my thesis does aim to bring to 
light significant acts of defiance which have previously been elided (including open revolt), I 
do not think that ‘collaboration’ and ‘resistance’ can be so easily disentangled. As Walter 
Johnson observed with regards to the role of agency in historical scholarship on slavery, the 
very notion rests on a liberal conception of selfhood, premised on independence and choice, 
which is far from a historical constant.71 Even with respect to ostensibly free, modern citizens, 
Lauren Berlant has argued that ‘in the scene of slow death, a condition of being worn out by 
the activity of reproducing life, agency can be an activity of maintenance, not making’; 
Berlant suggests the term ‘lateral agency’ to encompass how, under conditions of duress, 
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people might seek simply to survive rather than acting in a ‘life-building way – the way that 
liberal subjects are supposed to.’72 By applying these insights to the activities of Indians of 
various backgrounds at court, I will seek to remain sensitive to the changing circumstances 
which conditioned their actions relative to British imperial agents, recognizing that these 
cross-cultural relationships were sometimes points of pragmatism or exigency rather than free 
choice.  
However partial or contingent their commitment to the Company might have been, 
without the support and assistance of Indian administrators and political elites the Resident 
would have struggled to navigate the rocky shoals of courtly politics. Given their reliance on 
Indian state secretaries, the Residents are an especially useful source for addressing a major 
point of contestation within the field of world history, the role of cultural intermediaries in 
imperial administration and the construction of colonial knowledge. Edward Said famously 
described European scholarship on the Orient as a form of power; by constructing the Orient 
in particular ways, by claiming to know it, Western Europeans thereby claimed their right to 
speak for the Orient and indeed to rule it.73 In an Indian context, historians like Bernard Cohn, 
Lata Mani, and Nicholas Dirks have likewise portrayed colonial knowledge as an imposition 
and a form of control.74 This historiography has been criticized, however, for obscuring the 
crucial role played by intermediaries, whose essential services as translators and interpreters 
in many cases made the colonial knowledge-making project possible.75 This revisionist strand 
of scholarship, which presents colonial knowledge as a product of Anglo-Indian dialogue, has 
in its turn been criticized for underrating the ways in which non-European agency was limited 
in an imperial context.76 Historians continue to pursue a more refined understanding of the 
interaction between colonizers and colonized in imperial settings, increasingly approaching 
empire as a ‘shared but differentiated space’.77 Still, the precise nature of that differentiation, 
namely, the power dynamic framing the encounters between British officials and Indian 
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intermediaries, remains inadequately analyzed. Historians such as Michael Dodson and Kapil 
Raj have elucidated the ways in which Indian experts shaped British knowledge about and 
engagement with India, whether in Oriental studies or in the realm of the law, but their 
interest lies primarily in the intellectual implications of these exchanges. Rarely have 
historians addressed the pragmatics of Anglo-Indian superordinate-subordinate relationships, 
for instance, the strategies munshis might have used to secure their position or lay claim to the 
perks of the job, and the obstacles they encountered in so doing.78  
The Residents are also a useful avenue for contributing to a rich vein in the history of 
cross-cultural encounters focused on the role of women and the influence of conflicting 
gender constructs. On an abstract level, Nancy Shoemaker argued that in the North American 
context at least gendered language and gendered metaphors provided a baseline of shared 
assumptions enabling Europeans and indigenous peoples to negotiate.79 In a similar vein, in a 
volume specifically focused on Native American women’s role as ‘negotiators of change’, 
Kathleen M. Brown introduced the influential concept of ‘gender frontier’ to describe how 
culturally-specific gender constructs shaped the interactions of Europeans and Native 
Americans and their perceptions of each other.80 Practically speaking, indigenous women who 
cohabitated with European men have also been identified as important cultural brokers who 
passed on crucial knowledge and facilitated communication and social integration.81 In the 
Indian context, Durba Ghosh has suggested that the cohabitation of British men and native 
women was central to the operation of the British East India Company’s empire.82 Yet, 
analyses of the Company’s relations with independent Indian kingdoms have neglected how 
evolving forms of indirect rule were shaped by the agency of elite women and the 
confrontation of British and Indian gender constructs. This thesis will shed new light on the 
Company’s imperial expansion by highlighting the role of royal women in abetting, 
exploiting, or resisting the Company’s political incursions at Indian courts. 
5. Methods and sources  
Rather than constructing a broad chronological narrative, this dissertation hones in on 
a brief, coherent, and historically significant unit of time when some of the most important 
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subsidiary alliances were concluded.83 The aim is not only to paint a richer and more nuanced 
portrait of the British Residencies at a crucial juncture, but also to identify and explicate the 
tactics which made up the emergent forms of imperial influence at Indian courts. Rather than 
trying to construct an ideal type or identify a paradigmatic example of how a Resident thought 
and behaved, this dissertation recaptures the messy and experimental nature of early attempts 
to consolidate the Company’s political predominance. Although certain broad patterns did 
apply to the Residents as a group, this dissertation does not shy away from idiosyncrasies. 
Instead, it uses them to illustrate the spectrum of possibilities available at this protean moment 
in the history of the Company’s diplomatic line.  
The Indian princely states numbered into the hundreds, but this dissertation will focus 
more specifically on the Residents stationed at the major Indian courts of Hyderabad, Awadh 
(capital city Lucknow), Delhi, and Travancore (capital city Trivandrum), in addition to the 
Maratha courts at Poona and Nagpur, and the itinerant court of the Maratha chieftain Sindhia 
(nominally based in Gwalior and Ujjain). These Indian states differed from one another in 
important ways; most obviously, they had different relationships with the Company resulting 
in varying levels of intervention by the Resident. At one extreme, the Resident at Delhi 
effectively ruled in the Mughal Emperor’s stead following the Company’s occupation of the 
city in 1803, and was accordingly charged with a range of responsibilities over neighbouring 
districts which other Residents did not have.84 At the other end of the spectrum, the Residents 
attached to Sindhia and the Rajah of Berar were essentially ambassadors with little influence 
over state administration, since neither Sindhia nor the Rajah were then bound to the 
Company through subsidiary alliances.85  
Other factors also distinguished the Residents’ experiences at different courts. In 
addition to their varying relations with the Company, courts differed greatly in terms of 
accessibility. Delhi, Lucknow, and Poona were well-connected, popular with tourists, and had 
large European populations, while Nagpur was notoriously isolated; the Resident at Nagpur 
could go years at a time without receiving a single European visitor, while the Resident at 
Delhi was burdened with the heavy cost of providing hospitality to the many European 
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inhabitants and travellers through his city.86 As Charles Metcalfe explained it, ‘the Residency 
at Nagpoor is out of the circle of European Society. The table to be kept is rarely for more 
than the Resident’s family, four or five in number,’ whereas ‘the Table at the Residency of 
Delhi, which is in the midst of a large European society looking up to the Resident as the 
Representative of Government, must be calculated with a view to the frequent entertainment 
of sixty or a hundred persons or as many as the house will hold.’87 Another difference which 
was much remarked on at the time was in the degree of formality and ceremonial expected by 
individual rulers. The Marathas were described approvingly as plain-spoken and pragmatic, 
little inclined to excess; Raghoji Bhonsla was particularly notorious for treating the members 
of his court with ‘rustic familiarity’.88 The Mughal capitals, on the other hand, especially 
Delhi and Hyderabad, were often described as arduous postings for the Residents, who were 
required to make frequent appearances in open darbar. Mountstuart Elphinstone dreaded 
being stationed at either of these courts, complaining that ‘half one’s life there would be spent 
in idle & unpleasant ceremonies’, which was ‘more than any ordinary temper could bear’.89  
Though the courts described in this dissertation were unique in many respects, it is 
nevertheless worth considering them together because both British and Indian contemporaries 
explicitly made these connections and comparisons at the time. All the courts discussed in this 
dissertation were bound together through the exchange of ambassadors, spies, newsletters, 
and correspondence, as Chapter 1 will show. The Indian political elite were highly attuned to 
developments at different royal centres, and these developments informed their strategizing. 
The Company, for their part, were conscious of the scrutiny they were under and the ripple 
effect that could ensue because of shifts in practice or policy at a single court. This was 
particularly true of the Maratha courts, whose historical relationships with one another, 
frequently tense but always close, were a recurring source of disquiet to the Company who 
sought ceaselessly to divide them. Just as importantly, Residents themselves regularly moved 
between courts during their careers, and their transience makes it necessary to take a broader 
view in order to understand the experiences and attitudes they brought to bear on their work 
as Company representatives.90 For, although Residents explicitly recognized the 
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idiosyncrasies of different courts, they nevertheless considered the Residencies to form part of 
a system which spanned the subcontinent.  
Even where significant cultural differences would seem to create sharp distinctions 
between kingdoms, for instance whether they were Hindu or Muslim, in practice the courts 
discussed in this dissertation had much in common. Eighteenth-century Indian polities tended 
to be religiously eclectic and inclusive, actively supporting a diverse array of religious 
practices and institutions.91 Although the Marathas were a loose confederacy of Hindu powers 
which emerged in opposition to the Muslim Mughal Emperor, in the process they 
appropriated many of the central features of Mughal ceremonial and bureaucracy. The 
outward manifestations of royal legitimacy, for instance the exchange of ceremonial robes, 
were practiced across religious lines by former officers of the Mughal Emperor as well as by 
the Marathas.92 And although Marathi was the language of balladry, story-telling, and 
conversation at Maratha courts, Persian predominated as the language of politics and 
interstate diplomacy, meaning that these courts were also important sites of patronage and 
employment for the Persianized scribal elite.93 The Malayalam-speaking Hindu court at 
Travancore, being further south, did not operate in the Mughal idiom to the same extent; still, 
Travancore, too, was part of this wider network of intelligence and exchange.94 As Susan 
Bayly has argued, too often the history of Kerala is considered in isolation from developments 
in the rest of India when in fact Travancore was a conquest state comparable to the Marathas, 
and subject to many of the same pressures as the kingdoms to the north.95 For the purposes of 
this dissertation, the dynamics between Resident, ruler, and minister at Travancore were so 
like the patterns which emerged at other courts that Travancore ought rightly to be considered 
as part of this broader story. By treating these various courts within a single analytical frame, 
this dissertation thus recognizes and elaborates on their connected history.  
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The main sources for this project are the letters and papers of the Residents 
themselves, both official and unofficial, as well as the orders and instructions issued by the 
Court of Directors in London and the Governor-General-in-Council in Calcutta. Although the 
Residents did on occasion correspond with the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, these 
Presidencies will not figure prominently in this dissertation. In their infancy, the Residencies 
were indeed subject to jurisdictional disputes between the competing governments who 
sought to exert control over neighbouring states. By the late eighteenth century, however, 
Governors-General like Richard Wellesley had effectively stamped out these challenges to 
their authority, and it was therefore unquestionably to Calcutta that the Residents looked for 
instructions and support.96  
In addition to the Residents’ correspondence, another important source for this 
project, which raises unique problems of its own, are the petitions which the Residents 
received from Indians at court. As is characteristic of the form, these petitions were written in 
deferential language, with the aim of convincing; they are intrinsically argumentative, and 
need to be read as such.97 There is, moreover, a long tradition of petitioning in India, meaning 
that the language of these petitions was to some degree formulaic; it is also worth considering 
that the petitions attributed to royal family members were probably written by scribes, whose 
influence over the finished text is difficult to determine.98 Even so, these petitions are 
revealing of how different Indian actors viewed the Company, and the possible opportunities 
they thought the Resident might represent. Through them, we can get a sense of how Indians 
at court sought to bend the Residency system to their will, and why, as Chapters 4 and 5 will 
illustrate in greater depth.   
Prescriptive literature will also be used to contextualize the Residents’ statements and 
activities. Though by its very nature prescriptive literature often reflects an ideal rather than a 
reality, it can nevertheless help us reconstruct the prevailing assumptions and models for 
appropriate behaviour which framed the Residents’ actions. There were a few conduct books 
for Company officials which were widely read during this period and which will be consulted 
throughout this dissertation, but even more important are legal treatises and diplomatic 
manuals.99 The eighteenth century witnessed the development of a widespread and relatively 
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homogeneous diplomatic culture.100 Whether or not the Residents actually read the classic 
manuals by Wicquefort, de Callières, Pecquet, or von Martens (there is clear evidence that 
some of them did), the ideas contained in these texts were so widespread that they doubtless 
informed the way in which Residents and their contemporaries thought about interstate 
relations and diplomatic practice.101 At the same time, by reading Residency archives 
alongside legal treatises and diplomatic manuals, we see the ways in which Residents 
deviated from diplomatic norms. These deviations help us to understand what was unique 
about the Residency system, suggesting how the Company’s developing imperial influence at 
Indian courts diverged from European precedents.   
6. Summary 
The chapters are organized thematically, focusing on the key strategies through which 
Residents sought to establish and consolidate a position of influence at court, and the 
obstacles which they confronted in so doing. Throughout, the dissertation will highlight 
divisions within the Company as well as tensions which emerged between the Residents and 
the court. The first chapter will focus on the collection and circulation of political 
intelligence, examining how the Residents managed the flow of letters between political 
centres and the gossip spreading through royal capitals. In response to the activities of 
political factions and other hostile parties who forged letters and spread misinformation, the 
Residents developed sophisticated strategies for controlling how news was disseminated and 
interpreted. Similarly refined methods were employed for framing and representing events at 
court to the Governor-General-in-Council in Calcutta. Yet, as the chapter will show, even the 
Residents’ best efforts in this arena were insufficient to repress suspicion, speculation, and 
secret correspondence within and between Indian courts, while the Governor-General, too, 
had reason to fear that the Residents’ carefully composed letters concealed a rather murkier 
reality.  
These themes of suspicion and distrust are further explored in Chapter 2, which 
discusses the role of violence in the emergent practice of indirect rule. Despite their role as 
diplomats, the Residents often doubted the effectiveness of political solutions compared to the 
use of physical force. This chapter will explain these convictions by situating them within 
                                                     
100 Hamish Scott, ‘Diplomatic culture in old regime Europe’, in Cultures of power in Europe during the 
long eighteenth century, eds. Hamish Scott and Brendan Simms (Cambridge, 2007), p. 59.  
101 For a description of the Residents’ libraries, see Richard Jenkins to Thomas Sydenham, 12 May 
1810, Letter books of Sir Richard Jenkins, Mss Eur E111, OIOC, p. 106-107. Important texts which 
will feature in this dissertation include: Abraham de Wicquefort, The embassador and his functions, 
trans. John Digby (London, 1716); François de Callières, The art of diplomacy, ed. Maurice Keens-
Soper and Karl W. Schweizer (New York, NY, 1983); Antoine Pecquet, Discourse on the art of 
negotiation, trans. Aleksandra Gruzinska and Murray D. Sirkis (New York, NY, 2005); Karl von 
Martens, Guide diplomatique (Leipzig, 1832).  
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their practical and ideological context; it will then examine their effects on the operation of 
the Residency system. Although these militaristic attitudes were prevalent throughout the 
Company, the ways in which they seeped into diplomatic practice in India was deeply 
troubling from the perspective of administrators in Calcutta and more especially in London. 
At the heart of these controversies was the question of how far British officials should adopt 
Indian styles of rule, and whether the Residents themselves were becoming dangerously 
‘Indianized’ in their habits and dispositions.  
The same anxieties emerged with respect to the question of gift-giving and political 
pageantry, the subject of Chapter 3. While the Residents’ superiors acknowledged the 
necessity of making some material show of authority, an idea which accorded well with 
British notions of pomp and circumstance, they hesitated to give their entire approval to the 
Residents’ material excess, as they viewed it. This chapter will identify some of the key 
tensions underlying the recurring disputes over expense clams which form such a prominent 
feature of Residency correspondence. The giving of gifts and other forms of lavish spending 
were an important component of the Resident’s political toolkit, but they also provoked fears 
of luxury, corruption, and inappropriate relations of obligation, as well as raising the question 
of what the basis for the Resident’s authority at Indian courts should properly be, and how it 
should be expressed.  
How the Resident should conduct himself relative to Indians at court was another 
divisive issue, and the final two chapters of the thesis will consider in more depth how the 
Resident engaged with his two key sources of support (and occasionally opposition), the 
scribal elite and royal family members, respectively. Both these bodies of people had the 
social and cultural capital necessary to assist the Resident in his political enterprises, but 
precisely because of their indispensability, both represented a weakness in the Residency 
regime. Residents were unsure about how to calibrate these relationships so as to secure all 
the benefits of collaboration without opening the door to subversion. These chapters will 
explore not only how the Residents sought to draw on and regulate these relationships, but 
also how Indians of various backgrounds sought to exploit, resist, or abet the work of the 
Company.  
Taken together, these chapters illustrate the multifaceted nature of the Resident’s 
work and the different, mutually reinforcing foundations of his influence at court. At the same 
time, they also show that on every front the Resident’s activities were questioned or 
undermined by colleagues within the Company as well as by Indians at court. Within the 
Company, contemporaries debated different styles of rule, and these practical and ideological 
divisions were exacerbated by mutual suspicions resulting from geographical distance and the 
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blurring of personal and public interests in the diplomatic line. This process was further 
complicated by the need to work through Indian elites and administrators with interests of 
their own. Theoretically the system of alliances was supposed to make things easier for the 
Company, allowing them to exercise political control over the subcontinent without 
shouldering the burden of internal administration. Practically this influence proved difficult to 
enforce, and, as the succeeding chapters will make apparent, the transition to indirect rule was 
therefore far from smooth. Contrary to British hopes and expectations, Indian rulers often did 
not make for willing or accommodating instruments for achieving the Company’s interests. 
Ultimately the Residents found themselves treating Indian rulers and their administrations less 
like allies, and more like subjects.  
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Chapter 1. The conquest of knowledge and the intricacies of 
information management 
 In the historiography of colonial India, it has become commonplace to assert that the 
consolidation of the East India Company’s control in the subcontinent was made possible by a 
concomitant conquest of knowledge. In their different ways, both Bernard Cohn and C.A. 
Bayly influentially drew attention to British desires to ‘know the country’.1 While Cohn 
emphasized the mutually reinforcing relationship between imperial state-building and 
officialising procedures, particularly the impulse to categorize and classify, Bayly opened up 
a different field of inquiry: ‘the information order,’ a heuristic device encompassing the 
various, overlapping systems of collecting and distributing political intelligence which 
crisscrossed the Indian subcontinent.2 In Empire and information: Intelligence gathering and 
social communication in India 1780-1870, a classic work populated by a rich cast of ‘canny 
people’ including astrologers, midwives, and religious mendicants, Bayly traced the changing 
nature of the Indian information order over the long nineteenth century and the Company’s 
attempts to infiltrate and subordinate it. Most relevant for our purposes, Bayly highlighted the 
importance of Mughal institutions to the Company’s dramatic imperial expansion, notably 
Persian newsletters, post and palankin routes, and scribal communities with a tradition of 
state service.3 Yet, Bayly paid little attention to the British officials who negotiated these 
Mughal institutions on the Company’s behalf. This chapter will provide a more intimate 
account of the uneven interpenetration of British and Indian information networks from the 
perspective of the men who stood at the interface between the two, men who linger on the 
margins of Empire and information but never fully come to the fore: the Residents.  
 As informants stationed at the courts of rival Indian powers, the Residents played a 
crucial role in the Company’s intelligence-gathering project. If imperial control depended on 
the ability to ‘listen in’ on internal communications as Bayly argued, it was the Residents who 
did most of the listening.4 At the same time, the Residents were far from being faultless, 
disinterested relayers of intelligence, and a major objective of this chapter is to complement 
existing analyses of communications infrastructure like the dak or the postal service by 
examining in greater depth the human element upon which their operations depended.5 
                                                     
1 C.A. Bayly, ‘Knowing the country: Empire and information in India’, MAS, 27:1 (1993): 3-43.  
2 Cohn, Colonialism and its forms of knowledge, p. 3; Bayly, Empire and information, p. 3-5.  
3 Bayly, Empire and information, p. 58-78.  
4 Ibid., p. 365.  
5 Devyani Gupta, ‘Stamping empire: Postal standardization in nineteenth-century India’, in Global 
scientific practice in an age of revolutions, 1750-1850, eds. Patrick Manning and Daniel Rood 
(Pittsburgh, PA, 2016), p. 216-236; Nitin Sinha, Communication and colonialism in eastern India: 
Bihar, 1760s-1880s (New York, NY, 2013); Patrick Joyce, The state of freedom: A social history of the 
British state since 1800 (Cambridge, 2013), p. 144-161.   
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Viewing the Company’s intelligence-gathering systems through the eyes of key agents like 
the Residents highlights how flows of information were inscribed with the assumptions, 
interests, and concerns of the actors responsible for producing and sustaining them. Through 
the Residents, we are alerted to the social dimensions of intelligence-gathering: the 
interactions through which knowledge is produced and communicated, the assumptions, 
aspirations, jealousies, and resentments which shape how it is packaged and transmitted, and 
the various social and political interests it can serve.  
We also discover, through the Residents, the finesse with which intelligence was 
managed and mobilized. The methods of communication available to the Residents were 
diverse, and they employed them strategically. Information could be performed publicly or 
communicated in secret letters; it could be passed on in conversation or put down officially in 
writing. The substance of letters and conversations could be strictly empirical or utterly 
speculative. The Resident could speak, write, or remain silent. Instead of simply adding to the 
Company’s stock of knowledge, then, the Residents handled information artfully and to their 
own advantage, sometimes for the good of the Company they represented, and sometimes not. 
In fact, the Residents as a group developed and experimented with strategies specifically 
designed to consolidate their own position and, on occasion, to screen themselves from the 
gaze of their superiors. Understanding the operation of the Company’s system of political 
surveillance therefore requires us to reconstruct the logic underpinning how individuals 
gathered, interpreted, assessed, and deployed knowledge.6   
 This chapter illustrates how the Residents learned to work within the existing 
information order, and the practical obstacles and active resistance they encountered in so 
doing. It begins by describing the Residents’ struggle to expand their powers of representation 
and communication at Indian royal capitals, first through the composition and transmission of 
letters (Section 1), and then through strategies adapted to manipulating news passed through 
word of mouth (Section 2). The remainder of the chapter will consider the circulation of 
information within the Company itself. Section 3 will probe the shifting and contested 
boundaries between ‘private’ and ‘public’ correspondence, while Section 4 examines the 
representative strategies which Residents employed in their official reports to their superiors 
in Calcutta. Considering these various, overlapping modes of information management side 
by side, it becomes apparent how much the Resident’s authority depended on the maintenance 
of accurate political intelligence and clear lines of communication, as well as how difficult 
these things were to secure in practice.  
                                                     
6 Steven Shapin, ‘Here and everywhere: Sociology of scientific knowledge’, Annual Review of 
Sociology, 21 (1995): 300.  
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1. Decorum, deception, and the epistolary arts  
Perhaps contrary to our image of courtly diplomacy, Residents seem to have spent 
most of their time ensconced in their offices. From their desks, they oversaw a system of 
assembling and communicating information not dramatically dissimilar from the methods 
devised by the Mughals to survey their own empire.7 In addition to the letters Residents 
received from their superiors in Calcutta and their colleagues in the political line, they also 
relied on the akbharat produced by news-writers stationed at Indian courts across the 
subcontinent.8 Akbharat were Persian newsletters reporting on events at different royal 
centres, modelled on the formulaic imperial court diaries which described the activities of the 
Mughal Emperor and the events of his reign, ranging from his eating habits and daily 
exercises to his political appointments and general assemblies.9 Residents supplemented the 
akbharat with more perfunctory military reports from agents placed in military encampments 
which described the mood and movements of Indian troops.10 Added to this was news gleaned 
from a range of informants at court whose services were repaid with Company pensions, as 
well as information purchased from visiting merchants, religious mendicants, and the 
harkaras (or men of all work) who served as messengers. Mobile groups like these were 
particularly valuable informants. Not only did they frequent the bazaars, pilgrimage sites, and 
army encampments around the country where people congregated and news was exchanged, 
they were also able to draw on further networks of informants because of their commercial, 
institutional, and occupational affiliations.11  
 These various forms of intelligence, written and oral, were translated, assessed, and 
synthesised in the Residency’s Intelligence Office, on the basis of which the Resident wrote 
reports for the Governor-General-in-Council. Information came and went from the Residency 
through the channel of the dak, a courier system with Mughal roots which, by the end of the 
eighteenth century, was increasingly monopolized by the East India Company.12 
                                                     
7 Although these intelligence establishments were often described as being ‘repugnant to the feelings of 
an Englishman,’ as in J. Sutherland, Sketches of the relations subsisting between the British 
government in India, and the different native states (Calcutta, 1833), p. 12.  
8 Richard Strachey to W.A. Brooke, 10 Apr. 1812, Strachey Papers, Mss Eur D514/1, OIOC, p. 92.  
9 For the akbar and their transformation under the British East India Company, see Michael H. Fisher, 
‘The office of akhbar nawis: the transition from Mughal to British forms’, MAS, 27:1 (1993): 48.  
10 Richard Jenkins to Charles Russell, 15 Feb. 1807, Letter books of Sir Richard Jenkins, Mss Eur 
E111, OIOC, p. 8.  
11 Chitra Joshi, ‘Dak roads, dak runners, and the reordering of communication networks’, International 
Review of Social History, 57:2 (2012): 169-189; Bernard S. Cohn, ‘The role of the gosains in the 
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12 Michael H. Fisher, ‘The East India Company’s suppression of the native dak’, IESHR, 31:3 (1994): 
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Correspondence was also copied out and preserved in Residency archives to serve as a frame 
of reference for the Resident and his successors. On first arriving at the Residency, new 
appointees used these archives as a means of grounding themselves in local conventions and 
concerns.13 There was no written body of rules or set of guidelines about how a Resident 
should conduct himself, so the Resident often based his decisions on the precedents 
elaborated in these papers, particularly where points of ceremonial were concerned. The 
archives which historians now use to study the Residencies were therefore themselves 
mechanisms of Company power, repositories of social and technical knowledge which were 
deployed for political purposes. 
Letters could also operate as diplomatic instruments in a more performative, public 
fashion. In the Mughal tradition, royal letters or letters from persons of authority were valued 
because they were believed to physically retain something of the charisma of their author, 
particularly when written in his own hand.14 During the early seventeenth century, when the 
Company was still trying to secure a commercial foothold in the subcontinent, letters from 
English monarchs addressed to Asian rulers were a critical mechanism for establishing trade 
agreements.15 Letters continued to play an important role in diplomatic relations into the 
nineteenth century; the Residents regularly commissioned letters from the Governor-General, 
whether of congratulation or remonstrance, which were presented or read aloud for strategic 
effect in open court.16 The Indian political elite were very aware of the Resident’s position 
within a larger hierarchy, which meant that he occasionally had to call on written support 
from his superiors to lend force to his assertions in this way. Richard Jenkins apparently had 
such a difficult time convincing the  Rajah of Berar Raghoji Bhonsla of the Company’s 
diplomatic intentions that he finally presented a letter to the Rajah in the Governor-General’s 
own handwriting, ‘which it is to be hoped will prevent the insinuations of interested persons 
from leading the Rajah into an Error respecting the designs of the British Government.’17 
Letters like these were handled with great ceremony, in the same way that the Governor-
General’s visit would have been carefully choreographed were he present in the flesh.  
                                                     
13 12 Jun. 1811, Journal of Mountstuart Elphinstone, Elphinstone Collection, Mss Eur F88/370, OIOC, 
p. 85.  
14 Cohn, Colonialism and its forms of knowledge, p. 19.   
15 Miles Ogborn, Indian ink: Script and print in the making of the English East India Company 
(Chicago, 2007), p. 38.  
16 John Collins to Acting Governor-General George Barlow, 25 Dec. 1805, Letters from Sir John 
Collins, Papers of Sir George Barlow, Mss Eur F176/28, OIOC, np.; Richard Strachey to John Adam, 
12 Jun. 1813, John Adam Papers, Mss Eur D585, OIOC, p. 82; Richard Jenkins to Marquess of 
Hastings, 14 Dec. 1814, Correspondence regarding the Pindaris, HM, IOR/H/599, OIOC, p. 474.  
17 Richard Jenkins to Marquess of Hastings, 11 Dec. 1814, Correspondence regarding the Pindaris, 
HM, IOR/H/599, OIOC, p. 464.  
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In addition to their symbolic power and persuasive force, letters bearing the 
Governor-General’s signature were also important markers of legitimacy for the Resident. 
The credentials which the Resident carried with him on his arrival at court were critical to his 
acceptance and recognition as an officially sanctioned representative of the Company.18 The 
absence of written expressions of support from Calcutta could severely undermine the 
Resident’s authority. For this reason, it was traditional for the Governor-General to conclude 
every letter to the Indian ruler with a brief reference to the Resident, reminding the ruler that 
he deposited his entire confidence in the Resident, and that all opinions expressed by the 
Resident should be regarded as those of the Governor-General himself.19  The significance of 
this seemingly trivial epistolary convention is illustrated by an incident which occurred at 
Nagpur around the time when Lord Cornwallis arrived in India to replace Marquess Wellesley 
as Governor-General. Rumours had been circulating that Cornwallis planned to remove the 
Resident at Nagpur Mountstuart Elphinstone from his post, and Elphinstone was worried that 
these rumours would only be substantiated by a letter which Cornwallis had written to the 
Rajah of Nagpur in which he did not reference the Resident as usual. Elphinstone begged his 
friend John Adam, secretary to the Governor-General, to send along new credentials in the 
Governor-General’s name, avowing that he could ‘take no step whatever without orders & 
consequently shall avoid the risk of being disavowed’. As a result, Elphinstone opined, ‘every 
thing is going to ruin in consequence of the ideas occasioned by our remaining inactive (while 
every body else is bustling) & taking no notice of any thing that is done or doing against us.’20 
Residents could be influential figures at court, but only insofar as they were recognized to 
have the weight of the Company at their back; accordingly, the Resident’s personal authority 
and legitimacy sometimes depended on his ability to sustain the flow of letters from the 
Company’s administrative centres.  
While it was therefore in the Resident’s interest to facilitate certain lines of 
communication, particularly with the Governor-General, he was equally concerned to block 
others. This was part of the Company’s broader policy of ‘subordinate isolation’, whereby 
Residents endeavoured to monitor and control communications between Indian courts as a 
way of preventing the formation of hostile coalitions.21 As the Company began to more 
closely track the dak system, court dignitaries resorted to the use of private and unassuming 
                                                     
18 Letters of credence were also critical in European diplomacy. See Wicquefort, The embassador and 
his functions, p. 109; Martens, Guide diplomatique, p. 48.  
19 See for example Earl of Minto to Daulat Rao Sindhia, 4 Jun. 1813, Out-letters 1813, Persian 
Correspondence, Minto Papers, MS 11594, NLS, p. 88; Minto to Nawab Vizier of Awadh, 2 Jul. 1813, 
Out-letters 1813, Persian Correspondence, Minto Papers, MS 11594, NLS, p. 102.   
20 Mountstuart Elphinstone to John Adam, 27 Aug. 1805, Mss Eur F109/89, OIOC, np.   
21 Ramusack, The Indian princes and their states, p. 68.  
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errand persons to deliver their messages; accordingly, the Resident and his agents were 
always on the look-out for concealed documents and illicit communications.22 The 
intelligence notebooks which Mountstuart Elphinstone kept in the tension-ridden months 
leading up to the Third Maratha War of 1817-18 reveal that Elphinstone employed Indian 
agents to monitor the residences of the Peshwa and other key officials, and to follow the 
Peshwa on his secret business despite the latter’s best efforts to disguise himself.23 In addition 
to tracking the movement of possible messengers in and out of court, Residents also worked 
closely with their counterparts at other political centres to identify information leaks and trace 
the channels through which they flowed.24 
These concerted attempts at isolation had mixed results. During this period, Indian 
information networks remained surprisingly resilient to Company penetration. At the outset of 
the Napoleonic Wars, the Resident at Poona William Palmer remarked with perplexity that ‘I 
have no knowledge of this Coast maintaining any direct intercourse or correspondence with 
the French but it is (by whatever means) well and recently informed of the situation of that 
nation in Egypt and Europe.’25 Four years later, Arthur Wellesley was outraged to discover 
that the Peshwa of Poona was still communicating with Frenchmen, ‘& has endeavoured to 
conceal his communications from the Agents of the British Govt & to screen the Frenchmen 
from their search’, as well as continuing to correspond with the Maratha chieftain Sindhia 
(with whom the Company was then at war).26  
Still, the Resident was occasionally able to discover, and expose, illicit 
correspondence, which he used to bolster his image of influence and omniscience at court. 
Tellingly, on 5 October 1814 when two British police officers intercepted letters from Daulat 
Rao Sindhia to the Rajah of Nepal hidden inside a book, ‘dexterously concealed between the 
cover and the leaves which were pasted down on it’, Governor-General Marquess Hastings 
                                                     
22 Thomas Sydenham to Earl of Minto, 17 Apr. 1808, Foreign Secret Department Records, no. 1, NAI, 
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ordered these letters to be returned to Sindhia by the Resident ‘unopened and without 
explanation’ to signal the Company’s powers of surveillance. In Hastings’ words, ‘it will 
make him [Sindhia] believe he is closely watched, yet that we do not seek ground of 
criminating him’.27 Here too, we see how letters in their physical form could be deployed to 
communicate messages distinct from the actual words inscribed on them.  
The way intercepted letters were handled also illustrates how technical knowledge of 
Persianate conventions, acquired through Company patronage of Indian scribes, was put to 
practical use. Every detail was carefully considered for evidence of forgery, with special 
attention paid to format, seals, signatures, and superscriptions.28  This is another context in 
which the practical importance of the Residency archives was made apparent. Residents 
carefully preserved letters from Indian rulers and dignitaries which were later used as models 
against which to examine suspected forgeries, confirming which intercepted letters carried 
authentic information and which did not. For instance, when the Resident at Hyderabad 
Thomas Sydenham received a suspicious letter from the Maratha chieftain Holkar, the hand-
writing and seal were compared with other letters in the Resident’s possession to test its 
authenticity; the Resident even compared the paper and the manner of enclosing and fastening 
it with a paper band.29  
Despite differences in form and style, Indians and Britons shared certain fundamental 
similarities with regards to the nature and function of letters which facilitated this process. 
The materiality and format of letters would have spoken to their nineteenth-century recipients, 
whether British or Indian, in ways that would not be immediately obvious to us in the twenty-
first century. As Giora Sternberg has pointed out, ‘early modern letters were not only a 
vehicle for narrated information, but also a formal social act, a statement by the addresser 
about his or her status relative to the addressee.’30 Sternberg developed the concept of 
‘epistolary ceremonial’ to encompass the many ways in which letter form signified status 
relationships between correspondents.31 Thinking about letters in this way alerts us to terms of 
                                                     
27 Marchioness Bute, The private journal of the Marquess of Hastings, J.G. Governor-General and 
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address, salutations, and modes of signing off which, alongside page layout and the size of 
quality of the paper, would have been imbued with meaning. 
Residents were sensitized to prose as well as format. C.A. Bayly has observed how 
the flowery Persian of Indian royal letters was tied to fine gradations of rank, suggesting that 
literal-minded British officials, who omitted these verses in their records, missed the 
underlying messages they communicated.32 While officials might have condensed their 
handwritten copies to facilitate fact-checking, often omitting the lengthy Arabic invocations 
and honorifics which prefaced royal letters, we should not assume that they were thus 
necessarily blind to the significance of epistolary etiquette. After all, the British elite had an 
equally sophisticated, though stylistically opposed, letter-writing culture; in Britain, as in 
India, there was an extensive body of prescriptive literature on the subject.33 Similarly, as in 
India composition was accorded a central place in European diplomacy; nearly the entire 
second volume of Martens’ classic diplomatic manual was devoted to the conventions 
appropriate to different kinds of letters, instructing readers on how to make written 
complaints, how to address memorials to sovereigns, and how to offer congratulations.34 
Thus, while the specific formulae used in India might be unfamiliar, British officials 
were predisposed to give weight to details which we might dismiss as trivial. For instance, 
Charles Metcalfe contrasted the injustice of the Nizam Sikander Jah’s refusal to embrace him 
in open court (which he termed ‘the only ostensible Compliment paid by the Nizam to the 
British Representative’) with his own willingness to adhere to the conventions governing their 
relationship, among which he numbered certain epistolary habits. ‘In other respects generally 
the forms of Royalty are assumed by the Nizam, and admitted by the Resident’, Metcalfe 
wrote. ‘Such as the application of the Title Hoozoor I poor noor to His Highness. The placing 
of his designation at the top of any written communication, and not where the sense of the 
Text would require it, with other similar forms’.35 The modes of address and salutation 
employed in letters were thus recognized to form part of an array of practises through which 
relationships were made manifest, alongside other forms of ceremonial like the exchange of 
                                                     
the Mughals (Calcutta, 1971), p. 19; 66. For the ways in which status differentials were encoded in 
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khilat and nazr (to be discussed in Chapter 3). Understanding the etiquette of letter-writing 
was considered just as important as knowing the protocol to be followed in open court.  
At the same time as Residents were familiarising themselves with these Indian 
epistolary forms (with the guidance of their munshis, to be discussed in Chapter 4), Indians 
too were becoming acquainted with British modes of writing letters, and using this knowledge 
for their own purposes. At Delhi in 1811, a few enterprising courtiers succeeded in forging 
letters purporting to be from the chief justice in Calcutta. The letters, which were addressed to 
the Mughal Emperor Akbar Shah II, suggested that the Resident Archibald Seton’s activities 
did not conform with Company policy. By casting doubt on Seton, these men undermined his 
influence at court, creating a vacuum to be filled with their own counsel and advice. The 
letters reflect the writers’ cognizance of the English language and the conventions of British 
letter-writing. The secretary to government, on reviewing them, noted that the letters bore ‘a 
subscription in the English character meant to appear as an English paper with an English 
superscription’, where ‘the imitations of the English signature are written by a person who 
could write bad English’. Beyond using English epistolary forms, the letters used the 
reputation and status of British information networks to their advantage as a means of 
encouraging the Emperor not to consult with anyone who might expose their plot: ‘let no one 
else be privy to your Majesty’s secrets, for I learned from Mr. Elphinstone [the Resident at 
Poona], that all your Majesty’s servants are traitors, and very worthless.’36 The Company’s 
reliance on the circulation of letters meant that the whole system was potentially fragile and 
open to subversion; it presented an opportunity for people outside the Company to appropriate 
its authority for their own purposes by writing letters in the Company’s name. 
Recognizing this subversive potential, Residents were careful to orchestrate as much 
as possible the composition, transmission, and delivery of official letters. Dispatches from the 
Governor-General were invariably submitted to the ruler through the channel of the Resident, 
thereby enabling him to influence how the letter was received and understood, and by 
whom.37 Although Thomas Sydenham at one point did make a copy of the Governor-
General’s address for the Nizam Sikander Jah’s perusal, to give him ‘an opportunity to 
examine, and comprehend, the nature, Tendency, and object of your Lordships 
Remonstrances and advice’, Sydenham averred that this practice was the exception rather 
than the rule. ‘On many occasions, I have declined furnishing the minister, or the Nizam, with 
copies of the Governor Generals Letters, in order that the contents of them might not become 
public amongst a Description of persons, who are ready to prepare the nizam for resistance 
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against every proposal from the British Government.’38 The information communicated in 
letters, as well as the way that information was phrased and presented, was liable to be used 
by ministers antipathetic to the Company in ways unintended by the author. Accordingly, the 
Resident consciously couched the messages conveyed by official letters in terms which left 
little room for misinterpretation.  
For the Residents, the problem was thus not simply to collect and communicate 
intelligence, but to determine how best to present and use it.  Taking a bird’s-eye view of the 
Resident’s routine business, it becomes apparent that letters were not simply vehicles for 
communicating facts; they could be used to cement legitimacy as well as to reinforce or 
subvert differentials in power and status. Because letters fulfilled a social as well as an 
informative function, a great deal of consideration was thus devoted, not simply to the 
circulation of letters, but also their composition, and, just as importantly, their mode of 
delivery.39 Would the letter be handed over without comment? Would the Resident simply 
summarize the contents without allowing the ruler or minister to glance at the words on the 
page? Would the letter be offered briefly for examination and then reclaimed, or would the 
ruler be allowed to keep it? Would the exchange take place in open court or in private? The 
options had to be weighed carefully if the letter was to have its desired effect.  
A few patterns seem to have emerged. For instance, points of policy were usually 
delivered in the form of a written memorandum, thereby ensuring that every detail was 
communicated with precision.40 Reprimands or peremptory instructions were, at least 
initially, delivered verbally and in private out of delicacy to the ruler in question (though 
continued resistance to the Governor-General’s commands might elicit a public reproach).41 
The ‘delicacy’ which Residents avowed to be their guiding principle in these circumstances 
was motivated by more than mere politeness; discretion could have strategic value. When the 
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Governor-General-in-Council sent a letter to the Nizam of Hyderabad Sikander Jah urging 
him to cease corresponding with the rebel Mohipat Ram, for example, the Resident Thomas 
Sydenham was advised to present the letter in private. ‘By thus rendering the interposition of 
the British Government less apparent,’ it was thought, ‘His Highness would be enabled to 
adopt the course of conduct recommended to him with more credit and dignity than if the 
compulsory motives of it were publicly exposed.’42 Handling these points of contention 
privately was believed to facilitate cooperation, since it allowed the ruler in question to cede 
to the Company’s demands without losing face in the eyes of the court. 
Try as he might, however, the Resident was sometimes flummoxed in his efforts to 
control the wider reception of letters, particularly given that the receipt of important 
dispatches usually occasioned a public, ceremonial event. Under these conditions, hamstrung 
by courtly etiquette, the Resident could do little to control the ruler’s behaviour, while the 
ruler, for his part, could exploit the opportunity to create general impressions among the 
public about the import of the letters being delivered. One instance of this occurred at 
Lucknow in 1816, when the Nawab Vizier Ghazi-ud-din Haidar Khan was in the process of 
appealing to the Governor-General for control of his deceased step-mother’s property in 
Faizabad. When the Nawab received an official letter from the Marquess of Hastings 
ratifying, in no uncertain terms, the Resident’s earlier denial of the Nawab’s claim to the 
begum’s vast wealth, the Resident Richard Strachey was unsettled to witness how the news 
was handled. Rather than expressing his disappointment or resentment, as Strachey had 
perhaps expected, the Nawab instead made a public display of his satisfaction by honoring, 
with ceremonial robes, the person who had delivered the dispatch as well as the munshi who 
had transcribed the original letter to the Governor-General. According to the bewildered 
Resident,  
public rejoicings also took place, and His Excellency’s satisfaction has been so unequivocally 
manifested that I cannot but believe his Excellency to have countenanced the report which has 
gained universal Currency, that he has received the Authority of the Governor General to the 
fullest extent of his wishes regarding Fyzabad.43  
By handling the letter publicly in the way that he did, the Nawab Vizier negated, to some 
extent, the message it contained and the intention with which it was dispatched. Through 
public celebration, the Nawab Vizier cultivated the impression that his claim was condoned 
by the begum’s executors, an impression which gave an aura of legitimacy to his subsequent 
seizure of the begum’s household in Faizabad.  The Resident might do everything in his 
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power to orchestrate, to the smallest degree, the communications between Calcutta and the 
court, but the marks on the page sometimes meant very little in practice.  
As this example suggests, while Residents could exert some control over the letters 
traversing the subcontinent, news passed by word of mouth sometimes proved more 
ungovernable. James Achilles Kirkpatrick remarked once in Mountstuart Elphinstone’s 
hearing that ‘the secrets of govt are so ill kept that the resolutions of govt about the French 
here were known to Gardner an officer in the Nizam’s service before they were known to the 
resident.’44 Tellingly, when the minister of Travancore was requested to write a letter to the 
Governor General expressing his willingness to cooperate with the Company, the minister 
refused on the grounds ‘that in less than Three Days the contents would circulate through 
every corner of the Country’.45 As the import of official letters spread through conversation 
and debate, their intended meanings could be lost or superseded. Meanwhile, Residents 
struggled to decide when to commit conversations to paper; while technical knowledge could 
be applied to evaluate the authenticity of intercepted letters, verbal assertions were sometimes 
less amenable to truth-testing. The following section will examine how the Residents 
negotiated this interface between oral and written culture; how they were impacted by 
information transmitted orally, as well as how they endeavoured to wrest control over public 
opinion out of the hands of their Indian opponents.  
2. The power of rumour, or, ‘the tattle in the suburbs of the city’  
 Rumour is a concept which social theorists have found difficult to define succinctly 
despite its prevalence in everyday usage. Traditionally rumour carries a pejorative 
connotation; early analyses of the phenomenon identified untruth as its essential feature, and 
were concerned primarily with detecting and understanding patterns of distortion.46 Yet, as 
social science studies from the 1960s onwards became increasingly sensitized to the 
conditions in which rumours emerge, anthropologists and sociologists have emphasized the 
practical importance of rumour as a way for people to pool resources and give meaning to 
ambiguous situations. In his classic analysis, sociologist Tamotsu Shibutani illustrated how 
rumours are developed deliberatively and collaboratively in situations where the news 
provided by institutional channels is lacking or unsatisfactory.47 Considering these insights, 
historian Luise White, based on her reading of vampire stories circulating in colonial and 
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postcolonial Africa, has suggested that we think of rumour differently, ‘not [as] events 
misinterpreted and deformed, but rather events analyzed and commented upon’.48 Like 
Shibutani, White sees rumour as a sign of a critically engaged public actively seeking to make 
sense of their world and stake their place in the political discourse of the day. Similarly, based 
on his fieldwork in Haiti anthropologist Glen Perice has suggested that rumour, as a form of 
unauthorized speech, can be a way of taking action and registering opposition, albeit without 
publicly resisting oppressive regimes; these findings reflect, in moderated form, James Scott’s 
famous depiction of gossip as a symbolic ‘weapon of the weak’.49  
Many of these observations about rumour would seem to be applicable to the Indian 
context. In Indian society news and conjecture proliferated swiftly, passed through word of 
mouth at mosques, markets, pilgrimage sites, and army encampments; this was the sphere of 
political discussion and debate which C.A. Bayly dubbed the Indian ecumene.50 Oral culture 
of this type was important before the advent of print, and in a context where illiteracy was 
widespread, but it acquired additional significance given British attempts to stamp out Indian 
channels of communication. However resilient their networks might be, the Indian elite were 
still painfully conscious of the Company’s endeavours to keep them in the dark, and 
speculated about what the Resident might be trying to keep from them. The Resident’s 
inability to comment on or confirm Indian sources intensified these suspicions. James 
Achilles Kirkpatrick was constantly harangued by the Nizam Ali Khan and his ministers for 
what they perceived to be a failure on his part to pass along crucial information about the 
progress of a reported Afghan invasion of north India. As Kirkpatrick himself put it in a letter 
to his brother William in February 1799, ‘Edmonstone and his Deputy in Calcutta have 
discontinued for sometime past sending me the Delhi Papers, which frequently places me in 
an awkward predicament’. The minister seems to have suspected that Kirkpatrick was being 
disingenuous, and, in hopes of drawing him out, presented the Resident with letters from his 
own informants abroad, the contents of which Kirkpatrick was unable to either confirm or 
contradict until he finally received news from Calcutta on the subject.51 This atmosphere of 
mistrust combined with the slow pace of official communications from Calcutta meant that 
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rumours were taken very seriously at Indian courts, where the general public as well as the 
political elite were keen to discover the Company’s  intentions.52  
British commentators generally made light of what they considered an Indian 
predisposition towards gossip; Indian news-writers were condemned for giving any weight 
whatsoever to the talk of the town. Thomas Williamson’s popular handbook The East India 
Vade-Mecum reflected popular British opinion when it disparagingly described the contents 
of the akbharat as ‘the mere tattle in the suburbs of a city’.53 Residents were leery about 
forwarding this kind of news to the central government, fearing that it would bring their 
personal credit, that is, their reputation for truthfulness and accuracy, into question. In the 
eighteenth century, personal credit, as Margot Finn has illustrated, operated as ‘a broader 
social and cultural measure of personal worth.’54 In the interests of caution, Residents were 
careful to preserve their credit by couching their information with phrases like ‘my 
information adds’ or ‘I have heard through confidential channels’ or ‘it is said’. Only rarely 
did Residents communicate these kinds of rumours with confidence, and then only when the 
opinion of the court was unanimous. For instance, on the eve of the Third Maratha War, 
Richard Jenkins laid out several points of mutually reinforcing intelligence which 
substantiated his theory that the Rajah of Berar was conspiring with Sindhia to turn against 
the Company. He concluded: ‘the principal circumstances above mentioned [that the Rajah is 
corresponding secretly with Sindia] I hear from so many quarters that I cannot doubt their 
correctness and I am constantly receiving warnings from the principal persons in our interest 
in the Durbar.’55 
The Residents’ circumspection about forwarding information acquired through word 
of mouth was due in large part to the misinformation that was purposefully and industriously 
spread by rival Indian powers, who thereby hoped to confuse and misdirect Company policy, 
as well as to rally support among the general population. The rumours spread by the 
Company’s enemies generally involved exaggerations concerning the number and movement 
of Indian troops, or the formation of hostile coalitions. Richard Jenkins, carefully monitoring 
the Rajah of Berar’s troops for signs of incipient attack, made note of ‘false reports 
propagated regarding Pindarries, which are made the instruments of exciting alarm, and the 
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pretence of keeping the Rajah’s troops in a continued state of readiness for movement’.56 
Meanwhile, the Maratha chieftain Holkar’s agents regularly spread word of his planned 
assaults against the Company, attacks which in fact rarely materialized. In the Company’s 
view, these rumours were used as ‘an instrument for the support of his consequence, and the 
maintenance of his military reputation and political ascendancy’, and spread ‘through the 
industry of those who have an interest in reviving scenes of turbulence and disorder’.57 As this 
suggests, officials were liable to attribute rumours of budding resistance to an 
unrepresentative minority of troublemakers.58 In consequence, when Archibald Seton alerted 
the Governor-General to rumours of a potential alliance spearheaded by Holkar, the report 
was dubbed ‘absurd’, and Seton was warned against relying too heavily on ‘the credit of 
common Newspapers’, or on his Indian informant, who was deemed to be a willing 
instrument in the hands of the Maratha chiefs.59 In cases like these, where rumours had de-
stabilizing implications, British officials were generally slow to give credence to them, 
mistrusting the motives of their Indian sources and preferring instead to maintain the status 
quo. John Malcolm advised prospective members of the political line that given the unsettled 
condition of central India, ‘intrigues, treasonable conversations and papers, and immature 
plots, must for some time be matters of frequent occurrence and growth, but such will in 
general be best left to perish of neglect.’60 
Company officials were also wary of rumours because there was a recognized 
possibility that in appearing to take notice of gossip Residents might unintentionally give 
credence to it; given the powerful mutual distrust that so often existed between the Resident 
and the Indian political elite, vigorously attempting to quell a rumour could be interpreted as a 
confirmation of its truth. An incident at Hyderabad illustrates this principle at work. In the 
year 1808 the Resident Thomas Sydenham decided to host an entertainment for the Nizam 
Sikander Jah as a gesture of good will, an invitation which the Nizam refused despite having 
previously shown signs of eagerly anticipating the party. Eventually Sydenham traced the 
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Nizam’s uneasiness to a rumour that the Company was planning on violently deposing him 
and replacing him with his brother. One would assume that the most straightforward solution 
would be for Sydenham to confront the gossip head-on, but Sydenham was reluctant to 
address the problem so candidly, afraid of exciting the suspicions of the Nizam.61 ‘If I had 
urged the Nizam to perform his promise his suspicions would have increased with the 
Earnestness of my manner. On the other Hand if I permitted the Nizam to decline my 
Invitation, I should have encouraged the belief of the Truth of the Report.’62 Sydenham 
ultimately resorted to rumour himself. In his replies to various ‘Indirect Enquiries’, Sydenham 
‘treated the Nizam’s Fears with ridicule and expressed my compassion only that his Highness 
should seriously entertain such unmanly and absurd suspicions’.63 H.T. Colebrooke, while at 
Nagpur, took a similar line with respect to rumours circulating among the Rajah’s servants 
about preparations for a secret journey to Poona; Colebrooke decided to avoid questioning the 
Rajah and his ministers directly, ‘lest it should seem to indicate a jealousy of the Raja’s 
connections with Poona, but I directed my Moonshee to enquire indirectly from Sridhar 
Pundit.’64 Colebrooke’s successor at Nagpur, Elphinstone, was likewise loath to make direct 
enquiries, ‘unless they are necessary and likely to be attended with good effect because they 
excite jealousy’.65 By addressing a rumour directly Residents were at risk of exacerbating the 
suspicions and resentments which had given rise to it in the first place; in these instances, 
particularly where the rumour was unlikely to have implications beyond the court, it was 
usually best for Residents to simply wait for the rumour to die out of its own accord.   
In an effort not to betray their mutual suspicions, then, both Britons and Indians often 
preferred to engage in oblique and circuitous tactics when it came to addressing and 
validating rumours. How this sometimes tortuous negotiation might have worked is suggested 
to us by an account of Richard Jenkins, Elphinstone’s successor at the court of Nagpur. 
Jenkins described with contempt the Rajah Raghoji Bhonsla’s policy of ‘using every 
endeavor to procure the most particular intelligence respecting our designs and the movement 
of our troops,’ noting that ‘on one occasion his alarm was excited by a report from a person 
sent to Hyderabad to purchase Elephants’ as well as by agents ‘of still more despicable 
description’.66 Having received a report which warned him of the Company’s plans to go war 
against the Marathas, the Rajah forwarded the information to Jenkins without comment. 
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Unsure how to interpret the Rajah’s motive in so doing, Jenkins chose to treat the rumour 
with condescension, remarking that the Company’s goodwill towards the Rajah ‘was too well 
established to render it necessary for me to give importance to such insignificant rumours by 
making any further remark’.67 When another report about an impending Company attack was 
carried to the Resident via messenger, however, Jenkins sent his munshi to the Rajah to assure 
him ‘that there was no ground for the report which I should not have noticed had I not thought 
it would appear disrespectful to disregard a communication directly from His Highness 
through whatever channel conveyed’.68 To this the Rajah simply replied ‘that he had 
mentioned the subject merely to shew that he did not wish to have any concealments, and that 
he relied perfectly on the friendship of the British Government’.69 Both Residents and rulers 
were thus to some extent guilty of perpetuating suspicion and misunderstanding in their desire 
to preserve stable relations and avoid confrontation.  
When rumours were true, however, Residents were sometimes forced to acknowledge 
them more unequivocally, even when they might have preferred not to, to maintain a show of 
good faith. William Palmer purposefully avoided informing the Poona court of his recall, 
worried that it would undermine the authority which remained to him until the arrival of his 
successor. Not wanting to disrupt the business then underway, Palmer chose to remain silent. 
Eventually, however, ‘the Event being known to many of the principal Inhabitants of this 
Town by intelligence from various Quarters I judged it necessary to obviate the suspicions 
which the Peshwa might entertain of motives unfavourable to him if an appearance of 
Concealment should be countenanced.’70 While in some cases it served the Resident’s 
interests to keep information from the ruler and his ministers, he did so at the risk of 
damaging the Company’s credit at court; generally that risk was too great to hazard, however 
embarrassing the information in question might be. For credit, as de Wicquefort observed, 
was the political representative’s most valuable commodity, ‘the Foundation of all the 
Commerce that passes among Men, of what Nature soever it may be.’71  
Moreover, although Residents generally preferred not to officially acknowledge 
rumours relating to factional politics, opting to rise above ‘the Intrigues and Squabbles of the 
Court’, this is not to say that these rumours were practically insignificant. 72 Whispers issuing 
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from hostile quarters could corrode the Resident’s political agenda over time, attenuating his 
connections to key players and his ability to mobilize them in pursuit of Company objectives. 
For instance, in 1822 Charles Metcalfe discovered that a party hostile to him, as part of a 
general attempt to undermine his proceedings at Hyderabad, had succeeded in persuading the 
minister Chandu Lal that Metcalfe intended to remove him from office. In consequence of 
this information, which Chandu Lal described vaguely as originating in ‘the neighbourhood of 
the Residency’, the minister ceased confiding in Metcalfe and instead tried to sidestep the 
Resident by corresponding directly with the Governor-General without Metcalfe’s 
knowledge. Chandu Lal later justified his actions to Metcalfe by reasoning ‘that he had been 
extremely alarmed by reports of Intrigues at the Court for his overthrow’, an alarm 
compounded by Metcalfe’s ‘reserve and distrust towards him’. Metcalfe himself had long 
been aware of these rumours, but admitted that he had done nothing to dispel them, not 
anticipating the degree to which Chandu Lal would be swayed by ‘such imaginary fears’.73 
Yet in an environment of instability and change fears are quick to take root and, as the 
activities of Chandu Lal make plain, fear can be a powerful spur to action, prompting 
individuals to take decisive measures in their own defence. The scholarship on rumour has 
illustrated time and again that rumour, fear, and collective tension are mutually reinforcing; 
where alarm and apprehension are acute, rumours can trigger dramatic reactions.74   
The performative power of rumours is perhaps most forcefully illustrated by a violent 
confrontation which broke out between British soldiers and local inhabitants of Poona in 
1809. In this instance, several soldiers on leave were assaulted on the street because of 
rumours that British construction workers, charged with building the Peshwa a palace in the 
English style, were seizing, murdering, and burying local women and children under the 
palace’s foundations. Hamilton, the Acting Resident, conceded that he had been aware of the 
rumour, but had not saw fit to communicate it to Government: ‘this report came first 
accidentally to my ears about five days ago, and I thought the most likely way to bring it into 
discredit, as far as my influence went, was to treat it with contempt or ridicule.’ In the wake 
of the confrontation, however, the Resident demanded that the royal ministers ‘supress reports 
so injurious to the English name (although in themselves so incredibly absurd) and find out 
and punish the authors of them.’ Hamilton expressed, moreover, ‘the conviction that they [the 
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rumours] were fabricated and circulated by enemies of the two Governments for the express 
purpose of disturbing the existing harmony.’75 Subsequently, the English soldiers’ movements 
were restricted to the cantonment for fear of further attacks.76 This account, if the 
interpretation of the Resident is to be believed, would appear to suggest the danger of 
ignoring rumours and allowing them to circulate unobstructed; it would imply that Residents 
were required to take action to suppress narratives which worked against the Company’s 
interests, and to present a powerful counter-narrative favourable to the Company’s image.77  
In line with this philosophy, following violent incidents of any kind the Residents 
were quick to make public announcements to stop the spread of rumours which might incite 
the local population to protest. While political gossip or rumours relating to military 
movements had to be treated with caution since attending to them could entail broader shifts 
in government policy and military strategy, anything which might ignite popular fears or 
resentments was promptly counteracted with a public statement. When a labourer died on the 
road after being knocked down by a British officer on horseback, apparently by accident, the 
Resident Henry Russell immediately issued statements ‘to prevent unpleasant reports from 
getting abroad’.78 Following a violent confrontation at Delhi between Muslims and Hindus, 
Archibald Seton wrote dispatches to the other Residencies informing them of his version of 
events, explaining his letter as an attempt to stem ‘the exaggeration and misrepresentation 
which generally attend the diffusion of intelligence regarding any incidental disturbance 
within the limits of the Company’s dominions.’79 It was for this reason too that following the 
mutiny at Vellore in 1807 the Governor-General issued immediate reports to the Residents, 
assuring them ‘that the disturbance has been merely local and that is ceased with the recapture 
of the fort and the destruction of the insurgents’, urging them to ‘counteract any reports which 
may prevail inconsistent with the real facts’; apparently, the uprising in Travancore in 1809 
was inspired, at least in part, by precisely such incendiary rumours about events at Vellore.80 
As Ranajit Guha has observed, rumour often played a significant role in mobilizing popular 
resistance to the Company by feeding into widespread hopes and fears.81 British officials were 
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keenly aware of this pattern. As Charles Metcalfe phrased it, ‘the Intelligence of disaster 
spreads like wildfire, and immediately excites the hopes and speculations of the Millions 
whom we hold in subjugation.’82 Residents recognized that rumoured attacks on Company 
rule elsewhere in the subcontinent, whether in the form of urban riots or organized military 
campaigns, could undermine impressions of British inviolability and tempt resentful Indian 
rulers to contribute to the barrage.   
Much of the Residents’ time and effort was thus expended in combatting 
unfavourable rumours, and many of them mobilized their epistolary networks for that 
purpose. Mountstuart Elphinstone repeatedly thanked his friend John Adam for forwarding 
him information which allowed him to undermine false reports at Nagpur. For instance, 
Adam’s information contradicted rumours of the Company’s defeat at the hands of Holkar, 
which, Elphinstone explained, ‘has been talked of here with perfect confidence & mentioned 
to me as a certainty’.83 A few weeks later, Elphinstone had further reason to thank Adam, 
admitting that ‘I really am obliged to you for your regular intelligence which enables me to 
refute many falsehoods which I should have otherwise been obliged to have suffered & to 
despise reports which I might have believed.’84 Indeed, Elphinstone worried that rumours like 
these might incite the Raja to abandon his stated neutrality and throw his support behind 
Holkar; Elphinstone blamed this tenuous state of affairs on ‘the circumstance of his vakeels 
having a charge of horse in Holkar’s army and consequently being inclined to trumpet his 
successes & suppress his defeats but the want of news is made up in inventions & Gen Lakes 
meets with checks & [loss] almost without number.’85 The following year Thomas Sydenham, 
acting Resident at Poona, was similarly engaged in attempting to root out the sources of 
reports ‘injurious to the British Government’. Again, the enemies of the British Government 
were accused of purposefully spreading ‘the most absurd and extravagant reports of the 
strength, resources, success and intentions of Holkar and his adherents’.86 The Company, 
then, had not only to defeat Indian forces in the battle field, but to ensure that accurate 
representations of these victories were communicated to rival courts. The Company sought to 
conjure up an aura of martial supremacy which would encourage political stability in India by 
precluding regional powers, through intimidation, from attempting to unseat them.  
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Alternately, news of the Company’s successes could act as a convincing disincentive 
for resistance; in this case the connections between courts could work in the Company’s 
favour. Following his successful repression of a revolt at Hyderabad, Henry Russell observed 
with pleasure that news of the Nizam’s surrender of his two rebellious sons had encouraged 
the Peshwa to submit to the Resident’s demands to put his own minister into Company 
custody. Russell also quoted letters from Richard Jenkins at Nagpur which suggested that 
there too events at Poona and Hyderabad were taken as a warning against pushing the 
Company too far.87 As Ann Stoler has observed with respect to gossip circulating in 
nineteenth-century Indonesia, ‘rumor was a highly ambiguous discursive field: it controlled 
some people, terrorized others; it was damning and enabling, shoring up colonial rule and 
subverting it at the same time.’88 Rumour could help perpetuate an atmosphere of fear, 
persuading Indian rulers to accede to the Residents’ demands.  
It was this slippery, polyvalent quality of rumour that the Residents had to try to 
control and mobilize for their own interests. Rumour was a pervasive feature of Indian courtly 
society, connected, it would seem, with the generalised sense of anxiety and suspicion 
resulting from the Company’s policy of subordinate isolation. Residents often mistrusted 
these rumours, and not without reason; rival factions used them as a resource to destabilize 
and mislead the Company, and by reacting too forcefully the Resident risked playing into his 
rivals’ hands. Still, rumours had to be considered with care; while courtly gossip was often 
best ignored, some rumours carried incendiary implications and could produce destructive 
consequences, whether in the form of street brawls or rebellions. In these instances, the 
Residents were responsible for countering with their own representations of events, whether 
of violent incidents in the streets or pitched battles on the field of combat. Publicizing the 
Company’s victories in this way was understood as a powerful intimidation tactic, a way of 
making the flow of information within and between courts work for the Company. To do all 
this effectively, however, Residents were reliant on the proper functioning of the Company’s 
networks, upon which their legitimacy and status as a Company representative equally 
depended. Yet, Residents were often frustrated to discover that it was within the Company 
itself where information tended to fall through the cracks, and where doubt and distrust were 
generated. The remainder of this chapter will consider how information circulated, or failed to 
circulate, within the Company’s political line, beginning with the disputed relationship 
between private and public correspondence.  
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3. Between private disclosures and public avowals  
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, ‘private’ and ‘public’ were 
contested categories whose boundaries were shifting and pliable. Given the pervasiveness of 
patronage, ties of personal and occupational affiliation tended to overlap; appointments to the 
Company depended on nomination from the Court of Directors, meaning that most employees 
were connected in one way or another through ties of blood or friendship. The concept of 
‘friendship’ itself (a generic term which encompassed people connected through kinship, 
sentiment, occupation, politics, and all manner of other attachments) was defined largely by 
reciprocal services.89 This imbrication of public and private was reflected in contemporary 
epistolary practice, through which enterprising individuals in the eighteenth century 
mobilized friends and kin, often in the interests of advancing their careers.90  Historians have 
argued that eighteenth-century correspondence cannot be neatly categorized as ‘private’ or 
‘public’ at all; Clare Brant has suggested abandoning the concept of ‘private’ letters 
altogether, arguing that the term ‘is simply inaccurate for many eighteenth-century familiar 
letters, which were composed in company, voluntarily circulated beyond the addressee, and 
frequently found their way into print.’91 Yet, few studies of eighteenth-century letters actually 
explore public/private as categories of practice as well as analysis, or examine the 
consequences of that distinction on a pragmatic level. 92 For the Residents, at least, the 
existence of two overlapping epistolary traditions, a public and a private, posed definite 
possibilities (and perils).  
Rather than constituting two distinct categories, ‘public’ and ‘private’ (at least as they 
applied to the Residents’ letter-writing practices) are perhaps most usefully envisioned as 
existing on either end of a spectrum. On one extreme were official dispatches, usually 
transcribed neatly on large sheets of paper, written formally and clearly. On the other extreme 
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were personal epistles, scrawled messily on scraps of paper, written in intimate tones relating 
matters of interest only to the author and a small circle of friends and kin; in the language of 
the day these were usually termed ‘familiar letters’.93 Given the Residents’ remote situation, 
familiar letters were imbued with profound emotional significance. Reacting to his 
appointment to the Residency at Nagpur, Elphinstone admitted to his close friend Edward 
Strachey (then Assistant Resident at Poona) that ‘I dread being stationed long at a place where 
I shall be so solitary’, begging Strachey to ‘write me often and long in prose and verse, and 
have compassion on me now that I am door ooftadeh [outcast].’ As a counterpoint to the dry 
Company correspondence piling up on his desk, Elphinstone requested ‘long, frequent, open, 
wild, sentimental letters, with occasional peeps down the very abyss of your heart’.94 In the 
longer term, letters like these furnished Elphinstone with an avenue to his past life, which, as 
David A. Gerber has observed in his study of emigrant letter-writers in North America, was a 
crucial factor in helping dislocated individuals to sustain a sense of personal history and of 
self.95 Elphinstone regularly re-read old letters and journals, which, he explained, allowed him 
to ‘recall not only the occurrences but the opinions & sensations of past times’.96 Through 
these exchanges, the Residents were able to stake out a personal life separate from their 
professional lives as Company officials. Accordingly, Residents sometimes made a conscious 
effort to avoid writing too extensively about work, even in their letters to friends in the 
political line. ‘Enough’, Metcalfe concluded after a long paragraph deploring the policies of 
his predecessor in office, ‘this letter begins to smell of the shop.’97 
Familiar letters could also provide a welcome venue for informal conversation, as 
well as a cathartic outlet for feelings and opinions which might otherwise have remained 
painfully pent up. James Achilles Kirkpatrick certainly viewed his letters to his brothers as an 
outlet for sorrows and resentments which could not easily be voiced in the company of his 
household, who were his inferiors in rank. After being rebuked by his brother for complaining 
about a colleague, Kirkpatrick protested ‘my dear Will if I do not unbosom myself to you, and 
lay open to you all my weaknesses even, it will be a cruel mortification to me’.98 Though 
James conceded that William was perhaps right in admonishing him for his virulence, and 
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even thanked his brother for his counsel, he nevertheless boldly claimed his right to 
‘unburthen myself so unreservedly’.99 While it was not unusual for ‘private’ letters to be 
shared among family and friends, in cases like these when the author deemed the contents 
unsuitable for wider consumption (usually because they touched on personally or politically 
sensitive subject matter), letters were labelled ‘private’, ‘secret’, or ‘most secret’, occasionally 
underlined several times for greater effect. Sometimes these stipulations were made in the text 
of the letter itself; after going on rather at length about the defects of a colleague in a letter to 
Lady Hood, Mountstuart Elphinstone concluded, ‘Your Ladyship will perhaps have surmised 
that this letter is not intended to be read at the breakfast table.’100  
Letters like these might be cause for embarrassment if their contents became widely 
known, but they had little practical relevance for Company business. Where public and 
private correspondence converged more significantly, it was usually when Residents sought 
out auxiliary channels of information in cases where official, institutional sources had dried 
up. Sometimes it was a particular colleague in the political line who proved frustratingly 
reticent. No single individual appears to have inspired so much ill feeling on this head as the 
Resident Colonel Barry Close. In 1802 tensions ran high as the Governor-General-in-Council 
reprimanded James Achilles Kirkpatrick for what was perceived to be a tone of 
‘dissatisfaction & of mistrust’ in his official letter addressed to Colonel Close. Though 
Kirkpatrick apologized profusely, vowing that he had written the letter entirely unmotivated 
by personal resentments, he nevertheless emphasized the risk to public interests arising out of 
‘the ignorance under which I laboured – not only of the result of Colonel Close’s 
Negociations but of his proceedings and intentions at large’.101  Barry Close’s epistolary 
habits continued to draw complaints over the course of the following decade. This was a man 
who Henry Russell deemed ‘reserved and mysterious and everything he does, and everything 
he intends to do’, and who Mountstuart Elphinstone characterized as a ‘captious & fractious 
[…] old gentleman’ who ‘scarce ever answers letters’. 102 The acrimonious tone with which 
contemporaries described Close’s reserve suggests how important regular and accurate 
communication was in the political line. Individual idiosyncrasies could have broad 
ramifications given that Residents and other officials were reliant on the information 
contained in dispatches from colleagues at other courts. In consequence, the epistolary foibles 
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of fellow Residents were recurring points of discussion in official and familiar letters of the 
period. 103 Historians are left with reams of letters about letters which reflect the Residents’ 
awareness of the finer points of what Eve Tavor Bannet describes as letteracy: ‘the collection 
of different skills, values, and kinds of knowledge beyond mere literacy that were involved in 
achieving competency in the writing, reading, and interpreting of letters.’104  
Though Residents sometimes squabbled amongst themselves, more often than not 
obstacles to the smooth flow of information emanated from the heart of the administration. 
One of the most regular complaints in the Residents’ correspondence was of the neglect they 
suffered at the hands of the Governor-General-in-Council in Calcutta, who were supposed to 
be overseeing and supporting them in their role at Indian courts. Partly this neglect was a 
product of geographical distance between administrative centres, but the bigger problem 
seems to have been an overload of business which the central government struggled to keep 
under control. The Governor-General-in-Council in Calcutta was notorious for leaving its 
Residents in the lurch, sometimes failing to respond to important missives for months at a 
time. James Achilles Kirkpatrick had to wait impatiently not just for an acknowledgment of 
the treaty he had signed with the Nizam in 1799, but for any news or information at all from 
‘any one in the Calcutta Quarter’. Kirkpatrick’s only consolation was that he was not alone in 
his state of neglect, noting ‘the account Mr. Strachey gives of the extreme delay experienced 
in every public Department of late’, further remarking that ‘Scott the Lucknow Resident 
complains he says, that he has been half a year together without a Reply to references of the 
greatest importance!!’105 In this instance, James Achilles was writing informally to his brother 
William, who was a member of Wellesley’s council in Calcutta and could offer an insider’s 
insight into the Governor-General’s mood; this family connection was an important one for 
Kirkpatrick at a time when official contact was intermittent.  
More than simply filling in the vacuum left by official sources, news passed through 
private correspondence tended to differ in content and tone. In personal letters individuals 
could express themselves more freely, and give rein to opinions and conjectures which they 
might have hesitated to make public in official dispatches. James Achilles Kirkpatrick, for 
one, lauded ‘that freedom of narration and opinion which is the peculiar characteristic and 
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perhaps the merit of private correspondence.’106 Charles Warre Malet, Resident at Poona, 
likewise seemed to derive great succor from the letters of George Cherry, the official at 
Benares, whose correspondence, he claimed, contained ‘Landmarks which to a Wanderer like 
me in the Wide Sea of Politics must Ever be Extremely grateful & useful.’107 Malet repaid the 
favour by sending Cherry ‘my Country Intelligence which I must continue to recommend to 
your attentive Perusal as Containing a number of Items & Clues for Consideration which tho 
highly worthy of Notice are not of a nature to be introduced into my official Correspondence 
with Government.’108 In the interests of maintaining their personal credit, Residents were 
generally careful to limit their official reports to concrete facts, but bare accounts of 
developments at court were sometimes of little use without an interpretative layer to give 
them context and meaning. Private letters could therefore be a useful supplement to official 
despatches.  
This intersection of private and public correspondence could prove problematic, 
however. Sometimes networks of information fragmented; crucial facts were channeled 
through private letters rather than public correspondence, thereby becoming inaccessible to 
the central government who would otherwise have received copies of the letters being 
exchanged. Thomas Sydenham lost his position at the Hyderabad Residency because he failed 
to apprise the government of his correspondence with a captain implicated in an army revolt; 
although Captain Doveton had consulted Sydenham as a friend, the Governor-General-in-
Council argued that it was Sydenham’s duty to report the exchange, and charged him with 
having acted ‘with a deliberate purpose to conceal from the knowledge of Government all the 
circumstances of that transaction’.109 At the same time, the disclosure of personal 
correspondence in this fashion was not universally regarded as appropriate, even under such 
dramatic circumstances. When Henry Russell learned of what had passed at Doveton’s trial, 
where Sydenham’s private letter was made public, he wrote to his brother Charles that ‘if he 
[Sydenham] authorized Doveton to produce it upon the Court Martial, he is a Fool; and if 
Doveton produced it without that authority, he is a Villain. They may make the Selection 
between them.’110 Where personal and professional relationships overlapped, as they so often 
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did in India given that most Britons living there were in one way or another associated with 
the Company, the lines between public and private were clouded and complications ensued.  
Given the difficulties which could potentially erupt around the imbrication of public 
interests and private relationships, some Company employees appear to have considered the 
maintenance of a strict distinction between the two as the best defense against future 
animadversions. This strategy is rendered most transparent in the correspondence between 
brothers, where older siblings advised younger ones about the desirability of disentangling 
political and personal topics.111 The Resident Henry Russell was particularly keen to educate 
his younger brother Charles in the art of letter-writing, and his missives are therefore very 
revealing of the epistolary conventions of the day. Henry commented on Charles’ style 
(‘where[,] did you imbibe that horrid Expression “Your Letter may hereafter perhaps come to 
Hand”? It smells so strongly of the Haberdasher’) and his punctuality, or lack thereof. 
(‘Reciprocity is the Law of Epistolary Communications’.)112 What Henry emphasized most 
pointedly was the importance of differentiating between the appropriate contents of private 
and public correspondence, respectively. In a letter written on 12 June 1805, for example, 
Henry chided Charles for openly expressing his opinions on the present administration of the 
Company. ‘The Difference of our Opinions respecting Lord Cornwallis as a Governor’, 
Henry reminded him, ‘is a Difference of a political nature; which it is always impolite, and 
frequently dangerous, to render the subject of a familiar Letter.’113 In a later communication, 
dated 4 June 1810, Russell censured the inclusion of personal details in a letter which Charles 
had composed to the secretary to the Governor General, in which Charles alluded to then-
Resident Thomas Sydenham’s plans to meet Colonel Barry Close and his brother, George 
Sydenham. In Henry’s view, Sydenham’s arrangement was ‘a private Thing, [with] nothing in 
it either to require or deserve that it should be reported to the G.G. [Governor-General]’.114 In 
Henry Russell’s mind, the safest route to take in official letters was to be as objective and 
impersonal as possible; by avoiding points of dispute or questions of interpretation, it was 
possible to limit the likelihood of disagreement or reproach. 115 
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At the same time, there were advantages to blurring the boundaries between public 
and private epistolary modes in letters to Calcutta. The uncertain divide between the two 
could give Residents room for manoeuvre when considering how to report events at court. 
This is what is suggested to us by Henry Russell’s commentary on his means of conducting 
his dispute with Colonel Montresor, the head of the Hyderabad subsidiary detachment. 
Accompanying a letter to his brother on the subject, Henry forwarded a copy of an official 
despatch along with a private letter he’d written to the secretary to the Governor-General Neil 
Benjamin Edmonstone. Henry asked his brother’s candid opinion on these documents. He 
himself was sanguine, particularly about his private letter to Edmonstone: ‘I would have made 
it a public One, but that I should not perhaps be authorized in putting Extracts from 
Montresor’s private Letters to me into a public Despatch, without his Permission, and that my 
reference to the conduct of the Bombay Govt is too nice a Point for me to touch upon securely 
in any other than a private Letter.’116 Knowing that the conventions governing public 
dispatches dictated against the inclusion of passages from personal letters, and wary of 
touching on the politically sensitive issue of the relationship between the governments of 
Bombay and Calcutta, Russell nevertheless forwarded these points in a private letter which, 
trusting in the uncertainty underlying the divide between public and private, he thought might 
very well influence the outcome of a public dispute. Likewise, when in 1810 Russell feared 
that he had overstepped his orders by giving the ruler of Poona the aid of the subsidiary force 
without the previous sanction of the Governor-General-in-Council, Russell gives his 
explanation in two forms, one official, the other private, describing himself as being anxious 
to ‘avail myself of the freedom of a private letter to discuss them [points of debate] more at 
length than I could under an official form’.117 
Barry Close, though in other respects a bad correspondent (if his contemporaries in 
the service are to be believed), likewise furnishes us with an example of the ways in which a 
Resident might use the private epistolary form to sidestep an indiscretion. From the very first 
sentence of his letter of 29 April 1802, Close signals the unconventionality of his epistolary 
choice, writing that ‘the sequel of this address will explain to your Lordship the motives 
which induce me to give it a private form.’118 The letter describes a secret meeting between 
the Peshwa of Poona and Close, which the Peshwa himself had proposed on the condition that 
Close agree to keep all topics of discussion, and even the meeting itself, a secret. Although 
Close clearly perceived the value of a private conversation with the Peshwa unattended by his 
ministers or constrained by the formalities of the open darbar, it was nevertheless obvious 
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that Close would be in serious breach of his orders if he met with the ruler without reporting it 
to the Governor-General-in-Council. Accordingly, Close suggested a compromise: ‘I should 
adopt a private mode of address that would induce your Lordship to allow the subject to 
continue secret till disclosing it should become a matter of indifference, and that his Highness 
might rely that beyond your Lordship I should observe the most profound secrecy.’119 To this 
the Peshwa acquiesced. By resorting to a private letter, Close could make a show of 
confidentiality and good faith to the Peshwa, without betraying his responsibility to the 
Governor-General. Private letters could thus provide a kind of useful middle ground for the 
Resident, although in this case Close had nothing much to report after the meeting other than 
that the Peshwa was trying to set their relationship on a more friendly and intimate footing.120  
Thus, the variety of epistolary modes available to the Residents, from public to demi-
official to private, each had their own advantages. While there were certain dangers 
associated with breaching public topics in unofficial correspondence, there were also rewards; 
news communicated in this fashion was enriched by an interpretative layer of opinion often 
missing from official accounts, while the looser conventions of familiar letters could 
sometimes allow Residents to advance arguments which would have been considered 
inappropriate in public dispatches. The existence of this disparate tradition was therefore a 
useful weapon in the Resident’s repertoire, meaning that Residents continued to employ it 
even in the face of official reproof. This ability to move between public and private was part 
and parcel of the Residents’ larger powers of representation, a point of great concern for the 
administrators in London and Calcutta who often had no choice but to put their faith in the 
Resident’s version of events transpiring at court. The Residents’ strategic modes of reportage 
raise the question of what they might have been trying to gloss over, and why; the following 
section will consider in greater detail some of the tensions which flared up around the 
credibility of the Residents’ testimony.  
4. Silences and misrepresentations in the official archive  
 Bernard Cohn once famously described the vast records of the East India Company as 
the embodiment of his argument about the conquest of India as a conquest of knowledge. 
Cohn identified the dusty tomes in the former India Office Library as a form of tribute, 
exacted from communities of learned Indians, which enabled Company rule.121 Recent studies 
of colonial archives, however, have suggested that the sheer volume of records should be 
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interpreted less as a sign of imperial confidence than as a symptom of ‘epistemic anxiety’.122 
Remarking on the difficulty with which colonial officials in distant administrative 
headquarters struggled to keep abreast of emerging events, historians like H.V. Bowen and 
Ann Laura Stoler have described the archive as a repository of knowledge riven with silences 
and omissions, always in the process of ‘catching up’ to realities on the ground.123 
Meanwhile, the assumed connections between documentation, transparency, and 
accountability have also been brought into question. Bhavani Raman has observed that 
documentary practices which were supposed to make visible the exercise of colonial power, 
rendering it amenable to the oversight of the central administration, in fact enabled precisely 
the kinds of corruption they were meant to prevent: ‘far from fixing, codifying, and stabilising 
or reconciling the contradictions of rule, acts of filing, listing, and registering generate 
domains for all manner of transactions at the margins of the documentary state.’124  Given the 
political significance of their work, the Residents were under more pressure than other 
Company employees to keep the administration of Calcutta apprised of their activities, even 
keeping daily journals which they were expected to send along to the Governor-General at set 
intervals. Still, these reams of paper did not entirely efface doubts about the reliability of the 
Residents’ representations. Trust was central to the operations of the Company’s intelligence-
gathering apparatus, given that the secretariat in Calcutta had no other option but to trust in 
the accuracy of the reports they received from distant Residencies. Yet trust continued to be a 
problem and a point of ill feeling between the Residents in Indian capitals and their superiors 
in Company headquarters.  
To the extent that Company archives were patchy and partial, the Residents were 
certainly contributing to their unevenness. Residents consciously foreclosed lines of 
communication emanating from the Indian court as a means of consolidating their own role as 
mediator, and the power and authority attendant on that position. As Nathalie Rothman has 
pointed out, though we often take the ‘in-betweenness’ of cultural brokers for granted, 
intermediaries have a vested interest in constructing cultural boundaries and strategically 
fashioning themselves as in-between so as to secure their positions by rendering themselves 
invaluable.125 The Resident thus had practical reasons for presenting himself as uniquely 
equipped to manage the concerns of the Company at court, defending his prerogative on the 
basis of the threat presented to the British public image in India by unregulated intercourse 
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between the Indian ruler and Europeans outside the political line. Such unofficial 
relationships, it was argued, might upset the Resident’s finely calibrated diplomatic strategies, 
potentially undermining his authority at court. Colin Macaulay, the Resident at Travancore, 
successfully applied to the Madras government to order the Commercial Resident at Anjengo 
William Augustus Handley to refrain from corresponding with the Rajah or diwan of 
Travancore, convincing the Madras government of ‘the serious injury which might arise from 
the appearance of a divided authority in the administration of the British Interests in that part 
of India’.126 Even the most seemingly trivial transactions could be refused at the Resident’s 
say-so; Richard Strachey stubbornly disallowed the exchange of letters and gifts between the 
Nawab Vizier of Awadh and a certain Dr. Pears, a former acquaintance of the Nawab 
stationed at Chittra, even when the correspondence consisted of minor pleasantries and the 
exchange of gifts.127  
It wasn’t just marginal figures like Dr. Pears that were prevented from developing 
unmediated relationships with Indian courts. Residents were empowered to deny the very 
highest echelons of the Company’s staff the privilege of communicating with Indian 
sovereigns. Even the Governor General was prohibited from engaging in such a private 
correspondence.128 When Lady Hood (a visitor to Lucknow) innocently forwarded a letter to 
the Governor-General directly from the Nawab, the Marquess of Hastings, in his own words, 
‘remonstrated with Lady Hood by Letter for having forwarded even such a paper in breach of 
the Regulation which requires all communications from Foreign Princes to go thro’ the 
Resident at the respective Courts.’ Hastings then informed the Resident John Baillie of the 
circumstance, ‘that he might be confident no indirect correspondence would ever be allowed 
by me’. 129   
The limited relationship between the Indian court and the Governor-General-in-
Council meant that the Resident had it in his power to frame his reports to his advantage, and, 
in so doing, to misrepresent developments at court which were adverse to his self-interest. 
The Resident therefore had an advantage when it came to courting the favour and support of 
the Governor-General-in-Council over and against the appeals of the Indian courtly elite. The 
exceptions tend to prove the rule. For example, the Marquess of Hastings did eventually 
dismiss John Baillie from his post as Resident, in accordance with the Nawab Vizier Ghazi-
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ud-din Haidar’s demands, but only after several years and a series of written and oral 
complaints from both the Nawab and his predecessor Saadat Ali. Hastings, in retrospect, 
discovered that Baillie’s association with the Company had made the Nawab and his ministers 
loath to cross him, meaning that Baillie ‘had no terms to keep with His Excellency beyond the 
screening himself from having direct indecorum proved against him’.130 The Nawab’s 
resentments were therefore suppressed and, concealed beneath a thin veneer of civility, 
allowed to fester.131 Relations with the Resident soured to such an extent that the Nawab 
declared himself willing to take desperate measures and to ally himself with any power able 
to take the field against the Company.132 Although Baillie was caught in the end, the fact that 
relations with the Nawab were allowed to degenerate to such a point illustrates the extent to 
which the Company was unable or on occasion unwilling to monitor the Residents closely.  
The epistolary exchanges between the Governor General Minto and the Nawab Vizier 
Saadat Ali Khan during the earlier part of the crisis make this lack of oversight amply evident. 
When in 1808 the Vizier requested a private interview with the then-Governor General, Minto 
not only refused to make a personal visit, but reprimanded the Nawab for withholding his 
entire confidence from the Resident, reminding the Nawab that nothing could be achieved 
outside the official and designated channels. Tellingly, in response to this crisis Baillie placed 
his own behaviour beyond suspicion, asserting in his letters that he would have been uneasy 
about these protests on the part of the Nawab ‘if a minute & attentive introspect of my own 
proceedings at the Durbar, & of every recent discussion between his Excellency and me had 
not entirely precluded the possibility of my connecting the avowed distress of his mind with 
any part of my proceedings’.133  In 1813, when the Vizier wrote to Governor General Minto 
again, explicitly complaining this time about the insulting and aggressive tone of the Resident 
and accusing the Resident moreover of falsifying the Nawab’s words in letters to the 
Governor-General, Minto was once more dismissive. Responding to the Nawab’s description 
of a particular instance of threatening conduct adopted by the Resident John Baillie, Minto 
referred to ‘the clear and satisfactory statement’ which Baillie gave in writing of that meeting, 
as well as the ‘acknowledged integrity and veracity of that officer’, on the basis of which 
Minto remained convinced that ‘your Excellency must have entirely misapprehended the 
tenor, spirit and manner of his discourses to your Excellency on that occasion’.134 Ironically, 
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Minto concluded his letter to the Vizier by reprimanding him for the tone which he, the 
Vizier, adopted in his letters to the Resident. 
Similarly, following the outbreak of the revolt in Travancore, the parliamentary 
Board of Control in London were shocked to find that they had not been apprised of letters of 
complaint written by the Rajah and minister of Travancore to the Governor-General, and 
criticized the Indian government’s apparent disregard for the appeals contained therein.135 The 
Rajah of Travancore himself provided an account, in a letter to government, of the isolation 
and silence imposed on him by the Resident during this period. Because of Company 
conventions, the Rajah was forced to entrust his letters of complaint about Lieutenant Colonel 
Colin Macaulay, into the hands of Lieutenant Colonel Macaulay himself, who delivered these 
letters in person to the Governor-General in Bengal. When Macaulay returned with letters 
from Governor-General Wellesley, the Rajah was, in his own words, ‘utterly astonished’, 
remarking that ‘the Colonel had impressed His Excellency’s [the Governor-General’s] mind 
with a belief of what I had never represented’.136 The Rajah then attempted to communicate 
with Wellesley directly by letter, only to be reprimanded for not transmitting his epistle 
through the channel of the Resident. Later, when (according to the Rajah’s account) the 
Resident attempted to impose a new treaty upon him by force, the Rajah felt that he had no 
option but to concede defeat, ‘apprehending that if I wrote a letter to the supreme Government 
for the purpose of exposing my innocence I could only transmit it through the channel of 
Lieutenant Colonel Macaulay.’137 
At the same time, the case of Colin Macaulay also exemplifies how such 
dissimulation on the part of the Resident could lead the government to doubt the truth of his 
reports, even where his information was accurate. Despite their earlier disregard for the 
complaints issuing from Travancore, the government appear to have entertained a growing 
suspicion that Colin Macaulay was not to be trusted in his representation of that court. This 
budding doubt seems to have prevented them from furnishing him with military support when 
the uprising at Travancore finally did erupt. According to the Parliamentary Board of 
Control’s enquiry, the government countermanded the orders for marching troops to the 
frontiers of Travancore following the outbreak of violence, and recalled Colonel Macaulay 
from the Residency. In justifying their actions, the Indian government stated merely that they 
had ‘received information of a private nature from different quarters which certainly 
impressed [them] with a belief that the rumours respecting the preparations in Travancore had 
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been exaggerated.’ They founded their apprehensions on the ‘well known’ fact that the 
Resident was on bad terms with the minister. Meanwhile, the minister had continued to send 
letters to government evincing ‘the strongest professions of his earnest desire and endeavour 
to preserve undisturbed the subsisting relations between the two Countries’ (starkly 
contradicting the Resident’s desperate letters reporting the minister’s preparations for war).138 
In this instance, distrust of the Resident had built to such a pitch that private information from 
unnamed sources, corroborated by protestations from the rebellious minister, meant that 
Colonel Macaulay was left undefended and in the end forced to run for his life when on the 
night of 27 December an armed force led by the minister attacked and plundered Macaulay’s 
home. By misrepresenting goings-on in Travancore, Macaulay endangered his credit with the 
Company, which in turn meant that he could not rely on their support when his very life was 
in danger.  
The example of Colin Macaulay complicates our assumptions about the relationship 
between administrators in Company headquarters and agents on the ground. It reminds us that 
while Company officials might benefit from strategies of concealment, there were also 
advantages to official transparency; honesty was one significant means of generating trust, 
ensuring that the Resident could call on Company support when necessary. Moreover, being 
open with one’s superiors about an intended line of action was an important way of limiting 
personal liability if diplomatic relations took a turn for the worse; it meant that the Resident 
could later justify his actions by pointing out that the logic of his decision had been 
corroborated by senior officials. This was a general rule of diplomatic conduct in the early 
modern period; as de Wicquefort advised his readers, ‘the Minister who undertakes an Affair 
for which he has no Orders, is responsible for the Success thereof; whereas he who only 
executes the Orders that are given him, how unjust or unreasonable soever they may be, 
charges his Master therewith.’139 Thus, while there are notorious instances of Residents 
painting an inaccurate picture of developments at court, Residents also stood to gain from 
presenting detailed portraits of events to their superiors in Calcutta, in the interests of risk 
management.  
Yet, the example of Henry Russell suggests that Residents who operated according to 
this principle might find that their forthrightness was not repaid in kind by their superiors in 
Calcutta. Russell (then Acting Resident at Poona) was outraged when the Governor-General-
in-Council urged him not to intervene too directly in the dispute between the Peshwa and the 
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southern jagirdars, an order which in his mind directly contradicted the instructions he’d 
initially been given when the conflict first broke out.140 Russell decided to adhere to the 
Company’s original policy, taking an aggressive stance which in the end successfully 
convinced the recalcitrant jagirdar Appah Sahib to submit to the Peshwa’s authority. While 
Russell conceded that the Governor-General-in-Council could hardly complain about the 
outcome of the negotiations, he felt that ‘it will be rather inconsistent for them to praise the 
End, after blaming the means’. Russell’s conclusions following this incident are worth 
quoting in full for what they reveal about the awkward position which the Resident was 
sometimes placed in because of fluctuations higher up in the political line:  
They have used me very unhandsomely; so much so that I never can feel an confidence in 
them again. Before I set my Foot on the Ground, I will always hereafter make them chalk out 
the very spot on which I am to place it. They send me a set of Instructions so plain and clear, 
that I will defy a Child of six years old to mistake their fair meaning; and no sooner have I 
begun to act upon them, and gone too far to retract with credit, then they send me another set, 
attempting, with the most frivolous refinement, to explain the Tone of the former ones entirely 
away, and insinuating pretty plainly, ‘if you act upon our Instructions, and are successful, well 
and good; but if, in consequence of your acting upon them, any Expense or temporary 
Inconvenience is incurred, the Blame will rest with you.’ This is not the way a government 
ought to act in.141 
The Governor-General might be dependent on the representations of the Resident when it 
came to developments at Indian courts, but the Resident, in turn, relied on the Governor-
General for guidance, legitimacy, and support. While the Governor-General-in-Council might 
suspect the Residents of omitting or misrepresenting information, Residents for their part 
were prone to complain about the lack of direction and assistance they received from 
Calcutta, which, as mentioned in Section 3, often forced Residents to seek information from 
auxiliary channels. Residents, then, might argue that the Governor-General-in-Council were 
more often the source of miscommunication and artifice in the political line, to the detriment 
of the Company’s political interests at Indian courts.  
Trust has long been recognized as foundational to social order; by consciously or 
unconsciously enabling us to form expectations of other people, trust provides a basis for 
human association. As we will see in Chapter 2, trust figured centrally in eighteenth-century 
conceptions of international law, as well as playing an important part in the scientific 
enterprise and other knowledge-building projects.142 Yet trust was a valuable commodity 
which seems to have been in relatively short supply in the political line. Company 
administrators were inclined to place greater trust in the British Resident than in the Indian 
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courtly elite, but that trust was not boundless. The Resident’s distance from imperial centres 
of control, and the discretionary power which he enjoyed in consequence, were known and 
questioned by those higher up in the political line. Residents who were suspicious of the 
Indian courtly elite tended to use their letters as an instrument for cultivating the same 
suspicion among their superiors in the Company, but the more they deviated from the facts, 
the greater the risk that they would bear the brunt of their misrepresentations in the end. Yet 
even those who rigorously adhered to the Company’s standard of scrupulous documentation 
had reason to feel that they were poorly rewarded for their candour by the lack of clear 
communications from Calcutta. Thus, lack of trust was a common trait underlying Company 
intercourse as well as being a feature of interactions between Residents and Indian 
informants.  
Conclusion 
 Political intelligence is known to have played an important role in the Company’s 
political expansion in the subcontinent in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. 
Through the Residents, however, we are alerted to some of the social and cultural dimensions 
which previous studies of the Company’s communications and intelligence-gathering 
networks have elided. We see how letters, as a medium of communication as well as a 
material object, could serve powerful political and diplomatic functions, which Residents and 
their Indian counterparts expertly sought to control. The strategies through which letters were 
composed and deployed, whether in public ceremonies or in private chambers, were just as 
important as the routes by which they were transmitted.  
While Residents had access to technical knowledge and experience which allowed 
them to use letters in this way, different strategies had to be devised to address the unruly 
realm of oral culture and public opinion. In response to the rumours industriously circulated 
by rival factions, Residents publicized the Company’s victories, and minimized its problems. 
To effectively combat the stories percolating through the streets and bazaars of royal capitals, 
however, the Resident relied on the smooth functioning of the Company’s information 
networks, and in this he was often disappointed. Through the eyes of the Resident, we see 
how suspicion, doubt, and mismanagement were rife within the Company itself, where 
essential information was liable to fall through the cracks. Tensions erupted as a result of 
distance, an overload of paperwork, neglect, fragmentation, and explicit strategies of 
misrepresentation. C.A. Bayly argued that there was an information crisis within the 
Company in the nineteenth century arising from its inability to successfully exploit Indian 
networks, but overlaying these networks were European relationships that were equally hard 
to police.  
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This aspect of the Resident’s work brings to light more general themes relating to his 
place in Indian courtly society as well as his position within the Company’s official hierarchy. 
Contemptuous attitudes to Indian news media reflect the cultural arrogance we might expect 
of British imperial officials, but the skill with which the Resident managed the exchange and 
interception of letters suggests how certain basic similarities between Indian and British 
political culture facilitated the consolidation of the Resident’s influence at court. The British 
and Indian elite had in common a highly sophisticated epistolary culture which placed great 
importance in subtleties of prose and address as well as the materiality of seals, ink, and 
paper. With the aid of skilled scribes and translators, Residents were therefore well equipped 
to penetrate, and make sense of, the stream of letters which flowed from court to court. At the 
same time, the Resident’s trustworthiness as a reliable conduit of information was, from a 
Company perspective, ever in doubt. Not only did administrators in London and Calcutta fear 
that the Resident was being taken in by Indian informants with agendas of their own, they 
also worried that the Resident was using private letters to forward information which ought, 
by rights, to have been accessible to their scrutiny and supervision.  
This chapter has focused more on the use of the pen than the sword, but based on the 
letters and rumours discussed here, it should already be apparent that violence or the threat of 
violence was a recurring feature of Residency business. Most of the political intelligence 
which Residents noted in their journals and forwarded in their letters related to the threat of 
war or general revolt, while much of the gossip circulating in the streets involved alleged 
incidents of British brutality. The following chapter will consider the role of violence in the 
developing Residency system, both as an ideological justification for Company intervention 
as well as a mode of imperial authority.  
65 
 
 
Chapter 2. Politics by other means: The use of force in 
theory and practice 
One distinctive feature of the East India Company in the early nineteenth century was 
its militarism: its employees’ high valuation of, and persistent reliance on, military measures. 
Writing to The Times, a Company officer affirmed that ‘the influence we have acquired in 
India is by arms and can be preserved by victory alone. Public opinion follows our successful 
standards, but would speedily quit them in the first moment of defeat.’1 The Company’s 
power and authority on the subcontinent was, effectively, equated with its ability to bring 
physical force to bear on recalcitrant populations. Contemporary opinion was that this 
emphasis on military might was in sync with pre-colonial conceptions of political legitimacy, 
which was believed to rest, at least in part, on displays of strength.2 While there were 
undoubtedly dissenters, historian Douglas Peers has shown how Anglo-Indian militarism 
united conservatives, orientalists, and liberal imperialists who, though they might have 
different visions of the kind of empire they aspired to in India, nevertheless agreed that the 
threat of punitive measures was the only means of securing them.3 This logic underpinned the 
use of force on different scales, from military campaigns to corporeal punishment; all were 
described and justified in similar terms, that is, with reference to the perceived nature of 
Indians and Indian political culture.  
 Some of the most vocal proponents of this view were Residents, and the aim of this 
chapter is to explain why the men of the political line felt the need for these coercive tactics, 
and with what consequences. Although historians have conventionally accepted Douglas 
Peers’s portrayal of the East India Company as a garrison state, more work remains to be 
done with regards to how violence was understood and used as a technique of power by the 
Company’s political agents during the formative period of Company rule.4 The absence of 
violence is particularly noteworthy in existing accounts of the Residencies, which tend either 
to present a rosy portrait of cross-cultural harmony, or an image of undisturbed imperial 
hegemony. These seemingly diametrically opposed portrayals both obscure the stories of 
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resistance and repression which saturate the sources, passing over the Residents’ vulnerability 
as well as how aggressively Residents sought to pre-empt perceived threats. While Michael 
Fisher and Barbara Ramusack are right to suggest that the Company’s superior military 
resources were an important component of indirect rule, they overemphasize the compliance 
of the Indian population when confronted with the Company’s military might.5 This chapter 
seeks to recover the turbulence and political unrest which was such a prominent feature of 
Residency life in the early nineteenth century.  
Just as critically, this chapter highlights the serious differences of opinion which 
existed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century regarding the meanings of violence 
and its appropriate forms and uses. These varied understandings of violence informed its 
uneven deployment and the ways in which such acts were subsequently debated as acceptable 
or otherwise. Company policy on the use of force was particularly far from uniform where the 
Residents were concerned. After all, the Residents were supposed to be diplomats and 
mediators, responsible for conciliating the ruler and his ministers to Company policy. The 
wider context of war and resistance seems to have predisposed the Residents to the use of 
brute tactics in pursuit of their political agendas, but this was, in the minds of their superiors, 
a troubling affinity which contradicted the very purpose for which the Residency, as an 
institution, had been created. The use of physical force therefore became a significant point of 
tension between the Residents on the ground and their superiors in London and Calcutta. 
Residents could not envision a form of political influence in India which did not manifest 
itself through violence, while their superiors were, on the contrary, determined to preserve a 
sharp, if somewhat artificial, distinction between their military and political arms. An analysis 
of the Residents therefore highlights the ways in which war and diplomacy, violence and 
politics, intermingled in an imperial context, flying in the face of a contemporary discourse 
which sought to justify imperial influence by emphasizing its civilizing and peace-bringing 
effects.  
The following chapter will consider the causes and consequences of these attitudes 
about the use of force within the political line, as well as how the Governor-General-in-
Council and the Court of Directors in London endeavoured to contain them. Section 1 will 
recreate the contemporary atmosphere of tumult and uncertainty in India and discuss its 
impact on the Residents. Section 2 will describe the different cultural and intellectual 
frameworks through which the Residents understood and ascribed meaning to the disorder 
they witnessed in the subcontinent. The remainder of the chapter will examine how the 
Residents’ convictions about the necessity of coercive measures translated into practice; 
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Section 3 will focus on the Residents’ engagement with the Company’s military arm, and 
Section 4 will consider the use of punitive measures like floggings and executions. While the 
Residents and their superiors might have shared similar ideas about the place of violence in 
Indian political culture, this chapter shows that they differed dramatically when it came to the 
question of how far the Residents themselves should employ these tactics. 
1. Spirals of violence  
Violence begets violence. The wider context of war can set the conditions for 
individual acts of repression; in an environment where perceived ‘enemies’ are dehumanized, 
where violence is commonplace if not entirely normalized, individuals are more prepared to 
resort to violent measures. The rhetoric which justifies state-sanctioned military action can 
also allow for and legitimize the use of force in other contexts. In consequence, times of war 
are often characterized by heightened incidences of abuse and interpersonal violence, so that, 
as anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes put it, ‘we can rightly speak of chains, spirals, and 
mirrors of violence.’6 Social psychologist Ignacio Martin-Baro eloquently attested to this 
psychosocial impact of war based on his fieldwork in El Salvador, arguing that ‘there is little 
doubt that the almost compulsive violence, which can dominate interpersonal relations […] 
are intrinsically related to the growing preponderance of military forms of thinking, feeling, 
and acting in social life.’ Martin-Baro influentially termed this process ‘the militarization of 
the mind’.7  
Residents might have spent more time at their desks than on the battlefield, but their 
world was not bounded by the physical limits of the Residency building. The early decades of 
the nineteenth century were turbulent years, and that turbulence seeped into the Residents’ 
routine business and coloured their perceptions of Indian courts. Crucially, the years 1798 to 
1818 were years of war: against Mysore, the Marathas, the Nepalese Gurkhas, and the 
Pindaris. While the Company was almost unquestionably the predominant military power in 
the subcontinent during this period, ‘the transference of power in South Asia was not 
analogous to passing the baton of governance in a relay race’, as military historian Randolf 
Cooper phrased it.8 Indian regional powers had access to military technologies not dissimilar 
from those employed by the Company, and deployed the expertise of European mercenaries 
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to their advantage.9 Others capitalized on their intimate knowledge of the landscape, eluding 
the grasp of European detachments who longed for the familiar conventions of pitched 
battles.10 Although a secure line of credit gave the Company the advantage when it came to 
control of the military market, the Company’s expanding presence in the subcontinent did not 
at all go unchallenged, leading some prominent members of the political line to fear that 
‘From the Pinacle to the Abyss might be only one step’.11 
The Gurkhas were particularly successful at using the rugged environment of the 
Nepalese borderlands to their advantage, and their early military victories in the war of 1814-
16 raised the spectre of British defeat.12 A contemporary report authored by Resident Richard 
Strachey suggests the implications that were read into these reversals. Though conceding the 
relatively unprecedented nature of the struggle, for Strachey it was a compelling 
manifestation of ‘the precarious Nature of the British power in India, and shews the pressing 
necessity for adopting Measures for the purpose of counteracting the Perils of our Situation’.13 
The measures which Strachey had in view were military, and, in the long term, involved a 
significant expansion of the Company’s military establishment. In the short term, Strachey 
suspected that ‘the failure in the present Northern Campaign of our usual success attracts, 
naturally enough, the attention of those Governments [the independent states of India].’14 This 
led Strachey to argue that the war with the Gurkhas had to end (as in fact it did) with an overt 
demonstration of the Company’s military might, in order to re-establish the Company’s 
reputation in the eyes of the Indian states who eagerly registered the Company’s defeats in the 
field.15 Thinking ahead, Strachey concluded by observing that ‘the present crisis shews that 
the Establishment of our Empire in India on a firmer Basis than that on which it now rests is 
indispensable to our future Safety. It further shews the necessity of maintaining, by a suitable 
effort, our character for superiority in Military Prowess.’16 For Strachey and other Residents 
of his generation, the lessons learned from these encounters the subcontinent were clear; the 
Company’s military predominance had to be actively maintained rather than passively 
assumed.   
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Strachey’s fear that the Anglo-Nepalese War would stoke the fire of Indian 
opposition reflects the fact that the early nineteenth century was also a period fraught with 
recurring acts of open defiance. Resistance emanated from several quarters; in some cases, it 
was agitation within the army, as happened at Hyderabad in 1807 when sepoys in the 
subsidiary force were briefly required to wear turbans resembling European hats.17 Often it 
was incited by members of the royal family, as for instance at Delhi when Prince Mirza 
Jahangir occupied the palace.18 Just as frequently resistance was led by former ministers, as 
when Mohipat Ram rallied forces among disaffected landowners in the hinterlands of 
Hyderabad, or when the diwan of Travancore raised an army and led an attack on the 
Resident’s household in the middle of the night.19 These moments of agitation were short-
lived and violently repressed, but, taking a broad view of the period, they cropped up 
persistently, reminding Residents, should they doubt it, that their influence in neighbouring 
Indian kingdoms was unwelcome.  There were even accounts of peasants attacking Company 
troops as they passed through the countryside; during the upheaval of 1818 an army officer in 
the Nagpur area reported ‘there can be no doubt of the Inhabitants being much disaffected 
towards us’, citing for proof what he described as the massacre of a small party of sepoys at 
Shawpoor.20 Henry Russell was similarly convinced that the rural parts of the Nizam’s 
territories contained ‘ample materials of Insurrection’.21 For the Residents, this opposition to 
Company rule sometimes manifested itself more personally in assassination attempts. 
Preceding the outbreak of hostilities in 1817, Mountstuart Elphinstone was inundated with 
‘numerous reports & claims of plots, conspiracies, mutinies, assassinations’.22 In tempestuous 
and unsettled Travancore, where the populace had always resisted the Rajah’s alignment with 
the Company, the life of the Resident was regularly rumoured to be at risk.23 The mutinous 
Nair battalions in the Rajah’s service threatened to assassinate the Resident in 1804, while in 
1806 the minister reputedly planned to poison him.24 
                                                     
17 Court of Directors to Fort St George Political Department, 29 May 1807, General Correspondence 
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Alongside acts of open resistance were less clearly defined incidents of raiding and 
plunder. Residents were regularly plagued with complaints from frontier officials in British 
India about banditti who pillaged Company territory and then escaped into princely 
dominions where they could not be pursued without permission from the ruler in question.25 
Sometimes these acts of looting seemed to take place with the implicit support of regional 
officials, and there was even a suspicion that they were encouraged at the higher levels of 
government as a form of opposition to the Company. These suspicions were sharpened by the 
fact that many of these marauders were mercenary soldiers in the pay of Indian rulers. Acts of 
pillaging and plunder, as Stewart Gordon has shown, were a traditional way for out-of-work 
soldiers to support themselves; this aspect of the Indian military economy became particularly 
pronounced as the introduction of subsidiary forces into Indian kingdoms drove many Indian 
soldiers out of work.26 British officials were certainly aware of this pattern, but suspected that 
the Indian elite were encouraging, rather than obstructing, these depredations. 
This burgeoning doubt is evident in the letters of Richard Strachey. While Resident 
with Daulat Rao Sindhia, a great deal of Strachey’s correspondence was devoted to 
coordinating efforts between the Company’s army and Sindhia’s subalterns to capture thieves 
and murderers who had fled Company forces and sheltered in Sindhia’s territory. Strachey 
appears to have oscillated in his opinion of these assaults, on the one hand holding Sindhia 
responsible given that most of these men were members of his army, on the other recognizing 
the limited authority which Sindhia actually enjoyed over his frontiers. In 1812, in a letter to a 
captain in the Company’s army, Strachey firmly declared his belief in Sindhia’s good faith, 
assuring Captain Popham that although criminals sheltering in the ravines on Sindhia’s border 
were rarely captured, this failure was not owing to any ill will on the part of Sindhia’s darbar 
but instead could be attributed to the lack of police in those districts, and the recalcitrance of 
local zamindars.27 By 1813 however Strachey was beginning to feel that ‘no consideration of 
the Faults of his Administration can be allowed in excuse for hostile Attacks of his Troops’.28 
Cases such as these blurred the line between acts of war and acts of pillaging. It brought into 
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question the effectuality of negotiation and peace treaties; after all, if the Company’s 
supposed allies could not control their troops, there was little point in diplomacy. 
The prevalence of this kind of opposition and unrest created a climate of uncertainty, 
inspiring feelings of vulnerability which in turn produced a strong militaristic bent within the 
political line. Yet, to fully explicate the Residents commitment to coercive measures, it is also 
necessary to understand the intellectual and cultural frameworks through which they 
apprehended this turbulence in the subcontinent. Developing convictions about Company 
‘paramountcy’, that is, the Company’s superiority and assumed right to intervene, had 
ideological underpinnings; these beliefs were rooted in assumptions about military culture, 
the law of nations, and the appropriate forms of political conduct. The following section will 
explain why Residents were so pessimistic about the possibility or desirability of an equal 
alliance with Indian powers, and why they instead preferred the asymmetry of the subsidiary 
system, underpinned by the threat of force.  
2. The cultural coordinates of the subsidiary alliance system 
Though Wellesley and Hastings’s aggressive policies had many supporters, not all 
Residents necessarily had a rosy view of their prospects in the subcontinent, nor was British 
expansion celebrated without a hint of ambivalence. Many prominent members of the 
political line, perhaps consonant with the cyclical understanding of history prevalent during 
this period, anticipated the Company’s ultimate downfall, which, though perhaps not 
imminent, they nevertheless considered inevitable.29  In 1805, following the Company’s 
victory in the Second Maratha War, Mountstuart Elphinstone predicted that ‘India will most 
likely go as France & America did before’.30 As William Palmer remarked in a private letter 
to Warren Hastings, ‘[t]hat an Empire so extensive including many Millions of men to whom 
our Religion, Laws, Manners & even our very Faces are abhorrent, can be governed to the 
effects of augmenting the National Wealth & power, […] I have met with no man so sanguine 
as to expect.’31 In his private letters to his father, Henry Russell similarly expressed the 
conviction that ‘our Power in India, like the ripple of a stone thrown into the water, is 
destined to be lost in its Expansion’, remarking that ‘I do not believe that our vast Indian 
Empire will form a single Exception to the Rule of all the Empires since the world began.’32  
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Despite these mixed feelings regarding British expansion, the Residents almost 
universally advocated for greater intervention and a more coercive style of rule. Impositions 
backed by the threat of force were considered the most efficacious, indeed only means of 
safeguarding the Company’s position in the subcontinent. Mountstuart Elphinstone was 
convinced that the alliance system could not be substantially improved, and said as much 
when the Marquess of Hastings approached him about the possibility of reform. In an ideal 
world, according to Elphinstone, the Company’s alliance with independent Indian powers 
would be an alliance of equals, founded in mutual trust and respect, without political 
intervention on either side. Yet the character of the Indian rulers in question, as Elphinstone 
saw them, appeared to make such an arrangement impracticable:   
their restlessness, their rapacity, their weakness and the general want of confidence in them 
that results from their want of faith, continually bring them into situations where we are forced 
to interfere, either to save them from utter ruin or to prevent their making our power 
instrumental to their injustice and oppression.33  
The traits which Elphinstone identified, namely, rapacity, weakness, and want of faith, are 
implicit in many of the Residents’ descriptions of the Indian elite.34 According to this vision, 
Indian administrations had to be controlled if they were going to make for effective 
instruments of British imperial interests.  
These stereotypes of Indian polities were partly a product of what might be described 
as a clash of military cultures. Conceptions of legitimate violence are to some extent 
historically contingent and culturally conditioned; ideas about what forms of violence are 
appropriate, and under what conditions, differ across space and time.35 The Residents’ 
reactions to Indian methods of waging war were shaped by their own models of how conflicts 
should properly be conducted, leading them to classify the Marathas in particular as outlaws 
and brigands.36 From a European perspective, pitched battles limited damage, constituting a 
relatively civilized means of resolving conflicts; the Marathas’ preference for mobile, 
‘irregular’ warfare, their reliance on light cavalry, and their use of tactics like cutting supply 
lines and ravaging surrounding territories thus elicited the condemnation of prominent 
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officials within the Company.37 Particularly problematic, in the Company’s view, were 
escalating incidences of armed plunder within Maratha domains. Pillaging was, as Stewart 
Gordon argued, a key method of accumulating resources and maintaining standing armies in 
central India, and in a context where many Indian kingdoms were critically underfunded 
owing to bad harvests and Company debts, it was difficult to pay for military support in any 
other way.38 Company officials, however, condemned Indian rulers for their seeming 
indifference to the depredations of armed bandits within their own territories, arguing that the 
Marathas sacrificed the wellbeing of their subjects in the interests of keeping a pool of 
mounted military labour close at hand without having to pay directly for the privilege. 
Resident Richard Jenkins observed censoriously that Nagpur and the surrounding regions 
were hard hit by these depredations: ‘indeed all these territories are overrun by them, and 
never free from their parties so great is their confidence of not being attacked, and so little are 
the Exertions of the Government to protect its miserable subjects’.39 
This kind of behaviour was perceived to warrant forceful intervention. British 
attitudes on this point were heavily informed by classical understandings of ‘tyranny’, a 
concept which encompassed various forms of misgovernment but generally implied either 
active brutality or a passive disregard for the safety and wellbeing of the population.40 In a 
European context, ‘tyranny’ had historically been a powerful justification for military 
intervention.41 Similarly, for British officials who espoused such views, the logical conclusion 
was that the Company would be doing the Indian population a service through their 
intervention. Thomas Sydenham, describing conditions in Hyderabad, proclaimed that ‘the 
cultivators of the soil, the manufacturers, artisans and merchants groan under a load of 
exactions and oppressions, and would willingly be transferred to the British government’.42 In 
even more moralizing terms, William Palmer condemned Sindhia and the Peshwa for being 
‘wholly regardless of the happiness of the people committed to their charge, & destitute of 
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any sense of moral Obligation’, while Mountstuart Elphinstone proclaimed that ‘it is a 
satisfaction to think that we are engaged in a holy war against violence and rapine & there is 
not one of our enemies whose destruction will not be a blessing to India as it relieves the 
country from his crimes.’ 43 Violence against Indian princes was supposedly justified since 
they themselves were a violent people, swayed by the rule of the sword rather than the rule of 
law. In support of this view, commentators also emphasized that many Indian rulers then 
dominant in the subcontinent had come to power through conquest. To quote two 
contemporary observers, ‘all the Mahomedan [powers] have been founded in rebellion, crime 
and usurpation’, while the Marathas were described as ‘an empire which has arisen on the 
basis of injustice, falsehood, and treachery’.44 These visions of Indian brutality were 
reinforced by widely circulated horror stories about the Black Hole of Calcutta and Tipu 
Sultan’s treatment of British captives.45 Drawing on theories of the law of nations elaborated 
by influential thinkers like Emer de Vattel, many Britons (the Residents among them) felt that 
their common humanity authorised them to combat the oppressions of tyrants.  
This concept of ‘humanity’ was also regularly invoked. One might expect that ideas 
of shared humanity would mitigate against violent or coercive measures, and indeed natural 
law has traditionally been associated with a more open and inclusive notion of the 
international community, in contrast to the state-centred, positivist tradition of the nineteenth 
century.46 At the same time, ‘humanity’ could also function as an exclusionary category, and 
the idea that Indian enemies were for one reason or another outside the bounds of humanity 
was regularly given as a justification for extra-legal forms of justice. This was a common 
motif of European political propaganda in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, in 
which the enemies of the state were constructed as morally deficient barbarians excluded 
from the civilized European community.47 Dan Edelstein has illustrated how conceptions of 
the laws of nature could give rise to this idea of outlaws and enemies of humanity which in 
                                                     
43 William Palmer to Warren Hastings, 10 Jul. 1801, Add MS 29178, Correspondence and Papers of 
Warren Hastings, BL, p. 63; Mountstuart Elphinstone to John Adam, 29 Mar. 1805, Papers of John 
Adam, Mss Eur F109/88, OIOC, np.   
44 John Clunes, An historical sketch of the princes of India, stipendiary, subsidiary, protected, 
tributary, and feudatory; with a sketch of the origin and progress of British power in India (Edinburgh, 
1833), p. 18; An officer, Origin of the Pindaries, p. 34.  
45 Kate Teltscher, ‘“The fearful name of the Black Hole”: Fashioning an imperial myth’, in Writing 
India 1757-1990: The literature of British India, ed. Bart Moore-Gilbert (Manchester, 1996), p. 40; 
Kate Teltscher, India inscribed: European and British writing on India 1600-1800 (Delhi, 1995), p. 
229; 233.  
46 Famously in the South Asian context by C.H. Alexandrowicz, An introduction to the history of the 
law of nations in the East Indies (16th, 17th, and 18th centuries) (Oxford, 1967), p. 2.  
47 Renaud Morieux, ‘Patriotisme humanitaire et prisonniers de guerre en France et en Angleterre 
pendant la Révolution française et l’Empire’, in La politique par les armes. Conflits internationaux et 
politisation, XVe-XIXe siècles, eds. Laurent Bourquin et al. (Rennes, 2014), p.301-16; David A. Bell, 
The cult of the nation in France: Inventing nationalism, 1680-1800 (Cambridge, MA, 2001), p. 84.  
 
75 
 
 
turn laid the ideological groundwork for brutal acts of summary justice. In France, he argued, 
these categories were used to justify the violence meted out during the Terror and the war in 
the Vendée.48 Philip Dwyer has similarly observed how massacres during the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars were accompanied by dehumanizing rhetoric which labelled the enemy 
as vagabonds, brigands, bandits, and beasts, categories which exempted them from the normal 
rules of warfare.49 The same logic applied in India, particularly with regards to the Pindaris, 
who, during the upheavals of 1816-18, were subject to summary trial and execution in the 
field if found guilty of ‘depredations’.50 These disciplinary measures were considered 
necessary to curb the ‘inhuman barbarities’ of the Pindaris, ‘whose progress is generally 
marked by the smoking ruins of villages, the shrieks of women, and the groans of their 
mutilated husbands.’51 
Ongoing conflicts between Indian powers were also understood to require the 
Company’s pacifying intervention, and thus were seized on as a further legitimation for 
increasing the Company’s military presence. From the very earliest days of the subsidiary 
alliance system, the maintenance of orderly borders was presented as a key objective of the 
Company’s growing intervention in the affairs of Indian kingdoms. In response to Indian 
border disputes, the Company positioned itself as the ultimate political arbiter in the 
subcontinent, committed to ensuring a so-called ‘balance of power’ conducive to peace, 
stability, and trade. It was the Company’s explicit policy to ‘convince the several powers of 
India that their real interest consists in respecting the rights of their neighbours, and in 
cultivating their own resources within the limits of their several territories’.52 Parallels were 
drawn with Britain’s perceived role in European politics, and its opposition to the rise of 
French or Spanish land-based empires; similarly, in India the Company identified itself as the 
champion of smaller kingdoms, particularly the Rajputs, against the depredations of the rival 
Maratha empire.53  By imposing clear borders, British officials claimed to be civilizing and 
disciplining the Indian landscape, curbing ‘the lawless ambition, predatory habits, and restless 
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violence of the native states of Hindostan and the Dekan’.54 British paramountcy was 
understood as the most efficient means of restoring order to a disorderly land.55  
Residents posited practical as well as moral reasons for their asymmetrical alliance 
system. In their view, the disorganized state of Indian governments made them practically 
ineffective as allies, meaning they had to be actively controlled rather than passively trusted. 
Indian armies were, it was said, ill-administered and unruly; Residents regularly complained 
that Company armies were forced to do the worst of the fighting, with little or no assistance 
from their Indian allies.56 Ongoing unrest in Indian states, which rulers were apparently 
unwilling or unable to control, brought their military capabilities further into question. The 
Company routinely found themselves resorting to military measures to quell rebellions in 
neighbouring territories which threatened to spread to their own subjects.57 The general 
feeling, therefore, was that the impotence of Indian states was more dangerous to the 
Company than direct attack; ‘the ills arisen from their weakness, and bad policy, have not 
been much less than those which we might have feared from their hostility.’58  
Similarly, the perceived fickleness of Indian rulers led Residents to suggest that they 
could not be trusted to hold to a single line of conduct, but were instead liable to be swayed 
by the insinuations of conniving ministers. Thomas Sydenham was ‘not disposed to place any 
Confidence in the Friendship or Constancy of the present Nizam [Sikander Jah]’, observing 
that ‘his sentiments and Feelings, on all subjects, are generally directed by those who 
surround him’.59 John Malcolm was similarly convinced that Baji Rao lacked the ‘firmness to 
resist any bold or wicked counseller’, and even went so far as to speculate that it was ‘this 
prominent defect in his character which has rendered him from the first, so uncertain and 
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dangerous an Ally to the British Government’.60 Credulous rulers of this type could turn 
against the Company at a moment’s notice. 
These recurring descriptions of ‘wicked counsellors’ were part and parcel of British 
stereotypes of the Indian political elite as cunning and devious. Based on these assumptions, 
many contemporaries were convinced that Indian intrigues could only be held in check by the 
threat of violence. This stereotype was particularly associated with the Marathas. As an 
anonymous author put it in a contemporary text, ‘no power ever placed confidence in them, 
without ultimately having reason to repent of its credulity.’61 This was an opinion regularly 
expressed by the Residents, too. William Palmer, Resident at Poona, alleged that ‘violence 
and perfidy are the usual means employed and injustice the end proposed in all the 
transactions of the Mahratta people.’62 Mountstuart Elphinstone, one of Palmer’s successors 
at Poona, described at length in his private journal his ‘hatred of the Marattas perhaps of the 
Indians in general & my disgust at their […] want of faith & principles’.63 As this complaint 
of Elphinstone’s attests, British officials widely commented on a lack of public faith among 
Indian rulers, and did not trust them to hold to binding agreements. When the Governor-
General the Earl of Minto asked Colonel Barry Close, then Resident at Poona, to report on the 
likelihood of Indian rulers supporting the British in the event of a French invasion, Close 
responded by asking ‘what reliance could be placed on a Maratha chief […] totally ignorant 
of the principles of Government, and of the use of probity, faith, or credit, and who knows no 
policy but that of violence, fraud, deceit, & monetary gain’.64 These accusations of bad faith 
had serious implications, for in the European tradition public faith was the very cornerstone of 
the law of nations itself, without which, as Emer de Vattel put it, ‘treaties are no better than 
empty words’.65 Public faith made negotiation, and by extension peaceful co-existence, 
possible. Indeed, Grotius concluded his influential text on the laws of war and peace by 
admonishing princes to keep their faith: ‘wherefore take away Faith, they will be like wild 
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Beasts, whose Rage all Men dread.’66 British perceptions of Indian lack of public faith meant 
that political negotiations with Indian powers were apt to be viewed as more or less empty 
exercises, rendered futile by the supposed insincerity of Indian political elites.  
There was a parallel line of interpretation, however, which attributed Indian ‘lack of 
faith’ less to an inherent Indian character, than to the unequal power dynamic embodied in 
Anglo-Indian relationships. Divided opinion on this question reflected broader uncertainties 
in eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century legal theory, particularly on the question of 
whether states were obliged to keep promises that had been made under duress.67 It was not 
infrequently conceded or implied that the reason why Indian rulers could not be trusted was 
that they had been coerced into alliances in which they were subordinate partners. This was 
an opinion commonly expressed by critics of the Company in the context of the parliamentary 
inquiry into Marquess Wellesley’s activities in India, which focused on his alliance with the 
Peshwa and his subsequent conflict with the Marathas. In a pamphlet commenting on 
Wellesley’s system of subsidiary alliances, the anonymous author argued that ‘where one 
party enters into such engagements with reluctance or by constraint, the advantages to be 
expected from such an alliance will not be realized,  because the reluctant or the constrained 
party can never be relied upon in the hour of danger’, and would, moreover, be ‘constantly 
upon the watch for an opportunity of emancipating themselves whenever the tide of affairs 
should chance to turn against us’.68  
In line with this interpretation, some Residents conceded that it was natural for Indian 
rulers to seek to free themselves from an unwanted alliance which impinged on their 
sovereign status. Writing in 1803 on the eve of the Second Maratha War, William Scott 
(Resident at Lucknow) anticipated that the Peshwa of Poona would either abandon his 
alliance with the British in favour of joining the enemy Maratha alliance, or that he would be 
deserted by his troops and followers. Scott’s fears were founded in the belief, apparently 
‘generally admitted’, that the Indian rulers who allied with the Company did so out of fear of 
Holkar and Sindhia’s depredations, but might recognize with the passage of time ‘that these 
oppressions were temporary and may be rescinded, whilst our authority and influence when 
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once established become permanent and our encroachments progressive’.69 Similarly, in a 
memorandum written in response to Governor-General Minto’s query about whether or not 
the Maratha powers were likely to ally with the French upon the occasion of a French 
invasion, Colonel Close admitted that ‘it might betray a want of knowledge of human nature, 
to suppose that the Maratta Chieftains […] do not regret their heavy losses from the late war, 
are not jealous of our superior power, and anxious to regain the relative levels, from which 
they have respectively fallen.’70 Richard Jenkins echoed this sentiment in a report written on 
the eve of the Pindari War; describing the Marathas’ feelings of frustration and humiliation at 
their loss of independence, Jenkins concluded that ‘it is not in human nature for such feelings 
to be subdued, by any show, or reality of moderation, by any thing, in fact, short of a 
thorough conviction of the hopelessness of ever recovering their former dominion’. It was 
Jenkins’s opinion that the Marathas would ever be willing to rebel, however minimal their 
chances, ‘so that they can shake the pillars of the edifice, which overshadows them, they will 
overlook the chance of being buried in its ruins’.71 In this light, far from being somehow 
‘inhuman’, the Maratha chieftains were, to the contrary, deeply human in their desire to 
preserve their position of independence and influence in the subcontinent.  
These opposing perspectives on the question of Indian public faith are connected to a 
deeper ambiguity at the heart of contemporary understandings of the law of nations, which 
was in brief that the dictates of the law of nature and the self-interest of sovereign states were 
sometimes diametrically opposed. Given that the preservation of the state was itself agreed to 
be of primary importance according to natural law, how far were governments allowed to go 
in pursuit of that end, and to what extent were they permitted to break with other tenets of the 
law of nations? Isaac Nakhimovsky has identified this tension in Emer de Vattel, a paradox 
which, he argues, has led to opposite interpretations of the text. On the one hand, states were 
supposedly authorised to punish inhumanity and injustice. On the other hand, sovereign states 
were supposed to be equals with no right to sit in judgement of one another, since their 
judgement might be informed by their own self-interests.72 To quote Vattel himself, ‘each 
party asserting that they have justice on their own side, will arrogate to themselves all the 
rights of war, and maintain that their enemy has none, that his hostilities are so many acts of 
robbery, so many infractions of the law of nations, in the punishment of which all states 
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should unite.’73 As Stefano Recchia and Jennifer Welsh observe, military interventions 
always, to some extent, contravene ideals of self-determination and political independence 
which have historically been central to the law of nations. Interventions bring into question, 
not just motives and means, but also the issue of right authority, in other words, who has the 
right to determine the legitimacy of an intervention?74 Many senior British officials certainly 
presumed this right to declare the justice or injustice of Indian acts of war, which they 
generally impugned as ‘depredations’, but this interpretation did not go totally uncontested. 
Charles Grant, a vocal opponent of military conquest in the Company’s Court of Directors, 
highlighted this difference of interpretation when he pointed out that, though in the eyes of 
the Company the Marathas ‘were immediately the aggressors, and they little scrupled the 
violation of treaties’, the Marathas might for their part ‘consider us the first aggressors, and 
themselves as originally the injured parties’.75  
 Finally, at least one Resident did draw the connection between the Company’s 
encroachment and what contemporaries perceived as Indian misgovernment. Henry Russell 
was explicit on this subject, observing that ‘an alliance with us, upon the subsidiary system, 
however it may contribute to the advancement of our own Power, leads inevitably to the 
ultimate Destruction of the state which embraces it’. Specifically, Russell complained that the 
Company’s intervention stifled competition among the Indian courtly elite, precluding the 
development of political expertise and administrative know-how. Residents were generally 
instructed to shore up the authority of pliant ministers to perpetuate the Company’s influence 
and ensure political stability, but in so doing, Russell felt, the Company were in fact creating 
the very conditions of disorganization and political stagnation at Indian courts which they so 
vociferously condemned. At the same time, even Russell believed the Company’s withdrawal 
from Hyderabad would, in his words, ‘be productive of the Subversion of the Government’. 
As he put it, ‘all the Functions of Administration would be dissolved, the Fabrick of 
Government would sink under its own weakness, and the Nizam himself would probably 
become the victim of an insurrection of his subjects, and the country be made a scene of 
anarchy & outrage’.76 In Russell’s opinion, only the direct intervention of the Resident could 
prevent the kingdom of Hyderabad from descending into chaos.  
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To some extent, then, even Residents who seem to have eschewed the language of 
tyranny and Oriental despotism nevertheless felt they had a moral imperative to intervene. 
This imperative was even more deeply felt given that the Company had long meddled in 
Indian governments to serve its own interests; given these precedents, how could they not 
intervene to serve the broader good, as they saw it? As Charles Metcalfe put it in his defence 
of the Company’s involvement in the affairs of Hyderabad, ‘if it be right to interfere, in behalf 
of our own Interests, by imposing a Minister on the country, it cannot surely be wrong, to 
interpose for the Interests of the People with a view to their protection against his Rapacity.’77 
Jenkins was similarly of the opinion that the Marathas, at least, ‘have been injured from 
whatever circumstances, beyond the possibility of reparation, or of reconciliation’.78 As 
sociologist Charles Maier observed, ‘empire does not emerge as a fit of absence of mind. 
Instead it represents a fit of what social scientists call path dependency, that is, clinging to 
choices made early on whose reversal seems unthinkable.’79 Rather than being entirely in 
favour of sustaining or further expanding imperial projects, some Residents expressed the 
view that the Company had to continue along its set trajectory simply because they saw no 
way in which the Company could responsibly withdraw from the crisis of states it had created 
in India.  
Although Residents were thus not necessarily optimistic about the future in store for 
their expanding empire in India, a few key ideas and assumptions nevertheless convinced 
them of the desirability of forcefully intervening in the politics of ostensibly independent 
Indian states. Not only were British and Indian military cultures starkly opposed, but British 
conceptions of ‘tyranny’, ‘inhumanity’, and the ‘balance of powers’ combined to make up a 
potent moral justification of the Company’s military presence. These concerns were overlaid 
with pragmatic considerations about the perceived ineffectiveness and untrustworthiness of 
Indian states as allies, even though some Residents conceded that the apparent treachery and 
weaknesses they observed in Indian administrations were traceable to the Company’s 
intervention. Although the Company’s role in Indian states raised difficult questions about the 
laws of nations, for instance, about the binding power of treaties made under duress, and the 
relative priority to be accorded to raison d’état over the law of nature, Residents were 
generally satisfied with the rectitude of the Company’s interference. Richard Jenkins for one 
felt that an article of ‘authoritative interference’ ought to be introduced into any future 
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treaties,  arguing that ‘we must almost Entirely new model the Marhatta Governments if we 
wish to make anything of them, conducive to the settlement & peace of India.’80 To the extent 
that these ideas were made explicit in writing, they were rarely disputed by the Residents’ 
superiors in London and Calcutta; rather, it was on the question of how these ideas were to be 
put into practice that opinions differed. The following section will address how these 
convictions about the relationships between the East India Company and its nominal allies 
affected Residency business.  
3. Manifestations in diplomatic practice  
While militarism was an accepted feature of Company culture, what made the 
Residents’ views problematic, from the perspective of administrators in Calcutta and London, 
was that they encouraged an aggressive line of action which was not in keeping with 
diplomatic conventions. In European diplomatic practice, the expectation was for 
ambassadors to avoid domestic political entanglements in order to leave their principals room 
for manoeuvre. Ambassadors were supposed to observe, report, and generally influence the 
course of events in a way that left their superiors in office the greatest scope for agency. 
According to de Wicquefort’s instructions, ‘the Embassador ought chiefly to take care not to 
engage himself, without express Orders, in Negotiations, the Consequences whereof may be 
of great Importance, and the Success uncertain.’81 Rather than allowing their own feelings and 
opinions to dictate their behaviour, diplomatic representatives were expected to be non-
committal and accommodating, and to cultivate as much as possible harmony between 
states.82 To quote de Callière’s influential manual on the art of diplomacy, ‘he ought to be as 
Proteus in the fable: always ready to put on all sorts of shapes, according as occasion and 
necessity may require.’83 Similarly, John Briggs advised a prospective member of the political 
line that persuasion depended upon ‘a systematic endeavour to please and conciliate, and to 
render the person whom you are desirous to convince pleased with himself’.84 
These expectations applied even during the tenure of Marquess Wellesley, usually 
remembered as an era of overt aggression on the part of the Company. To be sure, Wellesley 
often expressed himself in violent terms. In a letter to John Malcolm (who reported that the 
Marathas had adopted an insolent tone in their dealings with him), Wellesley declared that he 
would not ‘suffer with impunity’ such a ‘spirit of wanton insult and barbarous provocation’. 
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He warned that ‘the Governor-General in Council will enforce the respect due to the great and 
powerful empire which is committed to his charge, even at the hazard of dissolving all 
connection with [that] state’.85 In practice, however, Wellesley was inclined to be more 
yielding; or at least, that is the impression he wanted his diplomatic representatives to 
cultivate. Tellingly, Wellesley found fault with Captain Kirkpatrick for mentioning the 
desirability of war with Tipu in the presence of the Nizam of Hyderabad, and stating publicly 
that the Governor General intended to use compulsory measures against Sindhia.86 
Conversely, when Josiah Webbe refrained from reproaching Sindhia too forcibly about the 
presence of Tipu’s vakil at court and his preservation of Sirji Rao as first minister, Webbe met 
with Wellesley’s approval. Wellesley concurred in Webbe’s view that the Resident could do 
no good by insisting on these points, even agreeing that to do so would actually be dangerous, 
and might in fact ‘precipitate questions of the greatest magnitude, and involve our affairs at 
this Court in circumstances which might embarrass the judgment to be formed by your 
Excellency’.87 It was the prerogative of the executive branch of the Company, embodied in 
the Governor-General-in-Council, to take decisive action; if the Resident took too bold a line 
in his negotiations with the Indian ruler, he robbed the Governor-General of his room for 
manoeuvre and his ability to conclude a peace.  
The attack on Richard Jenkins’s camp while he was Acting Resident with Daulat Rao 
Sindhia makes Wellesley’s stance amply evident. Although Sindhia and the Company were 
ostensibly allies, tensions erupted between the two because the Company sided with the Rana 
of Gohud in her territorial dispute with Sindhia over the lands of Gohud and Gwalior. In 
response to Sindhia’s marked hostility, Jenkins left the camp, despite Sindhia’s refusal to 
grant him a passport for safe passage through his dominions. After leaving the camp, Jenkins 
was approached by a conciliatory mission from Daulat Rao inducing him to return. Upon 
Jenkins’s return, however, his camp was attacked and his property plundered by a large body 
of Sindhia’s irregular troops. A number of people in Jenkins’s entourage were severely 
wounded, including the Residency surgeon Dr. Wise, the head of his escort Lieutenant 
Greene, and several sepoys. Although general opinion was that Sindhia was not directly 
responsible for the attack, Sindhia also made no effort to find and punish the offenders, nor 
did he make reparations for Jenkins’s loss of property. Jenkins was subsequently held a 
virtual prisoner in Sindhia’s camp as Wellesley and Sindhia negotiated over the status of 
Gwalior and Gohud, which were later conceded to Sindhia by the Company.88  
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Not only did the Governor-General-in-Council fail to send military back-up to 
support Jenkins and to ensure his personal safety, Jenkins’s initial departure from the camp 
met with reproof from the administration in Calcutta. According to a sternly worded letter to 
Richard Jenkins from the secretary to the Governor-General-in-Council, ‘an extreme case 
alone could justify your abdication of your representative character without the positive 
orders of your Government’.89 Major-General Arthur Wellesley, commanding Company 
forces in the vicinity, was also privately of the opinion that Jenkins had acted ‘in too great a 
hurry’. He believed that Sindhia was open to restoring good relations with the Company, and 
considered it ‘unlucky that Mr. Jenkins has brought affairs to such a crisis that it is absolutely 
necessary to interfere with a strong hand to save Mr. Jenkins and our Honour’ (though all 
Wellesley actually had in mind, in this instance, was a strongly-worded letter from the 
Governor-General).90 Similarly, though Marquess Wellesley subsequently reprimanded 
Sindhia in fierce language for the injury to the Resident and his escort, in the end he proved 
all too ready to forgive the Maratha chieftain. Although he viewed events at Sindhia’s camp 
as an ‘atrocious act of violating the sacred person of the British minister at your Highness’s 
court’, Wellesley nevertheless claimed to be ‘disposed to limit the measures to be adopted by 
the British Government upon this occasion’.91 Wellesley did not even enforce his demands for 
a full restoration of the Resident’s property, or the due punishment of the thieves. In the end 
Sindhia was even granted the lands which had instigated the dispute in the first place. Jenkins 
was, moreover, strictly ordered to avoid ‘severe remonstrations’ when communicating 
Wellesley’s request that Sindhia publicly repudiate the thieves in open darbar, and ‘to avoid 
any harsh or irritating language which is always undignified and inconsistent with true 
Policy.’92  
The Residents viewed the incident with Sindhia rather differently from the Governor-
General-in-Council, reflecting their different ideas of their own role in the subcontinent. 
Whatever the opinions of Indian onlookers might have been, many Residents were convinced 
that events at Sindhia’s camp had belittled the Residents in the eyes of the courtly elite. 
Elphinstone felt himself in a difficult position at Nagpur, and attributed it in part to ‘many 
circumstances which occurred in Jenkins's case which go to shake the credit of English 
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Agents at all the courts in India.’93 The Company’s refusal to back Jenkins, and ultimately the 
concessions which they made in Gohud and Gwalior, were perceived to have undermined the 
position of the Residents in India. As Elphinstone impatiently awaited the result of the peace 
negotiations, he claimed that ‘if he get Gohud & Gwalior it will be too horrid I shall be 
ashamed to look a native in the face if after what happened to Jenkins & what has since 
occurred we let Sindia obtain from our fears what he sought in vain from our justice.’94 Two 
year after his run-in with Sindhia, Jenkins himself concluded that ‘those barriers once 
removed, when they [Indian rulers] find they can insult, they will think it possible even to 
attack us with impunity.’ He recorded how the Company’s concessions to Sindhia, alongside 
the peace concluded with Holkar, were ‘represented as the effects of fear’ at the court of the 
Rajah of Berar (where Jenkins was then stationed). 95 For the Residents, it seems, the 
paramount thing was less to maintain good relations than it was to maintain relations founded 
on the Company’s predominance. For example, although Henry Russell was reprimanded for 
the tone he took in his negotiations with the southern jagirdars at Poona, he nevertheless 
insisted that ‘we must not let a snotty nosed Marhatta see we are afraid of him’.96 
It was this kind of attitude which the Marquess of Hastings, though equally 
remembered for his expansionary tactics, complained of during his early years as Governor-
General. He blamed the Residents’ lack of respect and failure to propitiate Indian monarchs 
for the unstable political condition of the Company when he arrived on the scene in 1813. He 
accused the Residents of ‘assum[ing] the functions of a dictator’, rather than ‘acting in the 
character of an ambassador’.97 In his view, ‘a rational jealousy of our power is not likely to 
excite half the intrigues against us which must naturally be produced by the wanton 
provocations which we have been giving on trivial subjects to all the States around us.’98 
Hastings worried that the high-handed behaviour of Company officials had agitated the Indian 
elite to such an extent that they would be ready to rally together against the Company 
whenever the occasion presented itself. The Resident of the Nawab Vizier had been 
‘authoritatively interfering with all the minor concerns of his domestic rule’ to the point that 
the Vizier was ‘driven […] to a desperation which he proclaimed in open durbar’. In Nagpur, 
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the Rajah of Berar, ‘nominally our friend, has evinced repeatedly his hostile suspicion of us.’ 
Meanwhile, in Hyderabad, the Nizam was open about his hatred of the British. Hastings 
worried that escalating tensions with Ranjit Singh might furnish these Indian rulers with an 
opportunity to attack while the Company’s forces were otherwise engaged.99  This view was 
shared by the former Resident at Nagpur H.T. Colebrooke, who similarly argued that the 
Company’s objectives would be more readily attained were the Residents ‘duly impressed 
with the importance attached by Government to a conciliatory conduct’.100 Rather than 
obviating the need for war, the Residents were creating the conditions which would give rise 
to one.  
The Residents’ eagerness to assert their authority stemmed from the fact that they saw 
themselves less as diplomats bound by the usual rules of comportment, than as mavericks 
operating in lawless spaces. In particular, because Residents believed that they fundamentally 
could not rely on the protection of the allied states within which they were stationed, they 
resented any limitations to their access to, and deployment of, armed forces. During his tenure 
at Nagpur, for example, Mountstuart Elphinstone engaged in a long and increasingly petulant 
campaign to secure a military escort for his Residency. In March of 1805, as the Pindaris 
encroached ever deeper into the Rajah’s territory, Elphinstone requested his friend in Calcutta 
John Adam to put a word in for him. In Elphinstone’s words, ‘[y]ou can't think what a bore it 
was to be without any defence against them’.101 Though initially the suggestion appeared to 
have met with approval in Calcutta, Elphinstone heard no further news of his intended escort 
for months. The impatience with which he awaited its arrival seems to be a testament to how 
much he felt the need of it. In Elphinstone’s eyes, if war broke out with the Pindaris he could 
not depend on the Rajah for his defence; rather, to quote him, ‘I shall consider myself as 
placed close to the enemy's camp & shall trust only to my own vigilance for my safety.’102  
Elphinstone therefore felt that the Company’s failure to respond to his request betrayed a 
marked indifference to his personal interests, indeed his very safety. As he remarked 
resentfully to his friend Adam, 'I wonder there is no "Censor of small wares" about the Govt 
House to wipe off things that are of no importance but to individuals & of great to them.’103 
Elphinstone’s successor at Nagpur, Richard Jenkins, similarly felt very keenly his 
lack of military support at Nagpur. This shortfall was felt strongest, apparently, when Jenkins 
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was set the task of inquiring into the competing claims put forward by the Rajah of Nagpur 
and the Nizam of Hyderabad to territories in Bhopal. After fruitlessly interviewing people at 
court and trawling the Residency archives for information, Strachey reflected that if ‘a British 
force [were] established in the Rajah’s territories [in Nagpur] many difficulties which now 
impede such researches would be removed, and probably many superior sources of 
information now closed by fears of the Rajah’s jealousy, would of their own accord become 
accessible.’104 Without the threat of military force, the Resident felt himself unable to 
compete with the power represented by the Rajah at Nagpur.    
This craving for military support manifested itself in disputes with military authorities 
in cases where forces were stationed at or near the Residency. These disputes were 
particularly prevalent at Hyderabad, where a large subsidiary force was posted. In 1808, the 
arguments between Thomas Sydenham and Lieutenant Colonel Montresor over their 
respective authority had reached such a pitch that Sydenham was forced to refer to the 
Governor-General-in-Council to establish a rule which would obviate such misunderstandings 
in future. Montresor objected to the fact that Sydenham had been corresponding with Colonel 
Doveton, who commanded a corps in Berar. Montresor viewed such a correspondence as a 
breach of his military authority, while Sydenham argued that the letters exchanged, and the 
instructions issued, were political in nature and therefore fell within the Resident’s purview. It 
was Sydenham’s view that, given his political experience and responsibilities, only he was 
situated to issue certain commands to the subsidiary force. In a private letter to Sydenham, 
Montresor voiced quite a different opinion, and complained with great feeling that ‘from the 
length of time you have been acting in a political capacity you are not aware what must be the 
feelings of an Officer’ when information about orders being issued to his subordinates was 
being systematically withheld from him. The Governor-General-in-Council ultimately 
acknowledged Sydenham’s right to correspond with officers when the circumstances 
appeared urgently to demand it, but Sydenham was nevertheless urged to use the 
commanding officer as a channel whenever possible. The Governor-General-in-Council’s 
decision does not seem to have clearly resolved the issue, however, as it did not make 
transparent what exactly constituted an urgent situation.105 Indeed, Sydenham’s successor 
Henry Russell had similar problems with the commanding officers of the Hyderabad 
subsidiary force, Colonel Conran and Colonel Montresor respectively. 106 Russell also found 
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himself in trouble with the Government at Fort St George when he requisitioned troops from 
Madras and refused to authorize their return.107  
While administrators in London and Calcutta expected Residents to adhere to 
diplomatic conventions of behaviour usually characterized as conciliatory or accommodating, 
Residents themselves thus had rather different ideas about how to most effectively represent 
Company interests. In practice, this meant that they were liable to take an aggressive tone 
when their superiors would have preferred them to be more moderate. This difference of 
opinion about the Residents’ role at Indian courts is reflected in the Residents’ avidity to 
secure control of military forces in the region. Technically these subsidiary forces were under 
the control of military officers, but Residents were increasingly prone to encroach on the 
prerogatives of their military counterparts; these interpositions on the part of the Resident 
were a recurring source of conflict during the period under study. Even more controversial 
than the Resident’s involvement in military affairs, however, were their disciplinary 
measures. The following section will consider some of the heated controversies which erupted 
around the Resident’s use of exemplary violence.   
4. Debating the pedagogical value of violence 
One of the most dramatic, albeit not widely publicized, controversies within the 
political line was when Henry Russell was dismissed from his post as Resident at Hyderabad. 
The Court of Directors were appalled when they learned that two Indians had died of their 
wounds after being brutally flogged by his order. The men had been caught robbing the 
market in front of the Residency, and Russell had ordered them flogged almost to death, that 
is, just short of what the doctor on hand predicted would kill them. The Court of Directors 
condemned Russell for failing to allow the two men the benefit of a trial, and for punishing 
them so ruthlessly. In the Court’s view, ‘such a proceeding must have impressed the people of 
Hyderabad with a strange idea of British justice’.108  The consequences were perceived to be 
serious, since the East India Company relied on the introduction of rule of law as a powerful 
justification for imperial intervention. India was perceived, or at least was described as, a 
lawless place where tyrants ruled by whim. Some of the most triumphant language of the 
period celebrated the fact that Britons had moderated what they believed to be the brutality of 
Indian law, particularly punishment by mutilation.109 Russell’s actions were therefore in stark 
opposition to the public image which his superiors sought to cultivate in India, and indeed, 
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across the empire more generally, as illustrated by James Epstein’s study of a similarly 
scandalous instance of corporal punishment in Trinidad around the same period.110 In fact, 
Russell was considered to have acted contrary to the very principles which were supposed to 
define him as a Briton; for, as Colin Kidd has emphasized, in the eighteenth century 
‘Britishness’ was seen to derive particularly from the enjoyment of rights and liberties, among 
which Britons numbered government by consent and trial by jury.111 British justice was 
supposed to be the best and fairest in the world, so it was particularly galling to the Directors 
in London that a Briton should behave in such a cruel and arbitrary manner when in a position 
of public authority abroad.  
The Company’s official stance on corporal punishment can be understood in part by 
situating it against a backdrop of changing attitudes in Britain. In the early modern period, 
violent forms of discipline and punishment were central to the exercise of power. This power 
was diffuse throughout society, belonging, in varying degrees, to heads of households, local 
authority figures, and to the state. Violence, and the shaming rituals and public spectacle 
which often accompanied it, was regarded as a legitimate disciplinary tool so long as it was 
judged commensurate with the offense.112 By the late eighteenth century, however, 
transportation and imprisonment were increasingly preferred to whipping, branding, and 
hanging. When physical punishments were administered, there was a greater likelihood that 
they would be carried out in the privacy of the prison or immediately outside its walls.113 
Growing numbers of commentators denounced the brutalizing and dehumanizing effect which 
public displays of judicial violence might have on the population, and questioned whether the 
crowds were extracting the intended meanings from these performances.114 These changing 
attitudes to corporal punishments were informed by changing ideas about the body and its 
significance.115 As Lynn Hunt has argued, a more recognizable notion of human rights was 
emerging as greater value was placed upon bodily integrity, and as a culture of sensibility 
urged an ever greater sense of identification with one’s fellow human beings and their 
experiences both physical and spiritual.116 At the same time, other forms of discipline and 
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punishment, not least the modern penitentiary, promised alternative means of social 
control.117 This is not to suggest, though, that the change was instant or total, and public 
executions continued to have their vocal supporters well into the nineteenth century, when 
they were finally abolished in Britain in 1868.118  
Opinions in Britain regarding corporal punishment were divided, and these divisions 
were equally apparent among British officials in India. To revert to the previous example, 
whereas the Court of Directors in London were unanimous in their condemnation of Russell’s 
actions, the Governor-General-in-Council in Calcutta seem to have been in serious 
disagreement about the justice and ‘humanity’ of Russell’s decision to flog the thieves in the 
Residency bazaar.119 Arguments concerning the public benefits of corporal punishment were 
given new life in a context where the populace was believed to respond particularly well to 
vigorous rule as well as visual display (a theme which will be picked up in the following 
chapter on political pageantry). This argument was commonly used by Residents, who 
defended aggressive measures by suggesting that public displays of force were uniquely 
appropriate in an Indian context. Indians, they declared, responded best to coercive tactics. 
Indeed, some Residents argued that clemency and conciliation, which in Britain might be 
considered virtues, were entirely lost on the Indian populace, ‘whose barbarous pride makes 
them bad judges of dignified moderation’, to quote one Resident.120 In fact, in India, it was 
sometimes argued, the usual rules for civilized behaviour did not apply at all. Russell, for 
instance, defended the brutal flogging meted out to the thieves based on the lawless and 
violent nature of Hyderabad itself. As he put it, ‘illegality is a breach of law. Where there is 
no law there can be no illegality.’121 This statement reflected a contemporary belief that the 
law of nations, some might even say the laws of nature, did not operate in the non-European 
world in the same way that they did in Europe.122 Thus, while there was certainly a strand of 
thought that emphasized Britain’s responsibility to mitigate what Britons considered to be the 
vicious extremes of Hindu and Muslim law, particularly the punishment of mutilation, there 
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were equally British officials who believed that such acts of state violence were entirely 
appropriate and indeed necessary in an Indian context.  
The underlying logic of many of these acts of physical brutality was that judicial 
violence should be used primarily to deter resistance rather than simply to punish the guilty. 
Residents saw the spectre of opposition everywhere, and the breadth of the perceived threat 
led them to believe in the necessity of exemplary acts of violence. Henry Russell speedily 
tried and executed several officers in the Hyderabad subsidiary force who had mutinied in 
1812, because ‘the Populace of Hyderabad are made of very combustible Materials, and a 
little Spark is at any time sufficient to occasion an Explosion’, elaborating that ‘if the Mutiny 
had not been put down with a strong Hand, some very unpleasant Consequences would have 
ensued from it’.123 Similarly, when the dethroned Rajah of Nagpur attempted to lead a revolt 
against the Company, the Resident Richard Jenkins was quick to identify and publicly hang 
his supporters; in his view, 
there will be no want of turbulent and disaffected people to second any sinister views of our 
enemies and those of the new Government, if they are not overawed by the presence of a 
sufficient body of our troops and the vigor of the measures adopted by the Government to 
repress and punish all treasonable attempts.124  
Because resistance and ill feeling was perceived to permeate more or less everywhere, the 
guilt of any one individual was less important than the effects that a visibly brutal punishment 
of that individual would have on the broader population. 
In the Residents’ eyes, this meant that the best punishments would be those which 
were locally specific, intelligible, and suited to Indian audiences. When Mountstuart 
Elphinstone was asked to report on the desirability of introducing British criminal justice into 
the Peshwa’s former dominions, he argued against it since ‘the whole of this [British] system 
is evidently better calculated for protecting innocent from punishment and the guilty from 
undue severity, than for securing the community by deterring from crimes’, whereas Indian 
forms of punishment, ‘although they were inhuman (or rather because they were inhuman) 
were effectual in striking terror’.125 Blowing perpetrators from a cannon, for instance, was 
held to be an ideal form of punishment both because it drew from Indian precedents, inspired 
terror in those who witnessed it, and perhaps unexpectedly, could be argued on humanitarian 
grounds to constitute a quicker and more pain-free death than other forms of execution such 
as decapitation.126 Accordingly, when three men were arrested and executed for treason at 
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Poona for their association with the rebel Chitoor Singh, Mountstuart Elphinstone chose to 
blow them from a cannon, which was later justified on the grounds that the threat of rebellion 
following the Company’s conquest ‘could only be repressed by severe examples’.127 The 
crucial point, then, was the spectacle. Kim Wagner has traced this mentality to the uprising of 
1857, and has identified it at work following outbreaks of resistance in India in the late 
nineteenth century; yet, as the example of the Residents shows, this logic is evident in much 
earlier sources.128  
It is worth noting that the execution of rebels was for the most part approved of by the 
Governor-General-in-Council in Calcutta. The fear of a general uprising in India was so acute 
that everyone seems to have agreed on the necessity of harsh punitive measures to repress 
incipient revolt. The point at which consensus splintered was on the question of whether acts 
of summary justice should be employed in other scenarios where the threat of general 
rebellion was less apparent or indeed non-existent; in other words, whether judicial violence 
should become an accepted part of the Resident’s repertoire. Thus, Henry Russell viewed the 
brutal flogging of the thieves and murderers who encroached on his domains as a mandatory 
display of his power and authority, while his superiors questioned the necessity and indeed 
the ethics of such a measure given that it was elicited by what appeared to be an isolated and 
ordinary criminal act which should have been handled by the Nizam and his officers.129  
The example of the Resident at Travancore Colin Macaulay is a further case in point. 
Following an unsuccessful revolt orchestrated by the diwan, Macaulay sent the executed 
minister’s body to the capital city of Trivandrum where his body was strung up on a gibbet 
for public viewing.130 The Governor-General-in-Council responded to news of this public 
exposure with horror. While such a revolt was taken very seriously, hanging up the minister’s 
body was considered to be ‘adverse to the common feelings of humanity and to the principles 
of a Civilised Government.’ The Governor-General-in-Council firmly refused to admit the 
necessity of such a measure, and regretted immensely that a British official had been openly 
involved in it. Indeed, to them it seemed apparent that such measures were savage and 
uncivilized, and Macaulay’s apparent acquiescence with this gross act raised questions about 
the ability of the Resident to properly represent the Company in Travancore. Residents, as 
government representatives, were supposed to embody all the virtues which Britain 
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supposedly stood for. They were meant to exhibit self-control, reason, judgement and 
understanding, not the kind of vindictiveness which appeared to be the driving force behind 
Macaulay’s treatment of the minister’s corpse. Macaulay, on the other hand, regarded the 
degrading treatment of the minister’s corpse as nothing short of a practical necessity. In his 
words:  
It cannot but be of importance, that in India more than any where, men should be taught that 
he, […] who utterly disregards and boldly discards from his breast, every sentiment of 
humanity, […] that such a man cannot be too ignominiously punished and exposed. 131 
 
 The actions of Colin Macaulay, and the reaction of the Governor-General-in-Council, 
expose the contradiction underlying Company policy in India. Macaulay defended his actions 
by arguing that the ‘inhumanity’ of the minister could not be too harshly punished, but in so 
doing Macaulay exposed himself to accusations of inhumanity from concerned administrators 
in Calcutta and London. This is a potent illustration of a process which Michael Taussig 
dubbed ‘colonial mimesis’, ‘a colonial mirroring of otherness that reflects back onto the 
colonists the barbarity of their own social relations, but as imputed to the savagery they yearn 
to colonize.’132 In their efforts to control what they perceived to be native savagery, imperial 
officials were liable to resort to precisely the kinds of violent acts for which native rulers were 
condemned. Such displays of cruelty on the part of some of the Residents inspired unease 
within the central government. The Company’s claim to a civilizing mission was predicated 
on the moral and intellectual qualities of its agents, and their essential difference from the 
Indians they were meant to regulate and improve through example.133 The behaviour of 
Residents like Henry Russell and Colin Macaulay, though it resonated with contemporary 
devaluations of Indians and Indian political culture, nevertheless powerfully undermined the 
Company’s claims to be a civilizing influence in India.  
These incidents of brute display within the political line were not an everyday 
occurrence, but although the acts themselves might have been unusual, the logic underlying 
them was not.  From the perspective of many of the Residents, such displays of force were the 
best, perhaps even the only way of visibly expressing their power. In their view, the European 
in India had to learn to suppress his natural aversion to violence if he was to effectively 
maintain social and political stability. Mountstuart Elphinstone ventured that ‘it is possible 
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that a very civilized Government may not be suitable to a society in a less advanced stage and 
that coarse expedients at which our minds revolt may be the only ones likely to check those 
evils which originate in the barbarism of the people’.134 While imperial rhetoric posited the 
‘civilization’ of Britain as its distinguishing feature and the foundation on which its empire 
rested, certain of its officials, to the contrary, viewed ‘civilization’ as a hindrance to be cast 
aside.  
Conclusion     
British attitudes to the use of violence in India seem to have changed significantly 
with the passage of time. In the late nineteenth century, as historians like Mark Condos and 
Elizabeth Kolsky have shown, the introduction of legal mechanisms like the Murderous 
Outrages Act gave colonial officials ‘licence to kill’ in frontier areas deemed dangerous or 
unstable.135 While these acts were not entirely uncontroversial, they did reflect general 
acceptance of the idea that officials stationed along the borders of British India should be 
given free rein to defend themselves and assert their authority by whatever means necessary 
in what was perceived to be a zone of perpetual warfare.  The assumptions enshrined in these 
laws were in many ways the same as those articulated by the Residents examined in this 
chapter, who certainly saw themselves as men under siege. In the early nineteenth century, 
however, there was no such consensus within the Company and the British public more 
broadly about the Residents’ executive powers. Though Residents drew on widespread ideas 
of Indian warfare, political culture, and the law of nations to argue for the necessity of 
coercive measures, their superiors remained unconvinced of the appropriateness of diplomatic 
agents resorting to violent methods.  
While administrators in London and Calcutta emphasized the Residents’ 
responsibility to conciliate, the Residents’ rather different interpretation of their role at Indian 
royal courts led them to try to assume military powers and occasionally even to engage in acts 
which contemporaries deemed savage.  The Governor-General-in-Council sought to maintain 
a strict division between the military and diplomatic branches of the Company, but in an 
imperial context situations of war and routine questions of law and order could blur 
together.136 Given that the Company’s wars against Indian states were regularly justified on 
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the grounds of the violent and untrustworthy nature of the Indian population, it was perhaps 
inevitable that such thinking would inform the activities of the Company’s civilian officials. 
Debates about the appropriate uses of violence thus reflected the rocky transition between 
diplomacy and the nascent stages of imperial influence.  
The reactions of the Governor-General-in-Council to the Residents’ acts of violence 
and, even more so, the reactions of the Court of Directors in London, also speak to 
contemporary concerns about the adoption of purportedly ‘Indian’ styles of rule. As Britons 
perceived it, Indian political legitimacy was rooted in the ability to protect one’s clients and 
punish infractions with dramatic shows of force, and it was certainly considered desirable for 
the Residents to possess this aura of authority. At the same time, this principle not only 
directly contravened the conventions governing traditional diplomatic activity, it also brought 
into question the Company’s claim to be curbing the brutality of Indian rulers. Thus, 
controversies over the use of violence were galvanized by the question of how far the 
Company officials should assimilate to Indian political culture.  
 The same basic problem animated the controversy over Residency expenditures. 
Though we might not usually connect debates over the appropriate use of violence with 
seemingly petty disputes over money, there is a common thread running through these 
discussions. The core issue which contemporaries were grappling with was the question of 
what constituted legitimacy in an imperial setting. To establish themselves at Indian courts 
British officials had to engage with Indian culture, but in what ways, and to what extent? The 
following chapter will show how these questions manifested themselves in recurring 
disagreements over Residency budgets, particularly concerning money spent on gift-exchange 
and items of display. 
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Chapter 3. Gift-giving, grandeur, and the ideological 
underpinnings of Residency budgets 
 Scattered across the Indian landscape, a few telling traces of the Residents remain. In 
Lucknow, the imposing ruins of the British Residency are a popular tourist destination 
because of its association with the uprising of 1857, when the British inhabitants of the city 
sheltered within the fortifications for close to three months. In Hyderabad, the splendid 
Palladian villa commissioned by James Achilles Kirkpatrick has been converted into a 
women’s college, and, though dilapidated, continues to draw visitors who marvel at the 
double staircase and the grand ballroom. Further south, in Kollam (formerly Quilon, the 
headquarters of the British Resident in Travancore), a large building with Italian architectural 
influences, now a government guest house, represents the legacy of Resident John Munro in 
the area. Though in varying states of disrepair, these buildings nevertheless convey one 
unmistakable message: someone important lived here.  With their lofty domes, marble 
columns, and clean, classical lines, these crumbling mansions are the last vestiges of the 
Residents’ carefully constructed aura of pomp and circumstance. They are a visible reminder 
of the magnificence which both reflected and reinforced the authority of the political 
representatives of the East India Company in the far corners of the subcontinent.   
In their heyday, these buildings were awe-inspiring, but they were also controversial. 
While contemporaries were broadly agreed that the Residents should be housed and arrayed 
in suitably grand fashion, the expenses associated with the construction and maintenance of 
these houses, along with the costs of equipage, retinue, and other visible markers of the 
Resident’s prestige, did not go uncontested. Throughout this period money was a major point 
of dispute dividing the Residents, the Governor-General-in-Council in Calcutta, and the Court 
of Directors in London. The problem was the Resident’s expense claims. In addition to a 
small monthly salary, the Resident was also permitted to claim certain expenses on a monthly 
basis as a concession to the public duties incumbent on him as a government representative. 
Legitimate costs included office establishment, table attendance and camp equipage, daks 
(postal service), intelligence, charity, and articles purchased for presents. According to a 
Company policy of 1805, these expense claims could not exceed Rupees 5193..9..7 per 
month, a sum which was meant to constitute a hard maximum rather than a fixed monthly 
allowance.1 Once submitted, expense claims were closely scrutinized by the Civil Auditor, 
who evaluated whether or not the costs laid out by the Resident were public and essential and 
therefore fit to be covered by the Company, or whether the charges represented private or 
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non-essential expenses to be defrayed by the Resident. The Civil Auditor and the Resident 
frequently disagreed on the status of various expenses, thus requiring the intervention of the 
Governor-General or occasionally the Court of Directors in London to decide the issue. 
Usually, these disagreements concerned money spent on gift-giving and items of display. 
Previously these debates have been explained with reference to the pragmatic 
interests of the principal players; put crudely, the Company’s hunger for profits was 
antithetical to the self-interest of the Residents, who endeavoured, for their part, to claim as 
much money as they could for themselves.2 While there is some truth to this interpretation, 
this chapter argues that the problems besetting the establishment of Residency budgets are 
significantly more suggestive of the ideological and practical uncertainties endemic to 
Company policy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century than existing accounts 
would have it. Rather than seeing budgetary concerns as a straightforward, politically neutral 
problem to be resolved through the application of reason and experience, my contention is 
that in fact the problem of what to spend money on, and how much to spend, is also the 
problem of what we value, and how much we value it. In other words, a disagreement about 
what kinds of expenses are appropriate or necessary is often symptomatic of deeper points of 
difference. In this instance, debates about the Resident’s expense claims were, at their core, 
expressions of uneasiness or uncertainty about the Resident’s immersion in Indian court 
society and the forms of influence which they exercised there.  
This ambivalence has been elided in existing studies of British engagement with gift-
giving and material culture in Indian politics. Both Nicholas Dirks and Bernard Cohn have 
influentially examined how royal practices of benevolence and spectacle were appropriated 
and reconfigured by British imperial officials, but, by focusing on the late nineteenth century, 
they omit a long prehistory of inconsistency and equivocation. Dirks and Cohn also construct 
stark oppositions between British and Indian political culture which, for the early nineteenth-
century at least, are far too clear-cut.3 Both historians assume, to varying degrees, that the 
Residents and their superiors were blind to the social and political significance of courtly 
munificence and spectacle, but it is my contention that, although contemporaries might have 
disapproved of the methods employed by the Residents, it was not because they failed to 
understand the symbolic dimensions of these activities. Though not wishing to rob eighteenth-
century Indian courtly culture of its local specificity, there are nevertheless ways in which the 
material side of Indian political culture closely resembled British valuations of gift exchange 
and stately grandeur. In fact, this chapter argues that the Resident’s auditors objected to the 
                                                     
2 Fisher, Indirect rule in India, p. 101.  
3 Dirks, The hollow crown, p. 354; Cohn, ‘Representing authority in Victorian India’, p. 169.  
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giving of gifts and the purchase of items of display precisely because they were all too aware 
of the social and cultural resonances of things.   
In the following chapter, money is considered from two theoretically distinct, albeit 
in practice closely and perhaps even inextricably related, perspectives: firstly, its economic 
aspect, as a store of ‘real’ value, and, secondly, its social and symbolic aspect, its imbrication 
(along with other forms of wealth) in webs of exchange which create ties, sometimes unequal, 
often power-laden, between people. Such an approach offers a helpful corrective to theories 
of market individualism, creating the space to acknowledge the complex motivations and 
practices involved in relationships of economic exchange. Thus, we can better recover the 
multiple and occasionally competing meanings which contemporaries, both Indian and 
British, attributed to money and other forms of wealth and the exchange thereof. This chapter 
centres on two particular foci of conflict, first gift-giving and then the purchase of items of 
display, to bring to light the ambiguities which complicated the adjudication of the Residents’ 
expense claims. Through these debates, we are alerted once again to contemporary anxieties 
about the relationship between Briton and Indian, the borders between public and private, and 
the appropriate forms of imperial authority.    
1. The symbolism and mechanics of gift exchange    
 Historians of South Asia regularly note the importance of beneficence to early 
modern understandings of kingship and the instrumental role of gift exchange in binding 
together the multiple political communities which made up the various Hindu and Muslim 
polities of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century India.4 At the most basic level, the provision of 
gifts and patronage imbued the sovereign with an aura of generosity, a quality emphasized 
and encouraged in both Hindu and Muslim religious culture. Through gifts of land, titles, and 
cloth, the Indian sovereign positioned himself as the ultimate wellspring of good fortune 
relative to his subjects.5 Gifts have also been identified on a more symbolic level as an 
incorporative mechanism, a means of establishing an almost organic relationship between 
people. This understanding of the gift is conventionally attributed to the non-duality of the 
eighteenth-century Indian worldview; in symbolic terms, no firm boundary was drawn 
between the material and the spiritual.6 Accordingly, material things possessed a meaning and 
a story of their own, deriving largely from their associations with people. Cloth, in particular, 
absorbed something of its owner’s essence; thus, through gifts of cloth, a symbolic 
                                                     
4 Rudolph and Hoeber Rudolph, ‘The subcontinental empire and the regional kingdom in Indian state 
formation’, p. 51; Richards, ‘The formulation of imperial authority under Akbar and Jahangir’, p. 315. 
5 John R. McLane, Land and local kingship in eighteenth-century Bengal (Cambridge, 1993), p. 96-98.  
6 Brittlebank, Tipu Sultan’s search for legitimacy, p. 102.  
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relationship was forged between giver and receiver.7 This is why gifts of cloth formed a 
routine part of Mughal court ritual. Visitors, subjects, and supplicants offered nazr (gold 
coins, the presentation of which symbolised a recognition of the ruler as the source of all 
wealth) and accepted khilat (ceremonial clothes which symbolically incorporated the recipient 
into the body of the monarch).8 Gifts of food performed a similar function, and Indian rulers 
routinely sat down to dinner with their ministers, distributing meals which were carefully 
differentiated to signal the respective status of the men who would consume them.9 While 
cloth and food occupied a special place as particularly symbolic gifts, gift exchanges of all 
kinds could be understood, to some extent at least, as having these kinds of social and 
symbolic connotations. Gifts thus represented an efficacious means of creating and renewing 
relationships, whether with subjects, feudatories, or regional allies.  
Indian rulers and their ministers readily incorporated Europeans into this gift 
economy. The Governor-General, given his position of recognized power, presented an 
attractive target whom Indian rulers enthusiastically sought to draw into relationships of 
exchange. Gifts were usually given with the intent of conciliating the Governor-General or 
placing an obligation on him to reciprocate with money or services. For instance, in 1808, 
when the Rajah of Nagpur stood in dire need of the Company’s military and financial support 
against the encroachments of the Pindaris, he lavished the recently-arrived Governor-General 
Lord Minto with rich presents of brocade, jewels, and an elephant. The gifts were a way for 
the Rajah to test the new Governor-General’s feelings towards him; the Governor-General’s 
manner of receiving the presents would signal his intentions towards the Rajah. As the Rajah 
himself put it, ‘your Lordship’s acceptance of these presents will augment the ties of mutual 
regard and esteem, and will afford me a proof that the relation of amity and cordial union are 
progressively improving.’10 Similarly, in 1816 when the Nawab Vizier of Awadh Ghazi-ud-
din Haidar sought a favourable settlement of his stepmother’s will, he routinely dispatched 
gifts of pickle and fruit from his garden to the Governor General in Calcutta, and, 
occasionally, the other members of his council. That same year, having heard rumours of a 
subscription for the families of British soldiers who fell at Waterloo, the Vizier determined to 
contribute to the fund, and transmitted 10,000 Rupees to the Resident with explicit 
instructions that the money be remitted to ‘my respected uncle His Excellency the Right 
                                                     
7 C.A. Bayly, ‘The origins of swadeshi (home industry): Cloth and Indian society, 1700-1930’, in The 
social life of things: Commodities in cultural perspective, ed. Arjun Appadurai (Cambridge, 1986), p. 
287.  
8 Cohn, ‘Representing authority in Victorian India’, p. 168-169.  
9 Brittlebank, Tipu Sultan’s search for legitimacy, p. 99.  
10 Rajah of Nagpur to Earl of Minto, 2 Feb. 1808, In-letters 1808 Jan-June, Persian Correspondence, 
Minto Papers, MS 11574, NLS, p. 62.   
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Honorable the Governor General the Earl of Moira, that it might be distributed to them in my 
name’.11 In this case, the Vizier’s gift also functioned as a marker of prestige; being in the 
position to give charitably to the British tangibly expressed the Vizier’s power and prosperity. 
By channeling such a gift through the Governor-General, the Vizier ensured that this act of 
generosity would not go unnoticed.  
 It was the Residents, however, who engaged in gift exchange on a more routine basis 
at Indian courts. The Resident exchanged nazr for khilat and accepted symbolic gifts of food, 
but also gave less ritualised presents. New Residents usually presented gifts to the ruler upon 
arrival; Mountstuart Elphinstone arrived in Nagpur loaded down with offerings for the Rajah 
Raghoji Bhonsla, his family, and his ministers, including ‘two of the largest and most 
ornamented mirrors’, a number of pistols and fowling pieces, ‘a most elegant & various 
assortment of cutlery’, ‘two or three richly embroidered saddles & trappings, for horses’, and 
‘a few illuminated & elegantly bound Hindoo books’.12 Holidays and special occasions such 
as weddings, births, and circumcisions all prompted further gifts from the Resident.13 Gifts 
were also sometimes given on a more spontaneous and informal basis, tailored to the tastes 
and habits of the ruler in question.14 On 21 February 1799, for example, James Achilles 
Kirkpatrick noted in a postscript to a letter  to his brother William that ‘the Minister is 
passionately fond of game cocks; and very desirous of getting some English ones of the true 
game breed. Are any of this kind to be had at Madras?’15 Later that same year, Kirkpatrick 
requested a pair of pigeons for Nizam Ali Khan, who was a connoisseur: ‘Spice Island 
Pigeons I am told are as large as a goose, which would be thought a prodigious [variety] 
here’.16  
 Though gifts given might vary subtly according to the tastes of the recipient, there 
was an overwhelming continuity in the kinds of gifts exchanged between Indian rulers and 
British officials in official and ceremonial contexts. Gifts of cloth, jewels, elephants, and 
horses were traditional Indian political presents, with recognized meanings, which therefore 
                                                     
11 Richard Strachey to John Adam, 25 Jan. 1816, Richard Strachey Papers, Mss Eur D514/3, OIOC, p. 
53.     
12 Mountstuart Elphinstone to John Adam, 18 Apr. 1804, Papers of John Adam, Mss Eur F109/88, 
OIOC, n.p.  
13 Richard Strachey to J.W. Sherer, Civil Auditor, 16 Oct. 1811, Richard Strachey Papers, Mss Eur 
D514/1, OIOC, p. 51; Richard Strachey to J.H. Sherer, Civil Auditor, 26 Aug. 1812, Richard Strachey 
Papers, Mss Eur D514/1, OIOC, p. 171.   
14 In addition to the example noted below, see records of Elphinstone’s embassy in Poona records, vol. 
XII, p. 274. See also Mountstuart Elphinstone to John Adam, Papers of John Adam, Mss Eur F109, 
OIOC, particularly letters dated 4 Mar.1804.  
15 J.A. Kirkpatrick to William Kirkpatrick, 21 Feb. 1799, Private letters from his brother James 
Achilles Kirkpatrick, Papers of Maj-Gen William Kirkpatrick, Mss Eur F228/11, OIOC, p. 80.  
16 J.A. Kirkpatrick to William Kirkpatrick, 29 Jun. 1801, Private letters from his brother James Achilles 
Kirkpatrick, Papers of Maj-Gen William Kirkpatrick, Mss Eur F228/13, OIOC, p. 83. 
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constituted a key element of these exchanges. As previously mentioned, cloth was perceived 
to retain something of the essence of the giver; jewels, meanwhile, were considered to possess 
talismanic qualities.17 Elephants and horses, while practically useful for travel and warfare, 
were also symbolically associated with kingship and authority, and were usually presented 
heavily laden with jewelled saddles and trappings.18 These conventional presents were 
supplemented with European specialties; according to Archibald Seton, it was ‘to foreign 
articles, from their superior beauty, their greater scarcity, and their consequent difficulty of 
procurement, that the natives attach the highest value.’19 Standard items included dishware, 
guns, telescopes, and, most popular of all, timepieces. As in other parts of the Islamic world, 
watchmaking in India was largely a European affair, and watches and clocks were therefore 
always well-received.20  
Christian Windler, commenting on the role of political gift-giving in nineteenth-
century Franco-Tunisian diplomacy, concluded that the giving of timepieces was ‘only the 
most persistent instance of a cultural ascendancy communicated by the carefully designed 
composition of presents’.21 In an Indian context, however, there is little to suggest that 
Residents chose presents intended to symbolise British technological advancement. The 
objective, at least according to surviving sources, was not to impress upon Indian rulers the 
superiority of European civilization, but instead to conciliate the ruler in question by catering 
to Indian tastes as the Residents understood them. Thomas Sydenham explicitly sought out 
‘such rare and curious Machines and Trinkets as I thought suited to the Nizams Fancy’, 
including telescopes, air pumps, thermometers, hand organs, opera glasses, spectacles, and an 
electrical machine.22 Mountstuart Elphinstone similarly tracked down timepieces at the desire 
of the Rajah of Berar, noting that ‘the Rajah is very curious in watches & is well provided in 
every thing but repeaters’ (a clock that audibly chimes the hour, usually by pulling a cord).23 
Rather than interpreting these gifts as a statement of European pre-eminence, Indian rulers 
seem to have viewed the acquisition of European items as a manifestation of the global reach 
                                                     
17 Brittlebank, Tipu Sultan’s search for legitimacy, p. 137.  
18 Sujit Sivasundaram, ‘Trading knowledge: The East India Company’s elephants in India and Britain’, 
HJ, 48:1 (2005): 27-63; Jagjeet Lally, ‘Empires and equines: The horse in art and exchange in South 
Asia, ca. 1600- ca. 1850’, CSSAAME, 25:1 (2015): 96-116.  
19 Archibald Seton to Marquess of Hastings, 6 Jun. 1814, Cleveland Public Library Papers, Neg 4227, 
wq091.92 Ea77p9, OIOC, p. 111.   
20 When the Peshwa of Poona’s palace was seized following the final Maratha War, soldiers discovered 
‘many very fine gold watches’ along with globes, an orrery, and a sundial. Private journal of an officer 
in the Deccan during AD 1817-1818, Grant-Duff Papers, Mss Eur F311/6, OIOC, p. 8.  
21 Christian Windler, ‘Tributes and presents in Franco-Tunisian diplomacy’, Journal of Early Modern 
History, 4:2 (2000): 186.  
22 Thomas Sydenham to Earl of Minto, 26 Aug. 1808, BC, IOR/F/4/296/6833, OIOC, p. 31. 
23 Mountstuart Elphinstone to John Adam, 4 Mar. 1804, Papers of John Adam, Mss Eur F109/88, 
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of their own power and influence.24 Indian rulers were therefore enthusiastic collectors of 
European goods, and as a result British visitors to Indian courts were often surprised and 
somewhat unsettled to encounter material reminders of home in very unexpected settings. 
George, Viscount Valentia, described his bewilderment on attending an entertainment hosted 
by the Nawab Vizier Asaf-ud-Daula, who was a particularly ardent collector:  
The scene was so singular, and so contrary to all my ideas of Asiatic manners, that I could 
hardly persuade myself that the whole was not a masquerade. An English apartment, a band in 
English regimentals, playing English tunes; a room lighted by magnificent English girandoles, 
English tables, chairs, and looking glasses; an English service of plate; English knives, forks, 
spoons, wine glasses, decanters and cut glass vases - how could these convey any idea that we 
were seated in the court of an Asiatic Prince?25 
Thus, while war and ceremonial were considered crucial to the construction of an ‘empire of 
opinion’, political gifts seem to have been used primarily to accrue social, rather than 
symbolic, capital; their main purpose was to amuse and entertain. 
 Nor was British gift-giving in the Indian context regulated by the logic of the 
potlatch, wherein rivals sought to outdo each other by competing to give the most valuable 
presents. Rather, the Company money which Residents spent on gifts was closely regulated. 
While sanctioning the exchange of presents in cases where the precedent of gift exchange had 
been inarguably set, the Governor-General-in-Council nevertheless encouraged the Residents 
to avoid displays of generosity where possible. For instance, the Governor-General-in-
Council approved the expenses necessary for Richard Jenkins to host entertainments at the 
Nagpur Residency upon the marriage of the Rajah of Berar’s daughter, because ‘this 
compliment would be expected in conformity to the usage observed on former occasions of a 
similar nature’, but nevertheless cautioned the Resident that such expenses, ‘should, if 
possible, be avoided in future’, urging the Resident consider ‘in what manner our intentions in 
this respect can be effected […] without subjecting our public Residents to the imputation of 
being deficient in the usual forms of civility and attention.’26 Residents were expected to keep 
detailed records of the presents that were disbursed, their value, and the reasons for their 
conferment. If the Resident failed to satisfy the Civil Auditor as to the validity and political 
necessity of the gift, the Company would refuse to cover the cost.27 When it came to the 
receipt of gifts, the Company’s position was equally strict. In an attempt to obviate 
                                                     
24 Brittlebank, Tipu Sultan’s Search for Legitimacy, p. 119. See also Indira Viswanathan Peterson, ‘The 
cabinet of King Serfoji of Tanjore: A European collection in early nineteenth century India’, The 
Journal of the History of Collections, 1:1 (1999): 71-93.  
25 Valentia, Voyages and Travels, 144. Rosie Lewellyn-Jones describes the collections of Asaf-ud-
Daula and his successors in A fatal friendship: The Nawabs, the British, and the city of Lucknow 
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26 Extract Political Letter to Bengal, 14 Sept. 1808, BC, IOR/F/4/308/7060, OIOC, p. 1.   
27 William Morton to Arthur Henry Cole, 5 Feb. 1816, BC, IOR/F/4/527/12633, OIOC, p. 30.  
 
103 
 
 
corruption, in 1773 the Board of Control instituted a Regulating Act which expressly forbade 
Britons from receiving gifts of land, jewels, and money.28 While the Residents continued to 
exchange nazr, peshkash, and khilat, the items which the Residents were given in return were 
never kept by them personally. Instead, the Residents compiled records of the objects they 
received and their monetary value; these items were then added to the toshakhana, a public 
treasury of ritual presents. These presents could be given again to a different person on a later 
occasion, or could be sold in Calcutta and the proceeds used to buy more presents.29  
The obvious rationale behind this policy of stringent account-keeping was the desire 
to avoid unnecessary expense given that the East India Company was mired in debt. In large 
part the ever-increasing deficit was a result of recurring warfare with Indian regional powers 
dating back to the mid-eighteenth century. It was not helped, however, by the wider context 
of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars then raging across the globe. The wars not only 
limited trade with Europe, but created a steep upswing in French privateering in the Indian 
Ocean. The British government was also feeling the strain of wartime expenditures, to the 
point that its financial aid had to be bought with concessions, for instance, surrendering 
trading privileges or allowing the navy the use of Company ships. In this position of financial 
embarrassment, it is unsurprising that the Company sought to institute a policy of the strictest 
economy when it came to the purchase of political gifts.30  
The efforts of the Governor-General-in-Council to monitor the Residents’ 
participation in gift exchanges were also influenced by public opinion in Britain, and can be 
attributed in part to the recent history of the Company and the criticism to which it had been 
subject.  In the mid-eighteenth century the Company’s growing political and administrative 
role in India had introduced new opportunities for profit, what diplomatist and Indian 
administrator John Malcolm in his 1826 Political history of India termed ‘the golden harvest 
which, about this period, opened up in the East’.31 With more of its servants returning to 
England with huge and ill-gotten fortunes, the Company quickly fell into disrepute; many of 
its former employees were subjected to painfully public parliamentary inquiries, most 
famously the dramatic impeachment trial of Warren Hastings. In consequence, the late 
eighteenth century witnessed a series of reforms designed to rehabilitate the Company’s 
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public image: in addition to the institution of the aforementioned 1773 Regulating Act, a 
parliamentary Board of Control was appointed to oversee the Company’s operations and 
Company officials were granted pay increases to deter them from engaging in corruption and 
private trading.32 The upper echelons of the Company were wary of the ways in which the 
exchange of gifts could verge on corruption, and were therefore keen to regulate it. The 
Residents, given their geographically distant and relatively solitary position at Indian courts, 
as well as their close engagement with Indian political figures, were (unsurprisingly) special 
objects of scrutiny and suspicion in this regard.  
It is difficult to determine to what extent, if at all, the Residents did accept gifts from 
the Indian political elite. On one occasion, at least, James Achilles Kirkpatrick was presented 
with a valuable diamond ring as a sign of the Nizam’s favour which he appears to have kept 
for himself.33 These kinds of gifts are almost never mentioned in the Residents’ official or 
unofficial correspondence, but then Company regulations would have dictated against 
Residents reporting these gifts if they had sought to profit from them, and it is possible that 
Residents would also have felt reticent about mentioning them to family or friends. Perhaps as 
a result, to the extent that gifts from Indians are discussed in the Residents’ correspondence, it 
is normally to say that they have been rejected. For example, Henry Russell mentions in a 
letter to his brother Charles that he has accepted a pair of shawls sent by Azizullah (the 
Residency munshi at Hyderabad), but has rejected the offer of a horse; in his words, ‘it is 
hardly the sort of Present that suits our relative situation; and is besides, in Point of Value, 
more than he ought to give with Prudence or I to accept with Propriety’.34 In this case the gift 
was probably mentioned because Charles (then Assistant Resident at Hyderabad) was the 
channel through which the gift reached Russell; the horse was likely considered inappropriate 
because Azizullah, as an employee of the Resident at Hyderabad, was subordinate to Russell 
(who had just accepted a position as Resident there). To accept such an expensive gift would 
have invested Azizullah with a dignity above his station, while placing Russell in a position 
of debt. Similarly, when Mountstuart Elphinstone was offered a piece of land by the Rajah of 
Berar, he interpreted the gift to mean that ‘the Raja thought it material to have favorable 
representations given of his conduct’. Elphinstone claimed to treat the offer with ‘ridicule & 
contempt’, mentioning it only because, in the context of Elphinstone’s attempts to negotiate a 
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treaty with the Rajah, the offer seemed to suggest that the Rajah was inclined to a 
rapprochement with the Company.35 In both cases the acceptance of the gift would have been 
onerous to the Resident, whether by conferring prestige on an inferior (as in Russell’s case) or 
by placing an obligation on the Resident to reciprocate (as with Elphinstone). It is possible 
that Residents preferred to maintain their status and freedom of action rather than to accept 
gifts that might have placed them in a difficult position at court or contravened Company 
regulations.  
At the same time, it is equally possible that Residents sought to take advantage of 
their more or less isolated position, endeavouring to make their fortune and return home in the 
shortest possible time frame. Writing to a family friend in Scotland on the subject of his 
personal finances, Archibald Seton alluded to the nabob’s reputation for corruption and noted 
that ‘it had been easy for me, had I been that which Indeans are frequently said to be, to have 
brought home with me as many pounds as I shall bring rupees’. According to Seton, ‘the law 
could not have checked me discovery could not have followed, but in foro conscientiae that 
most just and most formidable of all tribunals I should have stood condemned’. In Seton’s 
view, all the money in the world was not worth ‘the sad sacrifice of a mans own esteem’, but 
it is hard to say how many of the Residents made a similar appraisal, given that, according to 
Seton, they had only their own consciences to answer to.36  
2. A comparison of Indian and British gift-giving regimes 
Although these practicalities had an important bearing on Company policy on gift-
giving, this does not mean that Company officials were blind to the symbolic dimensions of 
gift-giving, or that they did not take this aspect of the exchange into account when 
considering what kinds of presents to give and when. This is how the official attitude towards 
gift-giving has been interpreted in the past; Bernard Cohn famously contended that Britons 
were liable to dismiss the giving of gifts as bribery because they viewed these exchanges as 
purely economic in nature and function, construing the goods thus exchanged as mere 
commodities, ignoring their social and symbolic overtones.37 Such an assumption, however, 
postulates a radical difference between Britons and Indians, identifying the former as modern 
and capitalist, the latter, implicitly, as something other. This dichotomy has a long history 
within the anthropological discipline; to quote Natasha Eaton, ‘most ethnographies of gift 
would have us believe that its locale is the non-occidental world, blatantly disregarding that 
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the West has its own gift institutions[.]’38 Beginning with Mauss, anthropologists have 
particularly associated gift exchange with small-scale non-industrial societies, drawing sharp 
distinctions between gifts and commodities and the theatres in which these exchanges take 
place. 39 This traditional opposition between gifts and commodities has been controverted by 
recent studies which demonstrate the overlap between these two modes of exchange. In an 
edited collection entitled Money and the morality of exchange, editors Jonathan Parry and 
Maurice Bloch assembled a series of case studies which together pointed to huge cultural 
variation in terms of the way in which monetary transactions are understood and engaged in, 
while at the same time suggesting that all over the world there is often a perceived connection 
between short-term exchanges and long-term relationships; in other words, that apparently 
straightforward economic transactions can still be and often are symbolic, culturally 
contingent, and highly social.40 
Indeed, while Britons in India might have treated particular instances of gift-giving 
with disdain, this by no means signified their disregard for the social and symbolic 
dimensions of these exchanges in general. For instance, although on the face of it T.D. 
Broughton’s description of the exchange of khilat and nazr at Sindhia’s court in his published 
account of his time with the Marathas would seem to substantiate Cohn’s claim, a closer 
reading suggests a rather different conclusion. Broughton, the captain of the Resident’s escort, 
grumbled that at Sindhia’s camp the presentation of gifts, and particularly khilats, ‘is 
considered more as a matter of bargain and sale than as a compliment’. For Broughton, 
‘[t]here is something very repugnant to European ideas of delicacy in the mode of conducting 
this part of an entertainment [the exchange of khilats]; especially at a Mahratta Durbar’. 
Broughton proceeded to complain that ‘at this court the Khiluts are notoriously bad; and the 
Muha Raj always seizes the opportunity to get rid of a lame horse or a foundered elephant’, 
while at the same time noting with contempt how ‘some of his Surdars return a pair of shawls, 
which they did not like, and desire that they might be changed; with as little delicacy as if 
they had purchased them at a shop.’41 The Maratha officials, in other words, were criticized 
precisely because they seem to confuse gifts, imbued with sentimental and symbolic value, 
with commodities.  
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The British in India would have been well-versed in the symbolic and social 
dimensions of gift exchange since gift-giving played an important part in eighteenth-century 
British social life. Some Residents imply in their letters that they regarded the exchange of 
gifts as a particularly Indian phenomenon, but their assertions on this point should be read 
critically. These men were effectively engaging in what legal historian Anthony Anghie has 
termed the ‘dynamic of difference,’ the ‘process of creating a gap between two cultures, 
demarcating one as universal and civilized, and the other as particular and uncivilized’.42 
Mountstuart Elphinstone, for instance, claimed that Indians invested gifts with an importance 
‘of which a man of sense could have no idea’. He further expressed the view that ‘a few such 
gifts conciliate the natives more than a long course of fair & honourable conduct joined to the 
gentlest behaviour. They are all fools & children to a man.’43 Yet Elphinstone himself 
regularly exchanged gifts with friends in India, and never reacted with anything less than 
delight when favoured with a present; he lauded his friend Edward Strachey as ‘the prince of 
good fellows & pride of old men’ for having sent a pair of boots, though Elphinstone opined 
that no half boots were to be had, he being ‘now under the mortifying necessity of going to 
dinner in silk stockings which I fancy is rather scandalous.’44  
As the example of Mountstuart Elphinstone suggests, British gentlemen (and women) 
routinely exchanged gifts as a means of cementing relationships. Historians of eighteenth-
century Britain have convincingly demonstrated the important social functions which these 
gifts were recognized to have. Charitable giving endowed the giver with status and marked 
out vertical ties within the community, while the exchange of gifts between friends and kin 
created and consolidated horizontal connections.45 Recipients might well be aware of the 
financial worth of the gift, but its value just as often inhered in its social or sentimental 
connotations; portraits for example were particularly valued because they presented a means 
of bridging the geographical distance separating friends and relatives.46 In diplomatic and 
mercantile contexts, as well, there was a long tradition of presenting gifts as a means of 
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establishing relationships, signalling mutual respect and the desire for mutual benefit.47  Gift-
giving, then, operated in a broadly similar way, in British as in Indian society, as a kind of 
social and political glue, imbued with meanings which were not strictly tied to the economic 
value of the object changing hands.  
Putting aside some of the basic similarities between British and Indian ideas about 
gift-giving, a long history of political transactions with Indian royalty meant that members of 
the Company’s political line had developed at least an elementary understanding of Indian 
gifting conventions, even where they differed from British traditions. As Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam has pointed out, ‘states and empires were very rarely ships that passed in the 
night of incommensurability’.48 It was possible for Europeans and non-Europeans to arrive at 
a mutual understanding, even though such an understanding required some effort to construct. 
On both sides of the encounter, the giver and the recipient took steps to ensure that their 
actions would be understood. For instance, Indian rulers often made explicit precisely how 
they wished a gift to be interpreted, usually through an accompanying letter. In their return 
letters, British officials in India likewise openly alluded to the meanings underlying their 
receipt of gifts from Indian nobility, signalling their awareness of the gift’s symbolic value. 
The Earl of Minto specifically thanked the royal women of Delhi for their gifts of shawls, 
whose ‘principal value’, he wrote, ‘consists in their having been worn by persons of your 
royal Highness’s rank.’ Such a present was, he recognised, ‘a distinguished mark of favor and 
condescension’.49  
In cases where the norms governing gift-giving practices were less transparent, 
Residents could draw on the expertise of the munshis who acted as secretaries and political 
agents, or the ministers who so often mediated between the Resident and the monarch.50 In 
cases where the Resident appeared blind to the implications of a failure to follow the proper 
protocol, the minister or munshi could alert him to the meanings that might be read into such 
an act. For instance, the minister at Hyderabad intervened when Thomas Sydenham neglected 
to host the Nizam of Hyderabad at his Residency. Sydenham recognized that such an occasion 
would require him to present the Nizam with presents and would therefore put the Company 
to considerable expense, but the minister convinced Sydenham of the necessity of the 
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measure by pointing out that it ‘would be extremely gratifying to his Highness and might 
conduce to a familiar Intercourse between his Highness and myself [Sydenham]’.51 
Company officials were not only aware of the symbolic connotations of particular 
kinds of gift-giving; they also accorded great political significance to these exchanges. This is 
manifest in the way in which officials in the political line monitored and attempted to control 
the exchange of gifts between Indian rulers. Company administrators were particularly keen 
to preclude the exchange of gifts between the Maratha chieftains, who had jointly dominated 
central India in the earlier decades of the eighteenth-century. In 1803, the Company signed a 
treaty with the nominal head of the Marathas, the Peshwa of Poona, which was meant to 
dissolve the confederacy and position the Company as chief mediator between the different 
Maratha courts. In an effort to cement this new political configuration, the Residents refused 
to allow the Marathas to exchange the traditional gifts of coin and ceremonial robes; most 
notably, the Resident at Poona repeatedly denied the Maratha ruler Holkar the right to offer 
presents to the Peshwa, as Holkar had done every year before the Treaty of Bassein was 
signed. The Resident equally denied Holkar the right to a robe of investiture, traditionally 
offered by the Peshwa of Poona to Maratha royal heirs as a public recognition of their right to 
succeed. The Resident’s justification for refusing these requests was that they implied a pre-
eminence on the part of the Peshwa contrary to the stipulations of the treaty, which was 
supposed to have placed the Maratha chieftains on an equal footing. Maratha aspirations to 
give and receive gifts were clearly taken seriously, since the Resident Barry Close (then 
absent on military campaigns) informed his substitute at court that ‘as the question is of a 
very delicate nature, I shall be happy if you will correspond with me minutely on every point 
that may occur relating to its future agitation or progress’.52  
 The Company’s attention to the political implications of such exchanges is equally 
exemplified by the way in which its representatives attempted to manipulate these rituals to 
accentuate their own status. To some extent, participation in these rituals of exchange helped 
to naturalise the Company’s relationship with Indian powers, effectively masking their 
asymmetry by outwardly maintaining all the conventional forms of Indian diplomacy which 
traditionally characterized relationships between allies. In this case, Bourdieu’s theories on 
the gift would seem to be borne out: gift-giving functioned as ‘a kind of social alchemy’ 
transforming ‘overt domination into misrecognized, “socially recognized” domination, in 
other words, legitimate authority.’53 At the same time, high-ranking officials within the 
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Company were keen to ensure that their participation in these rituals did not undermine their 
position of power. Governor-General Richard Wellesley accepted gifts of ceremonial cloth 
from Indian rulers on his tour of the Northwest Provinces, but insisted that these robes be 
presented to him on trays rather than ritually draped over his person. In this way, Wellesley 
attenuated the incorporative function of the ritual, which was meant to subordinate him to the 
Indian ruler in question.54 A few years later, when the Mughal Emperor dispatched an 
emissary to present Governor-General Minto with an honorary dress, Minto angrily refused to 
accede to what he considered to be ‘a public acknowledgement of vassalage and submission 
on the part of the British Government to the throne of Delhi’.55 Minto’s successor, the 
Marquess of Hastings, similarly denied the Emperor’s request to bestow him with a khilat; 
Hastings bypassed Delhi altogether on his tour of the Upper Provinces, anxious to avoid ‘a 
ceremonial which was to imply his Majesty’s being the liege lord of the British 
possessions’.56 Not wishing to offend the king, Hastings did sent a deputation to Delhi with 
prominent members of his escort, who were instructed to present nazrs on their own 
individual account. Hastings’ escort also presented the Emperor with a ‘gaudy state chariot’, 
while Hastings himself recorded in his diary that ‘as an article of convenience and splendour, 
it was the most striking that I could send; and I wished to show the attention, as I had so much 
shorn the pretensions of his Majesty to supremacy’.57 The fact that Hastings was still willing 
to furnish the Emperor with the expensive present of a richly decorated carriage suggests that 
the issue was not the monetary expense incurred by the exchange of gifts; the objection, 
clearly, was to the meanings that would be read into Hastings’ acceptance of particular kinds 
of presents.  
The Residents for their part did participate in such rituals of subservience to Indian 
rulers. At the same time, they still turned the ritual to their advantage by dispensing 
ceremonial robes of their own to courtiers and officials, thereby establishing themselves as 
centers of power and patronage in their own right.58 For instance, following the construction 
of a water tank in Hyderabad the Resident Henry Russell requested to be present at the 
ceremonial opening; once there, Russell dispensed gifts of shawls and money to the minister’s 
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servants who had superintended the work, thereby stressing his instrumental role in ensuring 
the tank’s completion.59 As we shall see in Chapter 4, Residents also regularly made public 
gifts of khilat to their munshis was a way of visibly co-opting the munshi’s social and cultural 
capital and marking the munshi out as his agent. These rituals were thus an important plank in 
the Resident’s representational strategies.  
Though recognising the value of such activities, Company auditors and administrators 
in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay were broadly uncomfortable with this facet of Indian 
political culture, and accordingly tried to limit and, in their view, rationalise these practices. 
Company administrators actively sought to transform the exchange of gifts into something 
more commoditised and controlled, and, in so doing, to limit expenses and to confine 
relationships between the Company and the Indian elite within a narrowly contractual sphere. 
For instance, the Company administration urged the Residents to treat the exchange of coins 
and ceremonial robes as a direct transaction congruent with the exchange of commodities for 
money, which entailed giving only gifts whose value they might expect to receive directly in 
return.60 Where services were rendered, the Company preferred the Resident to pay for them 
in cash rather than reciprocating with presents. The Civil Auditor of Madras chastised Arthur 
Henry Cole for presenting two shawl pieces to the Rajah of Coorg in recompense for repairs 
to an elephant saddle, since the shawls were valued at a higher price than the saddle itself.61 
This kind of assiduous account-keeping meant that the meaningful exchange of gifts could 
sometimes have the appearance of degenerating into an empty exercise. In her travel journal, 
Lady Hood, a visitor to the court of Mysore, described such an exchange of jewels between 
the Resident and the Rajah: ‘this reciprocation of presents,’ she wrote, ‘was rather farcical, as 
they were on both sides to be lodged next day in the Company’s treasury and put to the 
account of Debtor and Creditor.’62 Still, by attempting to regulate gift-giving in this way, 
Company administrators were not simply betraying their ignorance of Indian political culture. 
Rather, they were seeking to force Indian political practices into a more narrowly defined 
framework of their choosing, thereby cutting down on costs, limiting relationships of 
obligation, and preventing Company representatives from becoming too deeply embedded in 
courtly society.  
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Company administrators often found it difficult to enforce such strict reciprocity, 
however. For one thing, it was impossible to anticipate how a gift would be reciprocated. 
Sometimes a generous gift would be purchased, according to the high status of the recipient, 
and a mere token would be given in return. The brother of the Peshwa of Poona, though he 
was greeted with a rich array of presents upon his arrival at the city of Benares, reciprocated 
with very paltry gifts, including a horse so old and broken down that the Resident had to 
prevail on an old fakir to take the animal off his hands.63 Circumstances beyond the 
Resident’s control also sometimes dictated the giving of gifts where there could be no 
assurance of reciprocity, for instance at birthdays or weddings. Finally, the Resident’s pre-
eminence at court sometimes precluded him from receiving gifts in turn. The Resident at 
Hyderabad James Achilles Kirkpatrick objected to the Company’s emphasis on total 
reciprocity on the grounds that his position of high distinction actually prohibited this kind of 
equivalence. Out of respect for his position, visitors to Hyderabad were expected to pay 
Kirkpatrick the first visit. Kirkpatrick, for his part, rarely repaid that visit except as a mark of 
special respect and attention. This meant that Kirkpatrick could not expect to be reimbursed in 
kind for his munificence, since it was the host who was normally responsible for offering 
presents to his guests.64 The lack of equivalence between the gifts given, and gifts received, 
signalled and at the same time cemented Kirkpatrick’s pre-eminence. 
 As the example of Kirkpatrick suggests, the Residents themselves sometimes chafed 
at financial restraints imposed on them from on high. Through the lens of gift-giving, one can 
discern a split between Company auditors in government headquarters and the Resident on 
the ground. Gifts were a means of expressing the Resident’s prestige, and Residents were 
resentful of anything which tended to limit or undermine the expression of that social cachet. 
The political importance attributed to such exchanges by the Resident is reflected by the fact 
that the Resident at Travancore issued a formal objection to the Governor General when the 
Commercial Resident at Anjengo made a present to the Raja of Travancore at a marriage 
ceremony. Although the Resident referred to the presents as ‘trifling’, the issue was 
considered significant enough to prohibit further communication between the Commercial 
Resident and the court at Travancore on the basis that it undermined the Resident’s personal 
influence and authority at the court.65 As this example suggests, gift exchange was one of the 
most effective means of conciliating figures of political import, and Residents therefore 
defended gift-giving as an important component of their political toolkit. Consequently, many 
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Residents found the administration’s emphasis on money frustrating because the exchange of 
gifts clearly had social and political implications which could not be tallied in terms of rupees 
spent or received. As Bourdieu argued in his influential theory of the gift, gift-giving, though 
seemingly disinterested, is often motivated by the desire to translate one’s wealth into 
influence and social prestige.66 While the Resident’s superiors sought to shore up the 
Company’s stock of economic capital, from the Resident’s perspective this money was 
practically meaningless. A capital of obligations and debts, by comparison, could help the 
Resident to do his job by ensuring the cooperation of important figures at court. From the 
Residents’ perspective, money on gift-giving could hardly be considered lost, merely 
transformed into a more useful currency.  
This clash between Residents and Company auditors on the question of gifts was 
merely one important flashpoint in a broader field of combat, namely, the Resident’s expense 
claims. The Residents and their superiors debated, not just the validity of particular expenses, 
but also the limits to be set to the Residency’s monthly expense claims more generally. These 
disagreements were symptomatic of larger uncertainties, concerning the vague boundary 
between the Resident’s public and private life as well as the uncertain nature of the 
Company’s influence over these Indian states and how that influence should manifest itself. 
These squabbles over money, though no doubt motivated to some degree by the personal 
interests of the people involved, are therefore more revealing than they might at first appear 
about the shifting and ill-defined nature of the Residency system in its early years.  
3. Debating the political value of pageantry 
In a letter to his sister, Emily, the Resident Charles Theophilus Metcalfe expressed 
his frustration with the course his career in the political line had taken, noting regretfully that 
he had long significantly exceeded his income and had little hope of reducing his expenses in 
future. ‘This is such a backward way of making a fortune’, he admitted, ‘that I must consider 
what I have as all I shall ever have; and entertain no hope of any further savings; as I am not 
sensible of any extravagant outlays that could be avoided with any adequate effect’.67 The 
problems experienced by Metcalfe and other members of the political line inhered in the 
nature of their work; instead of being paid a sum of money that was their own to dispose of as 
they would, the Residents were paid only a small salary in addition to an expense allowance 
which many Residents found it hard not to exceed.68 In addition to the money spent on 
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political presents, the Residents and the Civil Auditor also disputed expenses associated with 
hospitality, equipage, and the upkeep and renovation of Residency buildings.  
The question of how much money Residents could legitimately claim was a vexed 
one. On one side of the question, many individuals within the Company, in addition to the 
Residents themselves, argued for the political necessity of large monthly stipends. These 
claims were founded mostly on contemporary stereotypes of Indian political culture.69 
Conventional wisdom was that so-called Oriental polities vested great weight in appearances, 
and many Company employees expressed the belief that Indians straightforwardly equated 
conspicuous displays of affluence with power. Governor-General Marquess Hastings himself 
defended the expenses of the Residents on the grounds that ‘the native Chiefs have seen 
Power and a certain degree of parade so invariably identified, that they cannot disconnect the 
notions’. Accordingly, a measure of magnificence was essential ‘to prevent the Residents’ 
appearing in a discreditable contrast before those who can only judge by the Eye’.70  Some 
contemporaries certainly seem to have recognised the mythic dimensions of this stereotype. 
Henry Russell described with amusement his father’s disappointment upon first sight of the 
Nizam’s palace, repeating Henry Russell Sr.’s complaint that the only establishment he had 
seen in Indian which he considered entitled to be called a palace was the Hyderabad 
Residency. Russell concluded the anecdote by remarking that ‘People in Europe are very apt 
to form their notions of Oriental splendour upon the Arabian Nights, and other Tales of the 
same kind, and are therefore sure to be disappointed.’71  Still, even men with long experience 
of India were apt to cast Indian monarchs into this stereotypical mould. Russell, though he 
made light of his father’s assumptions about Oriental grandeur, nevertheless made a point of 
attending carefully to ceremony and appearances, noting to his brother that ‘the influence of 
state at Hyderabad is so powerful, that I mean on all Occasions to keep up as much of it as I 
can’.72 
Though greatly exaggerated by British commentators, royal legitimacy in India did 
depend to some extent on the ability to project one’s power through visual spectacle. The king 
was meant to dazzle his subjects with an appearance of splendour and majesty, reflecting his 
association with the divine.73 In this case however Britons in India were again discursively 
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distancing themselves from a feature of Indian society which was broadly congruent to the 
attention accorded to appearances in the European world.  After all, Europeans also drew 
associations between power, status, and visible grandeur. Historian Tim Blanning has 
famously traced the ways in which European monarchs sought to express their authority and 
legitimacy visually in the eighteenth century, whether within the confines of the royal court or 
in view of the broader public.74 At the highest levels, ceremonial costume served to 
distinguish and reinforce the rights and privileges of the monarch and the aristocracy. Among 
the general population, too, clothes signalled a person’s rank and status.75  The idea that the 
Resident and his Residency ought to be arrayed in grand fashion, in a manner which 
adequately represented the standing of the Company, thus accorded with British assumptions 
concerning the relationship between power and appearances. 
At the same time, Britons also possessed a particularly charged notion of ‘luxury’ and 
its debilitating power. This concept was pervasive in eighteenth-century British discourse 
owing to its central place in the classical and Christian tradition. In principle, luxury bespoke 
the kind of absorption in one’s own material well-being which, on the one hand, signalled a 
disregard for the wellbeing of others, and on the other, a repudiation of God and his spiritual 
kingdom. Historically, luxury was associated with Roman imperial decline; according to the 
widely cited Roman moralist Sallust, luxury was imported to Rome from Asia by the 
returning army, resulting in a civilizational collapse that was at once moral, social, and 
political.76 Given the extent to which Roman history served as a model and a frame of 
reference for the British empire in the late eighteenth century, it should come as no surprise 
that the adoption of an Indian lifestyle was similarly feared to have a morally corrosive effect 
on Britons sojourning there.77 The Resident at Sindhia’s court from 1798 to 1804, nicknamed 
‘King Collins’, was perhaps the classic example of what James Mackintosh termed ‘the 
Sultanised Englishman’.78 Visitors to Company Residencies often commented on the 
Residents’ seeming addiction to grandeur (or, perhaps equally telling, expressed surprise 
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when Residents maintained a kind of dignified moderation).79 As historian Kathleen Wilson 
has noted, in the eighteenth century character was considered to be contingent on shared 
language, laws, government, and social organisation.80 Far from being taken for granted,  the 
‘civilisation’ of Britons in India, that quality which supposedly differentiated them from 
Indians (generally defined as control over oneself through use of reason, judgement, and 
understanding rather than instinct), was considered exceedingly fragile and in need of 
protection.81 Because personalities and behaviours were believed to be intimately related to 
one’s social and material context, Britons could not necessarily be trusted to continue to act in 
a civilised manner, that is, in reasoning or virtuous ways, when uprooted from the British 
context.82 In line with this conceptualization of the mind and body, engaging in Indian forms 
of ceremonial and spectacle, and living in the manner of an Indian ruler, could be argued to 
have pernicious effects on Britons who took up positions of power in India.  
On an ideological level, the question of how British prestige ought to be made visible 
in India was further complicated by the fact that the very nature of the Company’s 
administration in India, and the source of its legitimacy, was itself contested in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century. In the mid-eighteenth century, as historian Robert 
Travers has demonstrated, the British justified their empire in India on the grounds that they 
were restoring the subcontinent to a pre-Mughal golden age. The Company’s legitimacy 
derived from the claim that it was introducing a form of government that was more rational 
and just than that of the Mughals, but which was at the same time consonant with Indian 
tradition.83 Administration in such an Indian idiom seemed to require an element of 
conspicuous consumption and display. Pomp and sumptuousness served both to obscure the 
Company’s commercial origins and to mark its role as successor to the Mughals. The most 
obvious example of such stately magnificence was Governor-General Richard Wellesley’s 
Palladian government house in Calcutta.84 In his account of his travels to India, Viscount 
Valentia famously justified his uncle’s building project on the grounds that ‘India is a country 
of splendor, of extravagance, and of outward appearances’, and that ‘the Head of a mighty 
empire ought to conform himself to the prejudices of the country he rules over’.85  
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However, as ideas about the Company’s role and responsibilities in India began to 
change, so too did beliefs about how its power ought to be made manifest. In the late 
eighteenth century, as evangelical and utilitarian ideologies began to gain ground in Britain, 
commentators both within and without the Company increasingly began to justify the 
Company’s rule in India in terms of the benefits that would accrue to the Indian population 
through the imposition of supposedly British institutions like private property, rule of law, 
and Christianity. As the Company’s right to rule was increasingly seen to subsist in an 
inherent British superiority, the Company’s administration was accordingly less and less 
interested in attempting to express its power in what was perceived to be an Indian idiom.86  
Historian E.M. Collingham has charted these ideological shifts, and the ways in which they 
were reflected in the bodily practices of the Company’s colonial administrators. She has noted 
the decline in Indian pomp and pageantry, situating it within a broader change, namely, the 
transformation of the nabob, ‘the flamboyant, effeminate and wealthy East India Company 
servant, open to Indian influences and into whose self-identity India was incorporated’, into 
the burra sahib, ‘a sober, bureaucratic representative of the Crown’.87  
Though Collingham’s account of this overarching trend is convincing, she perhaps 
underplays the unevenness of this transition. Dividing her analysis between the nabob and the 
burra sahib, Collingham passes over the period of overlap, neglecting the ways in which the 
awkward coexistence of two competing ideologies regarding the Company’s rule in India 
posed practical ambiguities for those responsible for enacting the Company’s power on the 
ground. The gap between these rival systems produced an ongoing tension which the 
Residents were required to negotiate. Take for example a letter which the Governor-General-
in-Council issued to Thomas Sydenham in response to his requests for money to cover the 
expenses of decorative trappings for elephants and camels. The Council refused to cover 
Sydenham’s bills, arguing that ‘the dignity and respectability of the British Representatives 
should be made to rest as in fact it does on more solid foundations than the maintenance of 
state and splendour borrowed from the manners & habits of the natives […],in a great degree 
inconsistent with our national character’.88 At the same time, the Council was careful to 
complicate this hard stance by assuring Sydenham that ‘it is not intended to intimate, […] that 
it is unnecessary to adapt our Arrangements, in matters of this nature, to the perceptions and 
prejudices of the Natives of India. A certain degree of pomp and retinue, must in all situations 
be the concomitant of Rank and Authority’.89 What were Residents to make of such 
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equivocation? There was no set model to which the Residents could refer. It is telling that 
when Mountstuart Elphinstone first took up the position of Resident at Nagpur, his letters are 
full of questions about the money to be spent on gifts and the degree of state to be maintained 
at the Residency.90 His uncertainty, and the priority which he places on his establishment 
(which he deems ‘so much a public concern’), illustrate the extent to which the matter of the 
Residency finances was perceived to be a significant problem without a clear solution.  
4. Public dignity or private ostentation?  
The desire to regulate the Residents’ monthly expenses can also be situated, to some 
extent, within broader reformist trends in Britain. In the same way that Pitt and other 
reformers within the British government sought to systematise the civil service through the 
payment of salaries in preference to stipends, so too did the Governor-General-in-Council 
hope that closer scrutiny of the Residents’ expenses would streamline the Company’s 
operations, saving money and precluding corruption. What rendered the Residents’ expenses 
particularly problematic in this regard, however, was the difficulty of making clear 
distinctions between public and private expenses. The Resident was, after all, the Company’s 
physical embodiment in far-flung Indian kingdoms; it made sense for the Resident to be 
arrayed in a manner which reflected the Company’s influence. It was therefore difficult to 
determine a limit to be set to the Resident’s spending, whether on gifts to be dispensed at 
court, or on carriages and personal attendants. If the sumptuousness of the Resident’s 
establishment did not match or exceed that of his peers at court, it could, after all, reflect ill on 
the Company’s power and prosperity.91  
Residents frequently argued for an increase in their personal allowances by 
suggesting that their position put them at a financial disadvantage relative to other Company 
civil servants, since their public responsibilities precluded the frugal habits they might 
otherwise have espoused. John Munro for instance contrasted his previous life as ‘a private 
member of society’ when he ‘was at perfect liberty to live in whatever manner might be most 
suitable to my income or views’, with his current situation where as ‘the Organ of the 
authority of the British Government, and as ostensibly occupying the first place of the 
community, I must from considerations of public Duty support the establishments and incur 
the expences that are necessary for the maintenance of that weight and respect which the 
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Natives attach to certain appearances of state’.92 The Governor General, when presenting 
Archibald Seton’s claims before the Court of Directors, similarly noted that in Seton’s 
previous role as provincial judge his ‘personal habits’ had ‘admitted of his reserving a portion 
of his allowances, […] larger than the amount which he is able to set aside from the Salary of 
the Resident at Delhi’.93  
It was near impossible to determine the truth of such statements, however, since the 
government could only take the Resident at his word when it came to how he had previously 
disposed of his personal salary, or how he intended to use his present allowances. In support 
of Archibald Seton’s claim for an enlarged monthly allowance, Governor-General Minto 
assured the Court of Directors of Seton’s ‘high spirit of public zeal and honour’, arguing that 
he would ‘never be induced with views of personal emolument to retrench those personal 
establishments which are essentially necessary for the maintenance of the dignity and 
influence of the Government which he presents.’94 In advancing this argument, however, 
Minto implicitly admitted the possibility that a Resident could mishandle Company funds in 
such a manner. Despite his position of public authority, the Resident was also a private person 
whose own needs or desires might lead him to misrepresent the political necessity of his 
expenses. Given these conflicting interests, it was difficult to determine whether the Resident 
was driven by concern for the public good, or his own financial ambitions. 
The Resident’s geographical distance from administrative centers exacerbated the 
issue. His isolation rendered him eminently suspect, since his activities were difficult to 
monitor from government headquarters in Calcutta. At the same time, it was this very 
distance that allowed the Resident to claim the local expertise necessary to decide on 
questions relating to the Residency’s budget. For instance, in response to the Court of 
Director’s accusations of exorbitance, Metcalfe defended his expenses by emphasizing the 
large number of Europeans which he was expected to host at the Residency at Delhi on a 
routine basis. Metcalfe then proceeded to question ‘the equity of a condemnation passed on 
me by persons, who however high in authority, however respectable individually, however 
sacred collectively, cannot intuitively judge in London, what expenses may be necessary or 
superfluous at the Residency at Delhi.’95 The Resident could boast a kind of localised 
knowledge that Company administrators in far-away Presidency capitals, let alone London, 
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could hardly lay claim to.96 The Resident was the man on the scene, and accordingly, a better 
judge of local conceptions of British prestige (or so he claimed).  
Moreover, as the Company’s agent on the ground the Resident was also the one 
whose reputation and authority was most directly at stake. Parsimony might, after all, create 
an impression of weakness and insignificance in the opinion of the court. Henry Russell, 
Resident at Hyderabad, stubbornly demanded a personal escort of cavalry, which he argued 
was one of the only marks of distinction which visibly identified him as a figure of public 
importance at Hyderabad. This visible sign of authority was important, according to Russell, 
since the local population ‘can judge of power and authority by no other standard than the 
external marks of it, and if they saw a Resident with less state than his predecessors, nothing 
would convince them but that he had less power too.’97 The Resident’s professional 
credibility was thus perceived to hang in the balance; again, the Resident’s appearance of 
grandeur constituted a kind of social capital which, for the Resident’s purposes, was of more 
immediate use than money in the bank.  
The Resident’s private reputation within the European community was also 
implicated in these disputes. The Resident’s auditors used exceedingly moralising language 
when contesting expense claims, accusing the Residents, for instance, of ‘a spirit of […] 
profuse extravagance’ and ‘a lack of wholesome control’, as in Metcalfe’s case.98 The 
Residents were very sensitive to these allegations, all the more so since rumours of their 
supposed ostentation sometimes reached their family and friends in Britain. Archibald Seton 
was especially frustrated by talk of his own prodigality, since it appears to have led his friends 
and family in Scotland to gravely misconstrue the actual state of his finances, and even to 
doubt the sincerity of his intention to return home. As Seton put it in a letter to a family 
friend, ‘I cannot sufficiently regret the busy officiousness of ignorant people who, upon this 
as upon many other occasions, have misled you by fallacious accounts’. Reacting to gossip 
that he gave away large sums of money, and that his expenses were needlessly great, Seton 
countered that ‘I do not give away money – and for this simple reason, that I have it not to 
give.’ Of his expenses in general, he wrote, ‘to call them large, wears almost an appearance of 
mockery’.99 Charles Metcalfe likewise urged his sister to ignore ‘idle tales’ that he had a 
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hundred horses in his stable. ‘I detest wasteful and frivolous expenditure’, he assured her, 
‘and whatever I do, in that way, is from respect to the situation which I hold’.100 The disputes 
over monthly expense claims thus carried personal, as well as professional, connotations. 
Unsurprisingly, then, these disputes created serious rifts between the Residents and the men 
responsible for auditing them, resentments which always lurked close beneath the surface of 
the Residents’ correspondence.  
Conclusion 
While British officials in the late nineteenth century might have dismissed Indian 
stately ceremonial as empty theatre, this chapter has demonstrated that in the early years of 
the Residency system imperial administrators were hardly so confident. Archibald Seton, 
Resident at Delhi, observing the apparently trivial points of ceremony upon which the Mughal 
Emperor continued to insist in spite of his limited practical authority, wrote cautiously to the 
Governor-General-in-Council that ‘under the cover of the formal homage, which a tenderness 
for his personal feelings alone prompts us to render him, he seeks to advance a silent and 
gradual claim to the Substantial attributes of Empire’.101 The border between political theatre 
and ‘substantial’ power was, it seems, extremely difficult to mark out definitively. Residents 
could not guarantee that their ‘substantial’ power would be recognized and accepted as such if 
it were not performed in a visible, recognizable fashion.  
 This uncertain relationship between power and appearances meant that the upper 
echelons of the Company could never quite decide how much money Residents should be 
allowed to spend. In particular, Company officials debated the extent to which the Residents 
ought to use political gifts to cement their status at court. To be sure, the desire to regulate the 
Residents’ expenditure on this head was to some degree at least informed by pragmatic efforts 
at retrenchment and the desire to avoid future corruption scandals. Underlying these practical 
concerns, however, were deeper ideological ambiguities. Members of the political line were 
aware of the symbolism of gifts and their efficacy at securing relationships both vertically and 
horizontally. After all, gifts played a similar role in British society, and, even were that not 
the case, the agency of Indian munshis and ministers meant that British officials could hardly 
be ignorant of the political importance of these exchanges. Their awareness of the gift’s 
political implications is clearly manifest in their efforts to monitor and regulate such 
exchanges. The attempt on the part of the Company to impose a rigid, contractual framework 
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on such gift-giving was therefore not a sign of their disregard, but, instead, a betrayal of their 
anxious desire to set limits to such relationships.  
The Residents, however, resented these restraints; a currency of debts and obligations 
was crucial to their work as mediators and information-gathers. This rift between the 
Residents and their superiors on the issue of gift-giving was part of a broader, ongoing 
conflict surrounding the Residents’ expense claims. Though partly explicable with reference 
to opposed interests and institutional structures, at their heart these dissensions were about 
British ambivalence concerning conspicuous consumption and display, the blurred lines 
between public and private domains, and differences of opinion regarding the basis of the 
Company’s legitimacy in India. Attitudes within the Company were deeply divided when it 
came to the desirability of adopting Indian ways of life and styles of rule, particularly when it 
came to courtly pageantry. The Residents argued for the political necessity of such tactics, but 
their superiors worried about the effects that these strategies might have on them, the 
Company’s representatives.  
  Underlying these debates about expenses was a key concern of the Governor-
General-in-Council, namely, the Resident’s ability to act independently on the political stage, 
and the different relationships and obligations which might counteract that autonomy. Of 
these, one relationship loomed large: the Resident’s relationship with his state secretary or 
mir munshi. Previous chapters have alluded to the role which the Residents’ Indian secretaries 
played in composing and interpreting letters and advising on questions of gift-exchange and 
ceremonial, but the following chapter will examine the dynamics of these cross-cultural 
relationships in greater depth. In so doing, it will consider not only how the Residents sought 
to manage their ambivalent relationships with the munshi, but will also reflect on the practical 
risks and rewards which these relationships carried for the munshis themselves. 
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Chapter 4. Weak ties in a tangled web? Relationships 
between Residents and Residency munshis   
In 1805, the Resident at Hyderabad wrote a letter to Acting Governor-General George 
Hilario Barlow about a munshi. Munshi, a Hindi word meaning scribe or clerk, was a term 
which Britons commonly applied to their Indian or Persian language tutors, interpreters, and 
secretaries. The subject of this particular letter was Azizullah, the Hyderabad Residency’s 
long-time head munshi, and the topic was Azizullah’s proposed retirement. For more than 
twelve years, Azizullah had played a crucial role in the Residents’ negotiations with the 
Nizam of Hyderabad and his ministers, so much so that the former Governor-General 
Marquess Wellesley had awarded the munshi a pay rise and a pension in recognition of his 
vital work. In 1805, the Acting Resident Henry Russell wrote to inform the Acting Governor-
General of the munshi’s imminent retirement, and to remind him of Wellesley’s promise. 
Russell also took the opportunity to express his own ‘high Estimation of the Character and 
Talents of Meer Uzeez Oollah.’ Based on many years spent working alongside the mir, 
Russell confirmed that Azizullah had performed important services in the name of the 
Company, and had, in so doing, earned the respect and admiration of his British superior 
officers.1  
Russell’s earnest commemoration of Azizullah’s services at the twilight of his career 
speaks to the distinction which Indians sometimes acquired within the political line. Like 
most Company employees, the Residents were heavily reliant on the work of Indian clerks 
and scribes to do their job. In recognition of this broad pattern, the role of cultural 
intermediaries in imperial administration and the construction of colonial knowledge has been 
a point of enduring interest in the historiography of British imperialism in South Asia. Recent 
interventions have highlighted the importance of Indian expertise as a basis for British 
understandings of Indian history, geography, tax-collection, and jurisprudence.2 Despite this 
proliferation of scholarship on other branches of the Company’s service, however, the 
munshis’ essential contribution to Company diplomacy has continued to be overlooked since 
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Michael Fisher first highlighted it as an object of consideration in his general survey of the 
Residencies, written almost thirty years ago.3  
Yet, the relationship between Resident and munshi is worth investigating further 
since it differs in key respects from the cross-cultural working relationships usually described 
by historians of the Company state. Importantly, Residency munshis operated in 
predominantly Indian social environments regulated by courtly norms which privileged the 
munshi’s social and cultural capital over that of the Resident. More than a simple translator or 
informant, the munshi’s expertise inhered just as much, if not more, in his internalization of 
courtly practices and ideals of behaviour, and his ability to perform on the stage of courtly 
politics. This kind of embodied knowledge was not easily or quickly learned, meaning that 
the munshi often acted in the Resident’s stead, rather than simply furnishing him with the 
information requisite to do his duty. Munshis in the political line were thus able to acquire 
status and influence which was arguably unmatched by any other munshi in the Company’s 
employ. At the same time, Residents were senior officials intended to represent the power and 
authority of the Company at Indian courts; as such, it was important for the Resident to 
establish and maintain an image of control and incorruptibility. The question of how much 
responsibility could or should be delegated to the munshi was thus particularly difficult to 
resolve conclusively in the Residency system, where the issue of public opinion was vested 
with so much importance (as preceding chapters have illustrated), and the political stakes 
were perceived to be exceedingly high. 
Despite the significant yet contested role of munshis within the Residency system, 
given the nature of the surviving sources it is difficult to get a clear picture of the relationship 
between Residents and munshis. One type of source which does survive in relative abundance 
in Company archives, however, are petitions. These include documents authored by munshis 
themselves, as well as the letters which Residents wrote on their munshi’s behalf. These texts 
are far from being a transparent reflection of what the munshis thought or felt about their 
working conditions, nor are they a reliable source for what the relationships between 
Residents and munshis were like. After all, petitions are instruments for making claims; as 
such, they were unlikely to contain intimate, unpleasant, or otherwise inconvenient details 
which did not fit neatly into the narrative constructed by the author for the purposes of 
securing their objectives (usually a pension). Nevertheless, petitions can be revealing; they 
allow us not only to track the careers of the munshis in question, but to understand how 
munshis engaged with the Company and mobilized the Company’s networks in pursuit of 
their interests. By identifying the demands which munshis made on the Company, and the 
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ways in which these demands were explained or justified, we can acquire some insight into 
how munshis viewed the Company, and what they hoped to gain from it. Equally, by reading 
the letters which Residents wrote on the munshis’ behalf, we learn how far the Residents were 
willing to draw on their own networks and connections in their munshis’ interests. This in 
turn suggests the kind of leverage which munshis might have exercised over their employers, 
or the obligations which the Residents believed themselves to owe to their employees. Thus, 
while many aspects of the munshis’ experience are screened from the historian’s view, we can 
nevertheless reconstruct some of the transactions which underpinned and sustained these 
cross-cultural relationships.  
The relationships between Residents and munshis differed according to the 
personalities, habits, and convictions of the individuals involved. Yet, while there is not a 
clear, paradigmatic type of Resident-munshi relationship, there are nevertheless patterns 
which emerge when the major Residencies are considered side by side. The following chapter 
will identify some of the common features of these relationships as they took shape across the 
subcontinent against the backdrop of the Company’s political expansion. Section 1 will 
provide basic context by describing who the munshis were and how they were perceived by 
their British employers. Section 2 will show that despite the censorious language with which 
munshis were so often described, the Residents’ attempts to limit the munshis’ role at court 
were often stymied in practice; in other words, munshis remained crucial to the operations of 
the Residency despite the protestations of nervous Residents. Having outlined the dynamics 
which characterized the Resident-munshi relationship, Section 3 will show how this dyadic 
interaction was shaped by the larger political and corporate culture of which it was a part. 
Previous studies of go-betweens have emphasized the role they played in shaping intercultural 
encounters, but the following chapter charts some of the practical consequences that followed 
from this intermediary position, particularly where the forces of bureaucratic authority and 
personal obligation collided.    
1. Stereotypes and suspicions  
 Residency munshis were part of a broad corps of clerks and writers who made their 
living through ‘mastery of the pen’.4 Some sold their services in the bazaar, others worked for 
commercial firms or individual notables. The greatest prestige was attached to royal munshis, 
state secretaries operating at the highest level of politics.5 Munshis came to their work largely 
by way of family precedents, deploying networks of friends and kin to learn the craft and find 
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employment. Entry and advancement depended on skills and connections rather than formal 
qualifications.6 A munshi’s skillset generally included penmanship and accountancy, as well 
as an in-depth knowledge of social etiquette, political norms, and literary conventions.7 The 
East India Company’s Residents employed a number of munshis to perform a range of 
administrative tasks, but most important was the head munshi or mir munshi, the Resident’s 
personal agent. Mir munshis generally came from good families, and were for the most part, 
though not always, Muslim.8 While some were of local provenance, their families already 
established within the administrative world of the court, many mir munshis acquired the 
position because of their personal connection to the Resident in office or his network of 
friends and kin.9 Practices varied from Resident to Resident, but in addition to overseeing the 
Residency’s Indian staff, the head munshi usually met with ministers and other notables on 
the Resident’s behalf.  
Included among the voluminous papers of the major Residencies are a number of 
reports, authored by munshis, detailing their meetings with rulers and ministers. The 
Residents’ own everyday working relationship with their munshis, however, often went 
undocumented. The Resident and munshi met in person to discuss points of policy, and these 
conversations were only occasionally recorded in writing. When corresponding with the 
Governor-General-in-Council in Calcutta or their families in Britain, Residents 
conventionally passed over the mechanics of the Residency, including the activities of its 
Indian staff. When taken to task by his mother for failing to adequately describe his ‘habits 
and life’, Alexander Fraser, secretary to the Resident at Delhi, explained that such elisions 
were only to be expected in letters from Indian officials, ‘since the history of his life is a mere 
routine of business, whose nature is nearly unknown in Europe; or whose variety & 
complication renders it difficult to describe.’10 Kate Teltscher has described the familiar letter 
as a stage for dramatizing the colonial self, ‘a form of performance where the letter-writer 
stages the encounter between cultures, locations, and peoples’, but it is for precisely this 
reason that many of the more complicated or banal elements of the Residents’ day-to-day life 
were elided; they simply did not make for easy or compelling reading.11 As a result of these 
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kinds of epistolary conventions, even some of the more distinguished or notorious munshis 
make only sporadic appearances in the sources, occasionally disappearing from view entirely. 
In consequence, certain aspects of these relationships have proven elusive to the historian, 
particularly how they were viewed and experienced by munshis themselves.  
When reflecting on why munshis might have attached themselves to British 
Residents, it seems logical to assume that their trajectory was at least partly shaped by their 
history. Most analyses of human agency, while recognizing the importance of emergent 
events, nevertheless stress the ‘conditioning quality’ of the past.12 When confronting new 
situations, we generally draw, albeit creatively, on previous experiences and pre-existing 
repertoires. Munshis appear to have reacted in a similar fashion as the Company emerged as a 
major political player in the Indian subcontinent. At Indian royal capitals, there was a long 
historical precedent of service gentry seeking patronage from the local representatives of rival 
Indian powers.13 C.A. Bayly has argued that Indians in the eighteenth century had a strong 
sense of attachment to particular homelands, customs, or political and religious institutions, 
which he terms ‘old patriotism,’ but he made some exception for the munshis who depended 
for their livelihood on elite patrons.14 Many munshis were itinerant, moving from the land of 
their birth to regional cultural capitals in pursuit of learning or employment opportunities.15 
Their identity was tied up in particular forms of expertise and family traditions of service to 
the state.16 As historians of early modern India have observed, this scribal elite had long been 
flexible and diverse, bridging regional Brahmanical traditions and a wider Indo-Islamicate 
culture; they were accustomed to negotiating religious and cultural difference.17 Accordingly, 
when munshis found employment with the Company, they were adjusting to changing 
circumstances, but there was some continuity in the nature of their employment.  
There is even reason to think that munshis and Residents might have had broadly 
similar impressions of the reciprocal services to be expected from such a relationship. In 
India, relationships between elite patrons and their munshis could be powerful and long-
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lasting, almost resembling a family connection.18 Similarly, Naomi Tadmor has illustrated 
how in the British context membership of the ‘household-family’ was flexible and capacious, 
encompassing servants, apprentices, and other dependants.19 The servant’s recognized place 
within the patriarchal household meant that the household head had a responsibility towards 
him or her.20 In line with these prescriptions, Residents acknowledged a certain accountability 
for their munshi’s welfare, even after the working relationship had ended.  Henry Russell, for 
instance, found a post for his former munshi (who he called ‘Munshi Bankir’) at Hyderabad 
upon that munshi’s request. ‘He has Claims upon me,’ Russell explained, ‘from having been 
my first moonshy at Hyderabad; and I will cheerfully do for him every thing that I can with 
Propriety.’21 Richard Jenkins likewise appealed to a Company official at Bareilly on behalf of 
a former munshi Ghulam Hussein, for, in his words, ‘notwithstanding the unfortunate 
circumstances under which I parted with Gholaum Hoossein, I am still as solicitous as ever to 
serve him.’22 This vertical relationship of mutual obligation approximated the connection that 
the munshi would have historically shared with Indian patrons.23 Historians have been 
inclined to draw stark distinctions between the modern, bureaucratic Company and a more 
patrimonial Indian political culture, but in both British and Indian society, vertical 
relationships of service and obligation like this were an integral part of the texture of social 
and political life.24 
Still, there were no doubt disjunctions, aspects of the munshis’ experiences in the 
Company’s service which were shaped by the particular beliefs and assumptions of their 
British employers. Prominent among these was the distrust with which British officials tended 
to regard munshis as a group. Tellingly, although Resident John Munro strenuously denied 
the charges of corruption levelled at him by the inhabitants of Travancore, where he was 
stationed, he was far less enthusiastic in defending the good name of his munshi, Reddy Rao. 
While Munro’s investigation into Reddy Rao’s conduct produced no evidence of wrongdoing, 
Munro concluded that ‘however high my opinion of Reddy Rows integrity may be, yet, it is 
impossible that I can positively affirm that his conduct, or that of any other native servant has 
                                                     
18 Alam and Subrahmanyam, ‘The making of a munshi’, p. 65.  
19 Tadmor, Family and friends, p. 19.  
20 Cissie Fairchilds, Domestic enemies: Servants & their masters in old regime France (Baltimore, 
MD, 1984), p. 139.  
21 Henry Russell to Charles Russell, 4 Jun. 1810, Russell Papers, MSS Eng. lett. d. 151, Bodl. Oxf, p. 
101.  
22 Richard Jenkins to J. Brooke, 21 Jul. 1811, Letter books of Sir Richard Jenkins, Mss Eur E111, 
OIOC, p. 149.   
23 Alam and Subrahmanyam, ‘The making of a munshi’, p. 65.  
24 For the first point, see for example Dirks, The hollow crown, p. 354; for patronage in Indian and 
British society, respectively, see Leonard, Social history of an Indian caste, p. 22; Perkin, The origins 
of modern English society, p. 44.  
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invariably been pure and honorable.’25 From John Munro’s perspective, Reddy Rao’s status as 
a native servant meant that his probity could not be vouchsafed. Though Residents sometimes 
ascribed positive traits to specific munshis in this way, they almost always described munshis 
in general using negative, highly stereotyped language.26 The underlying foundations of this 
prejudice are difficult to disentangle. In part this indeterminacy is a product of the sources; 
Residents often repeated these stereotypes, but rarely reflected on them at length. The 
influence of nascent biological conceptions of ‘race’ is not readily apparent, though it is 
possible that Residents were simply unwilling to enter into explicit discussions of racial 
ideologies or racist practices in their letters to professional colleagues, and rarely discussed 
these relationships at all when writing to family.  
Of more obvious significance were contemporary attitudes towards Indian political 
culture; to some extent, the Residents’ attitudes towards their munshi seem to have been 
informed by a more generalised set of British preconceptions. The gist of these stereotypes is 
evident in a passage from John Blakiston’s published memoirs of his military service in India, 
where Blakiston writes that a unique feature of Indian society was ‘their policy to withhold 
every fact they possess, even though it cost them nothing to give it; and to deceive you by 
every means in their power, even when they can themselves derive no apparent benefit from 
so doing.’27 Alena K. Alamgir has identified a long-term continuity in the language of 
mistrust with which Britons described their relationships with Indians; in the personal papers 
of the Residents, Indian courtly politics were certainly characterized in terms that resonated 
with this convention.28 The long-time Resident at Poona Sir Charles Malet (Resident 1793 to 
1798) compared the position of the Company in India to ‘that of an honest Man thrown by 
Circumstances into the society of Swindlers […] & Highwaymen.’29 In line with this general 
view of Indian politics, Residents often described their munshis’ activities as crafty or 
conniving. Henry Russell claimed to have been obliged to expel his munshi from the 
Residency at Poona for ‘intriguing,’ as he put it, commenting that ‘there is something in the 
air of Poona which is not only villainous itself, but is also the Cause of Villainy in others.’30  
                                                     
25 John Munro, ‘Observations on a petition delivered to the Government dated 16 September 1813’, 
BC, IOR/F/4/445/10674, OIOC, p. 97.  
26 This is characteristic of representations of out-groups. See Mark Knights, ‘Historical stereotypes and 
histories of stereotypes’, in Psychology and history: interdisciplinary explorations, eds. Christian 
Tileagă and Jovan Byford (Cambridge, 2014), p. 246.  
27 Blakiston, Twelve years military adventure, p. 107.  
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29 C.W. Malet to G.F. Cherry, Diaries and Papers of Sir Charles Malet, Mss Eur F149/56, OIOC, p. 
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30 Henry Russell to Charles Russell, 18 Dec. 1810, Russell Papers, MSS. Eng. lett. d. 152, Bodl. Oxf., 
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Another potential factor explaining the Residents’ distrust of munshis more 
specifically could be socioeconomic difference. Imperial historians have long remarked the 
similarities between the language of race and class. Ann Stoler has theorized that racial and 
class language were not only parallels of one another, but were in fact overlapping and 
interchangeable ways of constructing and explaining what contemporaries considered to be 
similar kinds of human differences, to do with variant attitudes and behaviours.31 Munshis, it 
is true, were recognized by Britons to form a hereditary class of respected and highly trained 
service gentry; Susan Bayly has shown how these specialists emerged as a prestigious and 
prominent class of people in the eighteenth century as the proliferating Mughal successor 
states competed for administrative expertise and royal legitimacy.32 Moreover, Residents 
purposefully chose, as much as possible, munshis of good family and reputation, believing 
that this would increase the munshi’s credit in the eyes of the courtly elite, as well as acting as 
a form of insurance for the munshi’s good behaviour.33 Still, in his pamphlet directed at 
members of the political line John Malcolm highlighted the class of the munshi as an object 
of consideration when he warned his readers from investing them with too much power or 
favour, contending that Indian servants ‘cannot be supposed to have even the same motives 
with those of native rulers for good conduct, much less the same title to regard.’34 Munshis 
were still subordinate figures who were not always trusted to act according to the same 
principles as their aristocratic British employers. Tellingly, when writing to the secretary to 
government about his Residency expenses, Henry Russell refused to reduce the wages of his 
head munshi on the grounds that ‘it is vain to expect honesty from any Native Servant, who is 
not placed beyond the reach of ordinary Temptation.’35  
Munshis were also routinely accused of immoral behaviour by their British 
employers, mirroring language used to describe the lower social orders in Europe.36 In the 
words of Thomas Williamson, munshis, ‘having only to attend their employers at stated 
hours, and the residue of their time being wholly unoccupied, it is not to be wondered, that, 
with their liberal salaries, they should rather court, than shun, pleasure.’ Williamson 
elaborated that ‘what with venery, drinking, smoking, &c. nine in ten of them exhale the most 
                                                     
31 Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the education of desire: Foucault’s history of sexuality and the colonial 
order of things (Durham, NC, 1995), p. 127.  
32 Bayly, Caste, society and politics in India, p. 66; see also Richards, ‘The formulation of imperial 
authority under Akbar and Jahangir’, p. 311.  
33 Fisher, Indirect rule in India, p. 321 
34 Malcolm, ‘Notes of instruction,’ in Briggs, Letters, p. 203. 
35 Henry Russell to John Adam, 5 Sept. 1816, Notes and intelligence of Mountstuart Elphinstone 
regarding the Peshwa and Trimbuckjee, Elphinstone Collection, Mss Eur F88/60, OIOC, p. 149.  
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intolerable effluvia!’37 This complaint features prominently in the correspondence of Resident 
Mountstuart Elphinstone while at Nagpur, who grumbled to his friend John Adam that he was 
‘very ill off for natives,’ having ‘a Moonshee who is drunk half the day & an intelligencer 
who is drunk the whole day.’ To give substance to his grievances, Elphinstone recounted how 
when he sent his munshi to wait on the Raja ‘he [the munshi] was so drunk that he could not 
stand, was taken sick during the interview & fell off his horse on the way home.’38 These 
allegations, though they echo the rhetoric surrounding the lower social orders more broadly, 
also resemble the discourse of a supposed ‘servant problem’ in England. Elphinstone’s 
complaints call to mind the prevalence within British court records and family papers of 
dysfunctional relationships between masters and servants in which servants are ceaselessly 
charged with vice, cheating, idleness and drunkenness.39 
This resemblance suggests that a parallel can be drawn between the distrust with 
which the Resident viewed his munshi and the distrust with which masters sometimes 
regarded their servants in Europe and the colonies. In both cases, intimacy with a stranger and 
a member of a different social order could be viewed as potentially threatening. 40 
Elphinstone, at least, made his views on the status of the munshi as a dangerous interloper 
quite clear when he assured Lady Hood, in a personal letter, ‘that no native of Asia can be 
admitted to table without his interrupting the comfort of the Company on which he is a spy & 
that above all no Persian servant of any rank can be allowed such a distinction without its 
tempting him to encroach.’41 For Elphinstone, the munshi’s background and his rank together 
marked him out as an outsider to be kept at a distance. John Briggs, in a letter of advice to a 
young man just entering the civil line of the Company, similarly reminded his correspondents 
to be wary when setting up a household, for ‘[s]ervants in all countries have it greatly in their 
power to contribute to our comforts as well as to impose on us, and even sometimes to inflict 
on us positive distress,’ but that ‘this must be particularly the case in a strange land like 
this.’42 Munshis were not domestic servants, but their association with the Resident was also 
close, perhaps troublingly so. John Malcolm warned his readers that an Indian employee’s 
‘real or supposed influence will, under any circumstances that they are allowed frequent 
approach to an European officer in the exercise of authority, give them opportunities of 
abusing his confidence if they desire it,’ contending that ‘there is no science at which the 
                                                     
37 Williamson, East India Vade-Mecum, vol. I, p. 194.  
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41 Mountstuart Elphinstone to Lady Hood, 26 May 1813, Seaforth Papers, GD46/17/42, NRS, n.p. 
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more artful among the natives are greater adepts, than that of turning to account the real or 
supposed confidence of their superiors.’43 It seems possible that the munshi’s status as a non-
European, as well as his role as an employee with intimate access to the details of the 
Resident’s professional life, might have combined to make him doubly threatening from the 
Resident’s perspective.  
The munshi’s close association with the Resident, and his access to the Residency 
papers, did mean that he had it in his power to throw relations between the Company and the 
court into disarray. To some extent, the munshi’s personal connection to the Resident allowed 
him to partake of the Resident’s public authority, muddying hierarchies of power which the 
Resident would have preferred to keep clear-cut. There are a few examples of munshis 
extorting money from courtly figures with promises of bringing their influence to bear on the 
Resident, but none perhaps is more extraordinary than the case of Muhammad Saddick Khan, 
or illustrates so well the extreme possibility that munshis could infiltrate the Residency and 
use its authority for their own purposes.44 In the year 1809, the Governor-General received a 
mysterious letter from Shahamat Khan, second brother to the Nawab Vizier of Awadh, 
alluding vaguely to promises made to him by the recently deceased Resident John Collins. 
Further investigation by the newly appointed Resident John Baillie unearthed a plot 
orchestrated by a deputy munshi in Collins’ office. The munshi¸ it transpired, had forged 
letters purporting to be from John Collins and the Governor General, in which he promised to 
oust the current Nawab Vizier and to place Shahamat Khan on the throne in his place. The use 
of the Resident’s official seal, combined with the munshi’s status as representative of the 
Resident, appear to have convinced Shahamat Khan of the legitimacy of the plan, allowing 
the munshi to use the proposed coup d’état as a pretext for extorting large sums of money. 
The Resident’s exposure of the plot, and Shahamat Khan’s subsequent exile to Company-
ruled Patna, marked the end of the conspiracy.45 At the same time, this exceptional occurrence 
forcefully illustrates the subversive potential of the munshi, no doubt explaining why some 
Residents regarded their munshis with wariness, even though for the most part their fears of 
malfeasance never seem to have materialised. The very possibility of such a misappropriation 
of Company authority was a source of anxiety, however baseless such anxieties might have 
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been in practice given that these acts of corruption seem to have been a relative rarity, or at 
least were rarely exposed.   
This brings us to perhaps the clearest source of British anxieties about the munshi, 
namely, his role as middleman and translator. Munshis were regularly responsible for reading 
out, translating and explaining communications of Company policy to the ruler and his 
ministers, thereby giving the munshi a role in shaping relationships and negotiations between 
the Indian state and the Company.46 Given this position of influence, Residents and their 
superiors greatly feared being misled or misrepresented by munshis. This anxiety was not 
unique to Residents, but applied in more or less equal measure to most officials in Company 
employ. Throughout India, the Company was dependent on the mediation of clerks, money-
changers, bankers and commercial middlemen.47 Accordingly, the problem of translation and 
interpretation, and the danger of misrepresentation, was at the forefront of every Company 
employee’s consciousness. In his Vade Mecum, a popular guide for young men about to enter 
the Company’s service, Thomas Williamson vehemently urged his readers to familiarize 
themselves with the Indian languages, for until they were able to dispense with an interpreter 
on ordinary occasions, ‘no person can be deemed independent; far less, capable of acting in 
any civil, military, or commercial capacity, with effect.’48 Munshis, then, were the subject of 
many of the same anxieties which have historically coalesced around the figure of the 
translator.49 It was a fear which sprung from munshis’ relative power, as well as their 
perceived cultural and socioeconomic ‘otherness.’ What made the relationship particularly 
fraught was the disruption of clear lines of authority within the Residency; it was always 
possible that the munshi might act in the Resident’s stead to pursue his own interests or 
inclinations, perhaps without the Resident even realizing it.  
At the heart of these various stereotypes about munshis, then, were the Residents’ 
anxieties about their own incapacity, and the fear that the munshi might take advantage of it. 
The question, from the Company’s perspective, was how the Resident could ensure that the 
munshi did not use this power to frustrate or impede the Residency’s operations. As Kapil Raj 
                                                     
46 For descriptions of munshi’s role as translator and interpreter, see Thomas Sydenham to Earl Minto, 
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has illustrated, this problem of intercultural trust was a primary concern for Company 
administrators reliant on the skill and expertise of Indian agents.50 Under pressure from the 
Governor-General-in-Council in Calcutta, Residents accordingly devised strategies to manage 
the perceived risks represented by the munshi. As Henry Russell advised his brother, ‘without 
searching for perfect Instruments, which are not to be found, we must be content to make the 
best use we can of those which Circumstances have placed within our reach.’51 Yet, the 
question of what constituted ‘the best use’ for Residency munshis remained a conundrum, and 
most Residents found it difficult to displace the munshi from his position of influence, as the 
following section will illustrate.  
2. The dialectic of control  
The clearest means of mitigating the munshi’s power was by learning Indian 
languages. Even William Jones, perhaps the most famous Orientalist of the eighteenth 
century, was motivated to learn Sanskrit primarily as a means of more closely monitoring the 
Indian officials who assisted him in his work at the Supreme Court in Calcutta.52 The 
Company’s administration similarly sought to preclude a dependence on Indian interpreters 
by placing a deliberate emphasis on language skills. This prioritization of languages applied 
particularly to aspiring members of the political line, but to some extent British officials of all 
kinds were expected to be conversant in the Indian languages relevant to their post. During 
the late eighteenth century Persian and Hindustani language instruction was gradually 
institutionalized in the form of grammars and dictionaries, treatises, translations and class 
books directed to native English speakers. In the early nineteenth century, the Company 
founded colleges at Fort William (in 1800) and Haileybury (in 1806) where students were 
also instructed in Arabic and Bengali.53 By 1828, Company official John Briggs proclaimed 
proudly and in print that ‘hardly an instance now exists of any European holding a civil 
situation of responsibility removed from the presidencies, who is ignorant of the language of 
the district in which he resides.'54  
To be sure, Residents were hardly as well-versed in Indian languages as their 
munshis. Residents stationed at Maratha courts appear to have spoken little or no Marathi, 
notwithstanding that some of the Maratha rulers, notably the Raja of Nagpur, were reticent 
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51 Henry Russell to Charles Russell, 10 Jun. 1810, Russell Papers, MSS Eng. lett. D. 151, Bodl. Oxf., p. 
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about discussing politics in anything other than their native tongue.55 Even at royal centres 
where the dominant languages were Persian and Hindustani, Residents were still discouraged 
from acting independently of their munshis in their dealings with the court. Significantly, 
even John Baillie, previously a professor of Persian at the Company’s college in Calcutta, was 
scolded by Governor-General Marquess Hastings for assuming that he was sufficiently versed 
in Persian to dispense with a munshi in his meetings with the Nawab Vizier and his ministers. 
As Hastings put it, ‘the reliance of Major Baillie on his correct possession of a polished idiom 
was likely to betray him beyond the exact line of established usage.’56 However fluent the 
Residents were by European standards, their linguistic abilities were not expected to rival the 
eloquence and refinement of trained and experienced munshis.  In a context where an 
individual’s grasp of Persian was a point of personal prestige, minute idiomatic details 
mattered; as historian Muzaffar Alam phrased it, ‘deficiency in elegant self-expression meant 
cultural failure’.57 
Nevertheless, Residents were still proficient enough to intervene, to some extent, 
when they felt they were being misrepresented by their translators. While H. T. Colebrooke 
was in the process of negotiating a treaty of defensive alliance with the Rajah of Nagpur 
through the mediation of his munshi, he noticed that the munshi had omitted the word 
‘quadruple’ in his description of the proposed alliance, presenting it to the Rajah as an 
alliance between the two states exclusively rather than a joint alliance with the Company, the 
Peshwa of Poona, and the Nizam of Hyderabad; Colebrooke subsequently corrected the 
mistake.58 Similarly, John Collins carefully attended to the munshi Kaval Nain’s translation of 
the Treaty of Bassein to the Maratha chieftain Daulat Rao Sindhia. In his papers, Collins 
noted that ‘when the moonshee came to the 12th Article […] he by no means gave that force 
to the words thereof which he ought to have done, I was, therefore, under the necessity of 
assisting him, & embraced the occasion of giving the clearest explanation of that important 
stipulation.’59 Residents sought, as much as possible, to monitor and control the way in which 
Company policy was represented to Indian rulers and ministers via the channel of the munshi, 
even taking over entirely when the munshi was considered to have misspoken.  
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The problem, from the Residents’ perspective, was that in order to achieve their 
political ends it was not enough to be linguistically competent. Indian courtly politics were 
governed by a larger Indo-Persian system of meanings, a dense web of moral, ethical, and 
administrative ideals. The munshi was extensively trained in these Indo-Persian principles, 
and therefore better able to frame and present the Resident’s demands or queries. These 
scribal elite were widely read from a young age in poetry, politics, ethics, history, and 
epistolography.60 Contemporaries outside of the diplomatic line sometimes belittled this kind 
of expertise. Captain Thomas Williamson, a soldier, scoffed that ‘a few volumes of tales, the 
lives of those great men who have either invaded, or ruled, the empire, some moral tracts, and 
the Koran […] constitute the acquirements of this haughty class of servants.’61 Those in the 
political departments, however, clearly recognized the munshi’s worth. For instance, the 
Persian insha tradition of belles lettres comprised a complex blend of formula and invention, 
producing documents with a poetic bent ‘heavily imbued with rhymed prose, verse, figurative 
language, and rhetorical embellishment,’ to quote historian Colin Mitchell.62 The Resident’s 
working knowledge of Persian hardly sufficed for the composition of the highly stylized prose 
requisite for corresponding officially with the Indian elite.63  
There was also etiquette to consider. As Dick Kooiman demonstrated in his study of 
the Residencies in the later nineteenth century, ceremonial and questions of precedence were 
taken very seriously as reflections of the status and prestige of those concerned.64 A munshi 
could be an invaluable resource in this regard, as even the most grudging Residents were 
ultimately forced to acknowledge.65 The munshi was of vital assistance in determining 
questions of protocol when arranging meetings between the Resident and other figures of 
political importance, avoiding offence or indignity on either side.66 All in all, the munshi had 
the cultural capital so crucial to the success of the Resident’s diplomatic endeavours. It was a 
particular kind of know-how which, having been painstakingly acquired over the course of 
the munshi’s lifetime, was not easily transmitted to British officials.67  
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As a result of this savoir-faire, the munshi was often better equipped than the 
Resident to negotiate sensitive diplomatic situations. Indian rulers and their ministers were 
sometimes willing to extend a degree of trust to the munshi which they withheld from the 
Resident, and this trust could be taken advantage of by the Resident if he was willing to use a 
munshi as his agent. When Richard Strachey (then Resident at Lucknow) was having trouble 
reaching an agreement with the Vizier, he dispatched his munshi to initiate a second round of 
negotiations. The Vizier expressed his willingness to draft a written engagement, and asked 
the munshi to assist in formulating that treaty. The munshi reported this conversation to 
Strachey, at which point Strachey himself drafted a treaty, which ‘was submitted to the Vizier 
by the moonshee as if from himself.’68 In this case, Strachey clearly felt that, by presenting 
the draft as the munshi’s own work, the Vizier would be more likely to accept the treaty as a 
reflection of his own best interests. The most effective munshis were often individuals who 
were able to elicit the Indian ruler’s trust in this way, creating the sense that they were serving 
both parties at the same time. Azizullah, for instance, was said (according to a letter penned 
by the first minister of the Nizam of Hyderabad) to have shown ‘sincere attachment to the 
Interests of both States,’ and to have acted always ‘with due regard and consideration towards 
the ministers of his Highness.’69 
Although Residents could profit by employing munshis in this fashion, this 
intermediary role also clearly invested the munshi with precisely the kind of influence which 
the Resident sought to monopolize for himself. Accordingly, some Residents vacillated when 
it came to relying on the munshi in this way. Early on in his career at Poona, Mountstuart 
Elphinstone found that the intercession of a munshi could help smooth over disputes; as 
Elphinstone put it, ‘when transacting business with me on such occasions, they [the ruler and 
his ministers] are so intent on resisting my proposals and on guarding against committing 
themselves, that a great deal of the effect of all arguments and explanations is lost.’ Rather 
than attending on the minister himself, then, Elphinstone preferred to send his munshi.70 
Later, however, Elphinstone appears to have second-guessed his inclination to confide in the 
munshi so readily. In a letter of 1814, Elphinstone reported that though Cursetji Sait had 
proved very useful in past negotiations with the Peshwa, he (Elphinstone) no longer thought it 
expedient to use Cursetji Sait as a channel for communication with the court. As Elphinstone 
put it, the Peshwa’s favour well as Cursetji Sait’s position as agent of the British Residency 
had ‘given the natives an exaggerated idea of his consequence.’ This led Elphinstone to 
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‘discontinue employing him to the extent which had been usual.’ Once again, the spectre of 
undue influence made the Resident unwilling to place too much trust in an individual whom 
he nevertheless continued to recognize as ‘zealous and useful.’71   
Still, by sidestepping his munshi Elphinstone might have imperiled his own 
professional agenda, at least according to Gangadhar Shastri, emissary of the Gaikwar (a rival 
Maratha power). In 1814 Elphinstone was in the process of mediating between the Gaikwar 
and the Peshwa on the subject of an expired lease. In May of that year, with no end to the 
negotiations in sight, the Shastri approached Elphinstone with a suggestion, namely, that the 
Residency’s head servant Cursetji should be more closely involved in the mediation process. 
According to Elphinstone’s account of the conversation, the Shastri ‘said he observed that the 
Sait was not in my confidence, that a disaffected servant was worse than an enemy.’ When 
asked to elaborate further, the Shastri replied ‘that the Sait possessed great influence with the 
Peshwa, and would be tempted to employ it in thwarting our views.’72 Though ultimately the 
Shastri’s suggestions do not seem to have shaken Elphinstone’s determination to sideline the 
Sait, they nevertheless imply the potential dangers of bypassing a munshi. Not only was the 
Resident perhaps needlessly prolonging negotiations, he might even have been actively 
though unintentionally sabotaging his own plans by sowing resentments.  
Circumventing a munshi might have had its risks, but many Residents certainly 
shared Elphinstone’s desire to discharge the munshi entirely. Given the demands of 
Residency business, however, these aspirations rarely translated into practice. Barry Close 
and Thomas Sydenham both began their Residencies by vowing to meet directly with the 
minister on all points of material interest. Close argued that this observance would ‘prevent 
misconceptions and give precision to the delivery of our sentiments,’ while Sydenham 
averred that ‘at present it is often very uncertain whether the representations made to the 
Minister by the British Resident be faithfully conveyed to the Peshwa, and that uncertainty 
would be increased by the mediation of another agent between His Highness and the 
Resident.’73 With time, however, their resolve weakened. Henry Russell, who worked under 
both Thomas Sydenham and Barry Close as Assistant Resident and Acting Resident, 
respectively, remarked that neither man successfully made their ambitions a reality. 
According to Russell, ‘they both of them began their Administrations with a decided 
Resolution to conduct their Business without the Agency of a moonshy: and yet, perhaps, 
there never was a Time at which more was done by natives, or more entrusted to them, than 
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there was then at Hyderabad under Captain Sydenham, and at Poona under Colonel Close.’ 
This led Russell to conclude, when it came time for him to take up the mantle of Resident at 
Hyderabad in 1811, that ‘a native servant must be employed […] call him what you will, but 
such a man must be had, must very frequently be employed and trusted.’74  The munshi’s 
social and cultural capital, added to the sheer volume of Residency business, meant that the 
Resident could hardly afford to dispense with the help.  
Despite the language of malfeasance and mistrust with which so many Residents 
spoke about them, munshis were nevertheless integral to the workings of the Residency. In 
consequence, Residents were apt to do anything in their power to keep a skilled and hard-
working munshi in their employ. Munshi Azizullah, for one, had to petition several times for 
a pension enabling him to retire; his first effort earned him only an increased salary, with, as 
Resident James Achilles Kirkpatrick noted sarcastically, ‘the pleasing prospect of being a 
drudge in office for nearly the remainder of his days, for it is not reasonable to suppose that 
Government will dispense with the services of so useful a man, as long as they think they can 
have any service out of him.’75 Though Residents sometimes spoke of munshis as a group 
with suspicion, in many cases these partnerships lasted decades, often surviving the 
Resident’s professional peregrinations throughout the subcontinent. To take just one example, 
Pearee Lall served under Archibald Seton for 24 years in Bengal, Behair, Bareilly, and, 
finally, at the Residency at Delhi; Seton described Pearee Lall as ‘able and zealous,’ declaring 
that ‘he has served me with credit to himself & with the utmost fidelity.’76 It is worth 
observing that in this case Seton was writing a character reference in support of Pearee Lall’s 
application for a pension; these kinds of reference letters constitute the main instances in 
which Residents openly expressed their gratitude to their munshis, and they typically did so in 
very generic terms.77 Still, the fact of the Resident’s support for his munshi, added to the 
longevity of the relationship, would appear to substantiate affirmations of the munshi’s 
diligence and utility, and of the Resident’s own feelings of attachment.  
In addition to these written expressions of appreciation, the degree of respect 
conferred on the munshi was made manifest in the customary practice of endowing them with 
ceremonial robes. The khilat was granted to the munshi as, in the words of Resident Richard 
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Strachey, ‘a public acknowledgement of his services.’78  This ceremony was a self-conscious 
appropriation of Mughal court ritual. Khilats were given as a means of establishing and 
proclaiming an almost organic bond between an authority figure and a subordinate, 
symbolically incorporating the recipient into the body of the giver.79 Residents like Strachey 
sought purposefully to take on the role of Indian patrons, and to behave to their subordinates 
in what they perceived to be a manner that would be intelligible to munshis and their peers.80 
This was a form of ‘position-taking.’81 Through this public performance, the Resident actively 
affirmed and advertised his vertical relationship with the munshi, thereby visibly establishing 
his own authority while at the same time clearly co-opting the social capital of the munshi.   
These vertical relationships could yield practical benefits. The experiences of munshi 
Muhammad Hanif exemplify the favours a munshi could secure through the intercession of 
his British patrons over the course of his life. To begin with, Colonel Barry Close, formerly 
Resident at Poona, wrote to Henry Russell, the newly appointed Resident, recommending 
Muhammad Hanif for the position of head munshi;  Muhammad Hanif, the Colonel claimed, 
‘writes Mahratta as well as the Persian Language and is well acquainted with characters and 
affairs in the Deccan.’82 Later, when Muhammad Hanif was ready to retire, Close interposed 
to secure him a land grant and the command of a body of horse at Hyderabad, ensuring him 
an income that would see him through his remaining years. When financial reforms in 
Hyderabad put Muhammad Hanif’s tax collection rights in peril, Resident Mountstuart 
Elphinstone, who had known the munshi at Poona, intervened to get Muhammad Hanif a 
substitute land grant in Company territory in the Deccan.83 Throughout his life, Muhammad 
Hanif appears to have been able to call on the aid of Company officials to pursue his own 
ends, demonstrating how munshis could put their personal connections with their British 
employers to practical use.  
The interaction between Resident and munshi, in short, illustrates what Anthony 
Giddens termed ‘the dialectic of control.’ In Giddens’s view, even when relationships are 
deeply asymmetrical, they nevertheless retain a degree of complementarity; the superior 
figure might have greater resources at his command, but he depends on his subordinate to 
undertake certain tasks. The dialectic of control, to quote sociologist Ira J. Cohen, ‘refers to 
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this universal presence of imbalanced degrees of autonomy and dependence that constitute 
power relations in systems and reproduction circuits of all kinds.’84 Even though Residents 
sought to limit the munshi’s field of autonomy, munshis were nevertheless able to secure 
certain advantages through the provision of services which were indispensable to the 
Residency, belying the disparaging stereotypes about the munshi which were so prevalent 
within the political line. At the same time, although this relationship with the Resident created 
opportunities for the munshi, it also produced frictions. A munshi’s relationship with the 
Resident seems to have been complicated by the fact that the Resident, too, was an 
intermediary; the Resident’s place within the Company, as well as his pre-eminent position at 
court, meant that the munshi was doubly exposed to the caprices of Company and courtly 
politics. To properly evaluate the munshi’s position, his relationship with the Resident needs 
to be situated within this wider fabric of social relations of which it was a part. In so doing, it 
becomes clearer how disparate lines of personal and professional affiliation could come into 
conflict, often to the munshi’s disadvantage.  
3. Broadening the scope of analysis  
The Resident was a representative figure who derived his power and authority from 
his position in the Company; it was this corporate connection which made him valuable as a 
patron. For one thing, the Company could bring significant economic resources to bear 
because of its access to British credit. It has been convincingly argued that the Company’s 
army provided more reliable salaries, pensions, and other kinds of benefits for its soldiers, 
which in turn allowed the Company to monopolize the Indian military market; the same might 
be said, to some extent, of its Residencies.85 Although the provision of pensions was only 
properly institutionalized in the 1830s, from an early period many Residency munshis were 
provided with life-long salaries or grants of land to reward them for their services, and after 
their deaths it was not unusual for the Company to continue to support their wives and 
families.86 Some munshis were certainly left in dire financial straits, but their petitions to the 
Company suggest that they had had reasonable expectations of provision for their old age on 
the basis of these kinds of precedents. 87 Bhugwunt Rao, munshi at the court of Daulat Rao 
Sindia, reproached the Governor-General that ‘having long served the British Government 
with fidelity and zeal I am now reduced to great want and ready to expire.’ Bhugwunt Rao 
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pointed bitterly to the example of his predecessor in office munshi Kaval Nain, who had been 
awarded a jagir just a few years previously, arguing that ‘I who have been a faithful servant 
of the British Government for a period of 30 years am better entitled then him to the favour of 
the honorable Company.’88  Bhugwunt Rao had been betrayed by the system, but his allusions 
to the favours to which he felt entitled suggest the financial motivations he might have had for 
associating himself with the Company in the first place. Enam Allah, a former munshi of the 
Resident John Collins who also found himself in a dismal financial situation, similarly 
appealed to ‘the established practice of the British Government which abandons none of its 
servants or dependants to wander abroad in search of bread,’ thereby securing for himself a 
pension of 200 rupees per month.89  
 Perhaps just as enticing was access to the patronage of other Company officials, 
indeed, to a whole institutional network upon which the munshi could draw for support and 
assistance. Residents regularly manipulated the munshi’s ties to serve their own ends, using 
the munshi’s acquaintance with literati at other courts as a channel for political information. 90 
Munshis, however, also cashed in on the Resident’s social capital. Given the geographical 
spread of the Company as an institution, it made sense for munshis to cultivate good 
relationships with British officials who could help forge connections with patrons in other 
parts of India. Munshis fully exploited this perk of the job; the correspondence of the 
Residents is rife with examples of letters written to colleagues on behalf of Indian secretaries. 
Often it was in pursuit of legal aid, usually respecting the munshi’s landholdings or 
investments in distant parts of the subcontinent. The Resident at Nagpur Richard Jenkins, for 
instance, appealed to John Baillie, Resident at Lucknow, seeking legal aid for his former 
munshi, Mir Ghulam, who complained that a person named Saddick Ali was building on a 
piece of his property in Fyzabad. Jenkins asked Baillie, on behalf of Mir Ghulam, to ensure 
that the affair would be properly adjudicated.91 Through access to the Resident’s personal and 
professional network the munshi was also able to enjoy a range of employment opportunities. 
To take just one example, Mir Kazim Hussain, initially employed by Mountstuart Elphinstone 
as second in the Persian Department on Elphinstone’s mission to Afghanistan, was able, once 
the mission was over, to acquire a position under Elphinstone’s close friend Richard Strachey 
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at Sindhia’s camp in 1811.92 A connection with the Company therefore opened up lines of 
communication and aid to the munshi which might otherwise have been closed to him. The 
Resident’s position in the Company bureaucracy put him at the center of a network of 
relationships, and this administrative machinery could be set in motion to the munshi’s 
advantage.  
At the same time, the nature of the Company as a bureaucratic institution, and the 
Resident’s place as a subordinate within that wider hierarchy, posed problems for the munshi. 
In particular, there was no guarantee of how long a Resident might remain at court. It could 
be dangerous for a munshi to rely too heavily on an individual who might well be stationed 
elsewhere and in any case would likely return permanently to Britain at some point. To some 
extent, the munshi could expect to benefit from the networks of the Resident or those of the 
Company more generally to furnish him with employment or other kinds of financial support 
upon the Resident’s departure from court. As previously mentioned, Enam Allah Kahn, who 
declared himself ‘dependent on Colonel Collins’ and who on Collins death was ‘exposed […] 
to alarm and distress,’ was subsequently able to secure a Company pension.93 Still, depending 
upon the circumstances of the Resident’s withdrawal, the munshi might be left with nothing. 
Ibn Ali, for instance, seems to have had a good thing going as Thomas Sydenham’s head 
munshi at Hyderabad. According to Henry Russell, Sydenham’s assistant, ‘Ibn i Ally has 
exercised more Authority than ever Uzeez Oolah [his predecessor] did in the very zenith of 
his Power.’ This power had made Ibn Ali an important patron in his own right; Russell 
referred bitterly to ‘the Swarm of Locusts that he has invited from the Countries of the north.’ 
In 1810, however, Thomas Sydenham was disgraced because of his imbrication in an army 
uprising, and consequently forced to return to Britain. Following Sydenham’s departure, Ibn 
Ali was left without protection, and Henry Russell’s first act on taking up the Residency was 
to send him away.94 Ibn Ali’s reversal of fortunes highlights the insecurity of the munshi’s 
position given that the Resident was often his single, unstable link to the Company and its 
resources. More specifically, it suggests the dangers of acquiring too much power within the 
Residency; the appearance of influence could alienate the munshi from other employees of 
the Company who might, ultimately, replace the Resident upon whose complicity the munshi, 
to some degree, depended. 
It is worth noting that allegations of impropriety, and the appearance of undue 
influence on the part of a munshi, was also perceived to reflect on the morals and character of 
                                                     
92 Richard Strachey to C.A. Molony, 4 Jan. 1817, Richard Strachey Papers, Mss Eur D514/3, OIOC, p. 
225.    
93 Enam Allah Khan to Minto, received 28 Aug. 1808, BC, IOR/F/4/297/6840, OIOC, p. 5.  
94 Henry to Charles Russell, 31 May 1810, Russell Papers, MSS Eng. lett. D. 151, Bodl. Oxf., p. 93.  
144 
 
 
the Resident in question. To return to the previous example, though Henry Russell determined 
to replace Ibn Ali as head munshi at Hyderabad, he also decided, as he put it, to let the 
munshi go ‘quietly, and without any digging into his past Conduct.’ In so doing, Russell was 
explicitly motivated by ‘Delicacy towards Sydenham,’ who would be implicated in any 
misdeeds which Russell might unearth.95 Bhavani Raman has argued that, in the context of 
the local revenue office, Company officers often portrayed their Indian subordinates as 
corrupt as a way of deflecting these allegations from themselves.96 In the political line, 
however, it seems that it was less easy for Residents to dissociate themselves from their 
munshis. This intimate connection  was the subject of scrutiny and suspicion, given broader 
reformist trends within the Company and Britain at large, whereby accountability and 
transparency in the civil service were increasingly emphasized.97 The problem was that in 
practice the close working relationship between Residents and munshis made questions of 
responsibility difficult to resolve conclusively; it was hard to determine who to blame when 
things went wrong, particularly given the Residency’s geographical isolation from the 
Company’s administrative centres. The fates of Residents and Residency munshis were thus, 
to some extent, intertwined; the one was liable to suffer from the misfortunes of the other.    
The example of John Baillie and munshi Ali Naqi Khan illustrates this entanglement. 
Baillie and Ali Naqi Khan had traversed the subcontinent together filling various Company 
posts over the course of several years before finally settling at the Lucknow Residency. When 
the munshi faced the potential loss of some landholdings, primarily because of a disputed 
will, Baillie tried to use his influence with the Nawab Vizier to restore Ali Naqi Khan’s 
property. When his exhortations to the Nawab Vizier proved unsuccessful, Baillie brought the 
munshi’s petition before the government, arguing that the munshi’s long service to the 
Company entitled him to the Governor-General’s support. At that time, the then-Governor-
General Lord Minto interpreted the munshi’s difficulties, and the Vizier’s unwillingness to 
intercede in his favour, as part and parcel of the Vizier’s opposition to the Company. 
Accordingly, Minto pressured the Vizier to restore Ali Naqi Khan’s property.98 A few years 
later, however, when Marquess Hastings took office as Governor-General, he saw the entire 
affair in a different light. Hastings viewed the supposed restoration of Ali Naqi Khan’s 
property, a transaction that had taken place without any due investigation into competing 
claims, as clear proof that Baillie was using the Company’s power, and his status as Company 
representative, to pursue his own ends. Hastings’s belief was that political instability in India 
was at least partly a consequence of the Residents’ tyrannical treatment of Indian rulers, and 
                                                     
95 Ibid. 
96 Raman, Document Raj, p. 26. 
97 Harling, The waning of ‘Old Corruption’, p. 22.  
98 Extract Political Letter from Bengal, 24 Jul. 1811, BC, IOR/F/4/372/9249, OIOC, p. 2.  
145 
 
 
Baillie’s actions in favour of Ali Naqi Khan appeared to substantiate this view. In Hastings’s 
mind, the problem was that Baillie had developed extensive patronage networks which were 
beginning to spiral out of control, impeding Baillie’s foremost responsibility to conciliate the 
reigning monarch. As Hastings put it, because Baillie’s Indian agents were ‘essentially 
recognised depositories of his Power,’ Baillie ‘could not sacrifice those dependents to His 
Excellency’s indignation without giving up all hope of keeping together a Party,’ and was 
therefore ‘constrained to uphold them in confessed opposition to their Sovereign.’99 In line 
with this interpretation of the relationship between Resident and munshi, the property that had 
been reclaimed by Ali Naqi Khan was restored to his rivals, and a commission was created to 
investigate the dispute; John Baillie was removed from Lucknow shortly thereafter.100 In this 
case, the personal fortunes of Ali Naqi Khan and John Baillie were subject to shifts in 
Company personnel and policy, in light of which their relationship came to seem suspicious; 
in the end, their interests were determined to be dangerously linked.  
Figures at court and the surrounding area were equally apt to bracket Residents and 
munshis together, often to the munshi’s disadvantage. To revert to the previous example, 
when asked to explain the reasons for his conflict with the Resident John Baillie the Vizier 
blamed the tensions between them on a misunderstanding generated by Baillie’s munshi Ali 
Naqi Khan, claiming ‘that Col. Baillie was a good man but that he had been misled by the 
moonshee.’101 Similarly, when a petition was presented to the government of Fort St George 
on behalf of some inhabitants of Travancore, accusing the Resident John Munro of tyranny 
and corruption, most of the accusations actually centered on the activities of Munro’s munshi. 
Reddy Rao was accused of accepting bribes, and of conferring titles upon the Rani as a 
pretext for taking gifts from her. Reddy Rao was even blamed for causing a 3-month-long 
famine by ordering merchants not to sell their stores of rice. Colonel Munro was implicated in 
these crimes only because, as the petition stipulated, ‘Colonel Munro reposing all his 
confidence on his said Dewan Reddee Royer behaves himself pursuant to the said Reddee 
Royers evil persuasions. So that they seem to have one Soul in two bodies and consequently 
their conduct is arbitrary and tyrannical.’102 Conditions in Travancore were thus attributed to 
Reddy Rao’s evil influence rather than to the Resident himself, who was portrayed rather as 
Reddy Rao’s willing puppet. Passages like these are difficult to interpret. It is entirely 
possible that these munshis did exert a potent influence over the Residents, just as they were 
accused of doing, but it is also possible that these accusations were made strategically, based 
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on the assumption that the munshi was a more amenable target for criticism than the Resident 
himself. Generally speaking the influence of munshis is difficult to ascertain, since Residents 
were unlikely to describe themselves as being under the thumb of their secretaries, though 
onlookers might describe the relationship in precisely these terms.  
Whatever the basis for these accusations might have been, there is no doubt that the 
munshi’s relationship with the Resident placed him in a position of visibility at court which 
made him susceptible to these kinds of allegations. Indeed, the munshi’s association with the 
Resident seems to have made him an object of antagonism in his own right. This, at least, is 
what is suggested to us by a petition written by Rajah Kaval Nain, the appointed mediator 
between the Resident and the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindhia. Kaval Nain presented himself 
as an adherent of both parties; as he put it, ‘the attachment and loyalty which I have from first 
to last evinced in my conduct towards the two states is well known and has been often 
proved.’ Sindhia’s first minister, however, apparently used Kaval Nain’s affiliation with the 
Company against him in an attempt to reduce the munshi’s influence with Sindhia by arguing 
that Kaval Nain’s first loyalty was to the British. Indeed, according to Kaval Nain, the 
minister ‘treated me in a bad and improper manner, in order that no one for the future might 
exert himself to support the friendship between the states.’103 Though Kaval Nain claimed 
never to have lost Sindhia’s ear, and to be continually advising him to ally with the English 
(thereby trying, no doubt, to emphasize his own continuing utility to the Company), the first 
minister nevertheless succeeded in confiscating Kaval Nain’s property and expropriating a 
large sum of the munshi’s money, the reacquisition of which was the motive for Kaval Nain’s 
petition to the Governor-General. Kaval Nain certainly had practical reasons for framing 
events in this way; by presenting his loyalty to the Company as the chief source of his 
problems at court, he thereby had some justification for holding the Company accountable for 
his loss. Still, incidents at other courts would appear to support the idea that a munshi’s 
association with the Company could be a liability. Gopal Rao, the Peshwa’s agent at the 
Poona Residency, was also accused of being ‘an adherent of the Company,’ and consequently 
was ‘much alarmed for his own safety’, according to the Resident William Palmer.104 In the 
words of Thomas Sydenham, who briefly substituted for Palmer at Poona, ‘every person who 
is at all supported by us, becomes an object of persecution to the Minister.’105 Not only was 
the munshi vulnerable to the vagaries of Company policy, but his association with it also 
made him a target for the jealousies and resentments of the courtly elite.  
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The antagonism of the court was all the more threatening because the Resident was 
not a reliable ally against them. From the Resident’s perspective, the joint demands of 
fulfilling his official duties and conciliating the local monarch generally took precedence over 
his accountability to his Indian staff. The strict lines of authority within the Company 
sometimes competed with, and in these instances tended to outweigh, links of personal loyalty 
and dependence. In consequence, the Resident was often prepared to abandon his munshi by 
the wayside if circumstances seemed to demand it. A single case study will suffice to 
illustrate this point. In 1801 Resident William Palmer learned that his munshi Mir Fukhir al 
Din was rumoured to be involved in a conspiracy to depose the current ruler of Poona. One of 
the conspirators had been arrested, and charges were now being brought against the munshi. 
The munshi solemnly denied that he had played any part in the scheme. Indeed, Palmer 
himself recalled the munshi mentioning certain ambiguous advances that had been made to 
him in the past by some of the conspirators, though neither Palmer nor the mir had then 
realized the full extent of the plot. Palmer was thus forced to conclude that ‘if a mere 
knowledge of the Intrigue to this extent only is criminal towards the Peshwah, I am as 
culpable as Meer Fukir ul Dien.’ Although Palmer explained away his own silence by 
claiming that it was not his responsibility to inform the Poona government of any plots 
against it, he nevertheless felt that circumstances required that he dismiss Mir Fukir al Din 
from his service, whether the Mir was guilty of the accusations of conspiracy or not. As 
Palmer put it,  
though I know that I not only have a right, but it is my Duty as a public Minister to protect my 
Servants, until their conduct is proved to be unjustifiable, I will wave these Considerations 
rather than expose the public Business to interruption or afford the Peshwah a pretext for 
asserting that I countenance intrigue against his Person and Government.106  
In short, Palmer sacrificed his munshi to the interests of the Company at the court of Poona, 
concealing his knowledge of events which might have exculpated the mir. Palmer did not 
escape from this predicament entirely unscathed; his reputation does seem to have been 
vaguely tarnished by Mir Fukhir al Din’s reputed activities. Henry Russell, for one, blamed 
Palmer for munshi Mir Fukhir al Din’s alleged misconduct; Russell observed that ‘under the 
Ascendancy of Sir Charles’s [Malet] Talents and Dignity, he [Mir Fukhir al Din] was honest 
and useful; but the weakness and good nature of Colonel Palmer encouraged and permitted 
him to be a Rogue.’107 Still, the fact of the matter was that Palmer kept his job and Mir Fukhir 
al Din lost his; Palmer, given his association with the Company and his status as Resident, 
was too prestigious to become collateral damage to courtly intrigues.  
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The Resident would occasionally intercede in the munshi’s favour, but only when 
personal obligations and public responsibilities were in alignment. For instance, Richard 
Strachey, newly appointed to the position of Political Resident at Lucknow, refused to dismiss 
Ali Naqi Khan when the Nawab Vizier of Awadh demanded it; Strachey declared that he 
‘could not admit the propriety of his [the Vizier’s] interference […] regarding the members of 
my household.’108 Significantly, Richard Strachey described the munshi Ali Naqi Khan as a 
member of his household, a concept widely current in eighteenth-century Britain defined in 
terms of spheres of authority and household management.109 By attempting to abrogate the 
Resident’s power within his own household, the monarch was infringing on the Resident’s 
domestic authority. The Company’s authority was implicated as well on such an occasion; to 
surrender one of its employees would be tantamount to suggesting that the Company was 
incapable of looking out for its own. In instances such as these, the Company’s reputation for 
good faith was perceived to be at stake, and, in the words of John Malcolm in his ‘Notes of 
instruction,’ ‘whenever that is concerned, the tone of our feeling should be very high.’110 
When the Resident at Poona intervened to protect the munshi Byajee Naique against the 
Peshwa’s first minister, the Resident explicitly justified his intervention on the grounds that it 
would act as ‘a wholesome check upon the Minister,’ showing him that the Company were 
prepared to use their influence over the Peshwa when necessary. An association with the 
Company could, it seems, occasionally counteract the disfavour of notable figures at court; it 
could not, however, be trusted implicitly in a context when personal and professional 
affiliations were not infrequently in conflict.   
The munshi was therefore often forced to respond to circumstances not of his making, 
without even being able to place entire reliance on his patron. His position at the intersection 
of court and Company, though it opened up certain opportunities, also required him to be 
highly adaptive. The multiple contingencies to which the munshi was subject made the future 
difficult to judge, requiring him to be acutely attuned to changing circumstances in the 
present.111 Though the munshi played a crucial part in the operations of the Residency, he 
could never quite enjoy the luxury of resting on his laurels and looking with confidence into 
the future. Like so many cultural brokers in similar situations around the world, maintaining 
his precarious position required the munshi to be constantly on the alert as he navigated the 
turbulent waters at the confluence of the local and the global.  
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Conclusion  
In conclusion, the relationship between Residents and munshis, though of great 
practical importance to both parties, was also a source of considerable risk. The Resident’s 
attitude towards his munshi was inflected by negative stereotypes of Indian political culture as 
well as, it would appear, the conventional distrust of a master towards his servant. This 
relationship was equally coloured by the Residents’ fear of being misled or misrepresented in 
a context where his grasp of the dominant language and ruling political norms was weak; in 
this context, the usual lines of authority structuring the relationships between master and 
servant were jeopardized. From the point of view of munshis, an association with the British 
Resident had definite practical benefits; the Resident was not only an attractive source of 
patronage in his own right, but could provide access to a broader patronage network which 
spanned the subcontinent. Still, the Resident could be unreliable; while in some instances the 
Resident was able to protect his munshi from the disfavour of the monarch, his willingness to 
do so was entirely dependent on circumstances. Ultimately the Resident prioritized his own 
interests and those of the Company above the interests of his staff, privileging professional 
over personal responsibilities. Indeed, because of his intermediary status, and his prominent 
place in the Company and the local court, an association with the Resident actually doubled 
the potential problems from the munshi’s perspective by exposing the munshi to scrutiny 
from both British and Indian onlookers.  
From the Resident’s perspective, too, the munshi posed something of a dilemma. On 
the one hand, it was feared that Residents who relied too heavily on their munshis were liable 
to exploitation or suspicions of malversation; from an outsider’s perspective, their agency 
could become indistinguishable from that of the munshi, over whom they feared they could 
never enjoy complete control. On the other, Residents who dispensed with a munshi’s 
services risked committing damaging social and political faux-pas. To most Residents it 
seemed clear that there was a balance to be struck somewhere between the two, but where that 
middle ground was to be found remained a problem. Henry Russell was certain that a munshi 
was requisite at the Residency, but nevertheless remarked that the particular nature of that 
employment depended upon ‘circumstances casual and fluctuating.’ It was up to the Resident 
to determine, in his words, ‘what Business is to be transacted verbally, and what in writing; 
upon which occasion the Resident is to appear himself, where he is to employ his Assistants, 
and where he is to confide in a native servant.’112 This lack of definition sometimes created 
the space and flexibility for the munshi to acquire a position of recognized influence and 
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authority within the Residency, but it was equally likely to make the munshi a target of 
resentment and distrust. 
 Circumstances changed as the nineteenth century wore on and the Company’s 
bureaucracy matured. By the 1830s, the relationship between the Residents and the Residency 
munshis was increasingly subject to the oversight of the Governor-General-in-Council, who 
became more and more involved in processes of appointment, promotion, dismissal, and the 
provision of pensions. At first glance, one might suppose that these trends provided munshis 
with greater security. Whereas previously the munshi had been vulnerable to the whims of the 
Resident, with little guarantee of security or right of appeal and little consistency in terms of 
the award of pensions, by the nineteenth century the institution of formal rules furnished the 
munshi with clear expectations and solid grounds for making claims against the Company.113  
Nevertheless, it is also possible that something was lost in the process. As Max 
Weber observed, ‘bureaucracy succeeds the more it is dehumanized – the more it eliminates 
from official business all feelings of love, hatred, all purely personal, irrational, and emotional 
elements which escape calculation.’114 The impersonal regulatory apparatus often comes at 
the cost of older structures of sympathy and obligation. What the munshi might have gained 
in terms of the acquisition of clearly-defined rights, he may well have lost in terms of his 
ability to exploit the Residents’ social capital and feelings of personal duty. After all, the 
interference of the Company had the potential to break up partnerships which had previously 
spanned decades. This process of bureaucratization, rather than eliminating the risks to which 
the munshi was vulnerable, merely transformed them. Instead of being subject to the whims 
of the Resident, over whom the munshi could exercise some leverage, he was now 
increasingly exposed to the vagaries and changing policy of the Company, over which he had 
far less control. At the same time, as this chapter has shown, the munshi had long been 
subject to the impersonal, bureaucratic forces at work in the Company hierarchy. Sometimes 
the munshi had succeeded in using personal connections to put the Company’s formal 
organizational structures to good use, but the Resident’s position within a wider hierarchy 
meant that to some extent the relationship between the two had always been shaped, at times 
shattered, by shifts in the Company’s higher echelons.  
Though the resources available to them were very different, the members of the royal 
family were faced with a very similar problem to the munshis in the Residents’ employ. As 
the Company’s reach extended further across the subcontinent, Indian royalty had to decide 
for themselves how to secure their own best interests in an environment of instability and 
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change. The solutions to this quandary differed dramatically from person to person; in some 
instances, royal family members were the Company’s greatest allies, while in other cases they 
represented their greatest foes. Either way, royal family members found that they had to 
engage to some extent with the Resident if they were to continue to be players in the 
contested field of courtly politics. The Residents, meanwhile, recognized that royal family 
members had the power to promote or prevent their agendas from taking shape, and 
acknowledged that they could ill afford to ignore the kinds of patrimonial conflicts which 
they might have preferred to dismiss as family squabbles.  
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Chapter 5. Family dynamics and patrimonial politics 
When the Marquess of Hastings decided to tour the Northwest Provinces shortly after 
his arrival in India in 1814, he charged the Resident at Delhi Archibald Seton with a 
somewhat intractable problem. Seton was asked to manage the ceremonial encounter between 
the Governor-General and the King of Delhi, as he was then called, in a way that would 
reflect the political superiority of the Company, without offending the feelings of the so-
called king of kings. Seton accordingly wracked his brain for ways of exempting the 
Marquess from making the usual signs of deference, particularly the imperative to remain 
standing in the royal presence. In the end, Seton could recommend only one solution. ‘I have 
[…] been endeavouring to discover a principle or precedent calculated to meet both the 
feelings of the King and the wishes of your Lordship’, he wrote, ‘and this I can only do by a 
reference to your Lordship’s descent and illustrious pedigree’, alluding to the Marquess’ 
distant connection to the British royal family. Princely descent was, in Seton’s mind, 
‘unquestionably the plea most likely to be understood and admitted by the feelings of the 
king’, whereas ‘with respect to the office, high as it is, of Governor General, the feeling of the 
King would rather be supported than opposed by precedent’.1 Regardless of the power which 
the Governor-General wielded as the dominant political authority in the subcontinent and 
commander-in-chief of one of the largest standing armies in the world, it was his tenuous 
relation to the King of England, and the charisma conferred by that blood connection, which 
entitled him to approach the King of Delhi on a footing of near equality. 
 Whether the Company liked it or not, in a hereditary monarchy kinship mattered; it 
entitled a person to privileges and respect. In consequence, the king’s family could exercise a 
kind of authority which even the most senior Company officials had to take seriously. Yet this 
brand of hereditary power has been relegated to the background in contemporary scholarship 
on South Asian kingdoms. The weight of historical inquiry has tended to fall on imperial 
bureaucracy, on tax-collection and record-keeping; less attention has been paid to the ruler 
and his extended household, apart from a handful of cultural histories of the royal harem.2 
Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the way in which modern historians commonly 
define ‘the political’. The Mughal bureaucracy resembles to some degree the present-day, 
western state with which we are familiar, with its hierarchical organization, written 
regulations, and trained officials; its patrimonial side, the imbrication of kinship, sex and 
power, less so. A study of royal families would also seem to come dangerously close to being 
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an outdated history of great men and women, in stark contrast to administrative histories 
peopled by lowly scribes and clerks, touching on issues surrounding property and 
landholding, traditionally favoured topics in Indian social and economic history.   
At the same time, to ignore the dynastic side of Indian politics, and the scheming, 
intrigue, and revolt with which it was rife, is to ignore one of the biggest quandaries 
confronting the Residents as they attempted to consolidate their influence at Indian royal 
courts. As André Wink famously argued, fitna (roughly, intrigue and sedition) formed a 
crucial element of political practice in India, central to the establishment and maintenance of 
sovereignty.3 Fitna entailed forging alliances and marshalling support, and in this context, as 
Sumit Guha has shown, ‘the exploitation of both family loyalties and their dark face- familial 
hatreds – was an important resource’.4 If the Resident was to succeed in this world, he had to 
draw on every advantage available to him. His position as an outsider made it even more 
important that he cultivate the support of royal family members, arguably the ‘insiders’ par 
excellence. The extensive royal family, with its shifting internal rivalries, enmities, and 
affective bonds, was after all the very basis upon which the notion of indirect rule rested; the 
whole premise of rule by proxy was that the Company could draw on the authority of these 
kinds of local elites to maintain order and stability.  
The importance accorded to heredity was thus an ongoing problem which the 
Company, as a bureaucratic entity, struggled to contend with in the early nineteenth century. 
For kinship in India could be messy and oblique from an outsider’s perspective, complicated 
by practices of polygyny, adoption, and domestic slavery which Company officials did not 
clearly understand and found difficult to elucidate given their exclusion from the domestic 
realm of the zenana. The nineteenth-century British household too could be flexible and 
capacious, of course, but the rule of primogeniture created a clear line of royal succession, at 
least; in India brothers, uncles, and cousins could all levy a claim to the throne. Succession 
crises aside, family rivalries could create serious unrest because royal power was conceived 
loosely, belonging in some degree to the patriliny as a whole. In some cases, inheritance was 
even divided between siblings; the brother of the Rajah of Berar had extensive territories of 
his own in Cuttack and Chhattisgarh, for example.5 Royal family members could therefore 
muster significant social, cultural, and economic capital in support of their various personal 
and political projects. In consequence, the Resident had to think carefully about how to 
conduct himself when the interests of royal family members converged or conflicted with 
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those of the Company. Royal family members, men as well as women, could be crucial allies, 
dangerous foes, or occasionally a combination of the two.  
The following chapter returns these men and women to their privileged place at the 
centre of the sweeping maelstrom of early nineteenth-century Indian courtly politics. The first 
two sections will consider male relatives, and the obstacles and opportunities they represented 
from the Resident’s perspective. Section 1 will consider the recurring problems posed by 
royal successions, while Section 2 will discuss the more quotidian roles which royal brothers 
could play in the Residents’ schemes. The second half of the chapter will consider female 
relatives, who raised different issues from the Resident’s point of view, and are therefore 
analysed separately. Section 3 will examine how the Residents’ engagement with Indian royal 
women was mediated by British preconceptions. Section 4 will show how despite these 
superficial barriers, British Residents and Indian royal women could forge politically and 
practically important working relationships. All told, this chapter demonstrates the extent to 
which the royal family constituted both the defining weakness and chief resource of the 
Company’s system of political influence.   
1. Rebellions, succession crises, and imposed hierarchies of blood and birth 
The period of transition from one ruler to another was a crucial juncture from the 
Company’s perspective; a capable but compliant ruler could greatly facilitate the Company’s 
political and military projects, while a resistant successor could spell instability or even war. 
Thus, before the Company had even begun to station political Residents at Indian royal 
courts, they had already meddled in a series of succession disputes, most famously in the 
Carnatic and in Bengal in the mid-eighteenth century.6 A hundred years later, it was through 
the regulation of succession and the notorious ‘doctrine of lapse’ that the Company pursued 
its expansionist policies, by annexing states which lacked an officially recognized heir.7 
Succession disputes were thus an important element of the Company’s history, from first to 
last. The aggressive interventionism of the nineteenth century, however, was preceded by a 
period in which the Company’s main concern was to ensure stability and control. Usually, 
Residents pre-empted and managed succession crises by deciding the heir apparent well in 
advance, and supporting his ascension to the throne by keeping a military force close at hand.8 
This policy, however, did not go unopposed.   
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The nature of the elite Indian household meant that royal succession was usually open 
to a handful of claimants rather than a single heir. To some degree, questions of inheritance 
and ideas of legitimacy were complicated by polygyny, the practice of taking many wives. 
Not only were the women of the royal zenana many, sometimes numbering into the hundreds, 
but they were also differentiated according to multiple, graded forms of marriage and 
cohabitation; contractual marriages were distinguished from partnerships of pleasure, which 
in turn were distinct from women given as gifts, or concubines purchased or taken by force. 
Each different form could imply different rights and expectations, but these hierarchies were 
not rigidly maintained, and concubines could acquire influence through the favour of the 
ruler, with or without a formal marriage contract.9 Perhaps most confusingly, from a British 
perspective, slavery and kinship could exist on a spectrum; sometimes they were virtually 
indistinguishable, as Indrani Chatterjee has pointed out.10 Since wives, lovers, and slaves 
mixed and intermingled, the line between legitimate and illegitimate children within royal 
families was negotiable to an extent unmatched in Britain. What mattered in the end was less 
the legal status of the marriage, than the importance accorded it by the ruler in question; the 
favoured son of the ruler was usually the offspring of a favourite wife, whatever her family 
origins. Adoption also allowed the ruler to remould kinship at will, and childless kings 
regularly adopted the sons of brothers, sisters, or even the children of menial servants to 
succeed them.11  
The ruler habitually sought to smooth the line of succession by placing his favoured 
son in administrative or military positions, thereby publicly expressing his trust in his son’s 
abilities and his intention to pass on the reins of government to him. In the process, the youth 
was also able to acquire political experience and establish himself at court. The ruler’s choice 
was not incontrovertible, however, and court factions were not shy to intervene in these kinds 
of succession disputes. The claim of the heir apparent was almost always contested by uncles 
as well as younger brothers, legitimate and illegitimate, biological or adopted.12 Just as 
important as blood or seniority were qualities and connections. Heredity, after all, was 
understood to constitute only one facet of royal legitimacy; personal charisma and the ability 
to maintain order were also key.13 Though the Nawab Vizier of Awadh Asaf ud-Daula went to 
great lengths to mark out his son Vizier Ali as his heir, investing him with numerous offices 
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and titles in addition to financing his lavish wedding to the daughter of a Lucknow courtier, 
certain powerful figures at court nevertheless united with the Company to depose him.14 
Vizier Ali’s uncles were perceived to have just as much, if not more, of a claim to the 
musnud.  
Even though blood connections, narrowly understood, were not requisite for an heir 
apparent (who could be, and often was, adopted), the Company nevertheless began to use 
questions of legitimacy to undermine competing claims in succession crises. This ultimately 
became their strategy in the deposition of Vizier Ali. At first, individuals high up in the 
Company’s administration seem to have doubted their ability to penetrate Asaf-ud-Daula’s 
harem and discover its secrets. In response to rumours circulating about the spurious birth of 
the recently crowned Nawab, the Governor-General John Shore reaffirmed his support for 
Vizier Ali’s claim on the grounds that the truth or falsity of the rumours could not be 
conveniently proven. In Shore’s mind, the crux of the problem inhered in the nature of Indian 
elite family life: ‘the secrets of a Haram are seldom penetrable, and if it were otherwise, the 
attempt to unveil them would be an insult, and no Prince in a situation to resist enquiry would 
admit of it’.15 Further, Shore averred that ‘to institute a public investigation into the secrets of 
the seraglio, would affect our reputation in a degree which no professions of our regard for 
Justice would ever efface’.16 
Still, questions of access and etiquette, though they represented superficial barriers to 
Company surveillance, did not in fact prevent the Residents from doing their best to track the 
most intimate activities of the women in the zenana in their efforts to manage the question of 
royal succession. Despite his professed repugnance at attempting to unravel the mysteries of 
the harem, Shore subsequently plunged into precisely such an investigation, minutely probing 
into the most private aspects of the former Vizier’s sexual activities in his endeavour to 
ascertain the legitimacy of the new Nawab Vizier. Reliant primarily on the testimony of the 
former Nawab Vizier’s trusted eunuch, Almas Ali Khan, the Governor-General reported that 
Asaf ud-Daulah was not only sexually impotent, but known to have procured pregnant menial 
servants for his zenana to compensate for his childlessness; Vizier Ali was apparently the 
product of such a transaction. Vizier’s low birth was believed to manifest itself in his 
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‘fearless, debauched […] sanguinary & uncontroulable disposition’, and in ‘a series of 
actions, mean, profligate & vicious’, not least his overt defiance towards the Company.17  
While Shore argued that to support the succession of a known bastard would disgrace 
the Company in the eyes of the Indian elite, one wonders whether Vizier Ali’s chief crime 
was his refusal to sanction the influence of the Company or its agents at court. Still, the 
example of Vizier Ali illustrates how sexuality and heredity could become political, how the 
salacious gossip of the bazaar could become the stuff of official reports and correspondence.  
Though the Company often trumpeted their determination not to intrude into the Indian 
domestic sphere (a claim which historians have since proven to be hollow even with regards 
to the general population), these platitudes were obviously inapplicable where royal families 
were concerned.18 Births and marriages were rigorously recorded to amass useful political 
intelligence and trace emerging configurations of hereditary power, for in India, as in Britain, 
marriages in the royal family were strategic and political, used to cement alliances and accrue 
resources and status.19 Recognizing the importance of marriages, the Company were 
increasingly bold about insisting on their rights to this information. When the Kootluck 
Begum (a noblewoman resident in Benares) attempted to marry her granddaughters to the 
princes of Delhi, for instance, she was reprimanded by the Governor-General-in-Council for 
not communicating her intent through official channels. The Resident at Benares William 
Brook was instructed to remind her of her duty to the Governor-General, as well as to ‘request 
her royal highness to specify the princes to whom her granddaughters have been betrothed 
and report their names for the information of the government’.20 In this instance, the 
Governor-General was probably concerned that this marriage would augment the status and 
charisma of one of the Mughal Emperor’s younger sons, thereby undermining the claim of the 
Company’s own candidate for the throne. By keeping track of royal marriages in this fashion, 
Residents and other Company officials sought to pre-empt the formation of courtly factions 
and the possibility of succession crises which would have to be stifled or resolved if the 
Resident were to maintain control.   
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To illustrate the way family and factional feuds could intersect, and to give some 
context for the discussion of family relations that follows, it is worth exploring in some depth 
the contest for the Peshwaship that played out during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century as one typical example of the kind of Indian royal family drama which the Residents 
were seeking to stamp out or repress. In the second half of the eighteenth century, at the 
height of Maratha power, Raghunath Rao (also known as Raghoba), son of the late Peshwa 
Baji Rao and brother to the then-ruler Balaji Baji Rao (popularly known as Nanasahib 
Peshwa), figures in regional historiography as something of a villain, always seeking his own 
aggrandisement at the expense of his male relatives. Raghunath Rao’s efforts came to a head 
in 1772, when he assassinated Narayan Rao, his nephew and the successor to the Peshwaship, 
and sought the musnud for himself. Although Raghunath Rao was deposed shortly thereafter, 
replaced by the infant Madhav Rao II under the influence of the famous Maratha minister 
Nana Fadnavis, Raghunath Rao’s rival claim continued to haunt the politics of Poona in the 
form of his three sons, Baji Rao, Chimnaji Appah, and Amrut Rao, confined in the fortress of 
Sewernee. Even during the period of their exile, the three brothers were apparently upheld by 
a faction of Raghoba’s erstwhile supporters at court, ‘who endeavoured, by every means, to 
exalt the character of the prisoners, and lower the reputation of Nana Furnuwees’.21  
When Madhav Rao II died in an untimely fashion (contemporaries disputed whether 
he had fallen or purposely thrown himself from his balcony), the three brothers quickly 
became the focus of rival intrigues among Poona’s warring factions. Baji Rao had been 
favoured for the succession by his cousin Madhav Rao, but Nana Fadnavis instead proposed 
that Yessooda Bai, the widow of Madhav Rao, should adopt a son who would subsequently 
inherit the musnud.22 Meanwhile, beleaguered courtiers seeking to undermine the power of 
the minister Nana Fadnavis chose instead to support the claim of Baji Rao’s younger brother 
Chimnaji Appa, whisking the youth away against his will to Satara to be clothed in the robes 
of investiture, and then arranging for him to be adopted by the royal widow Yessooda Bai.23 
Although Baji Rao managed to oust his brother with the support of the Company, and quickly 
had the adoption of Chimnaji annulled, his struggles were not over; a few years later, rival 
Maratha chieftains Sindhia and Holkar attempted to replace Baji Rao on the musnud with his 
nephew, Benaik Rao, son of Baji Rao’s adopted brother Amrut Rao. Sindhia’s choice was 
conditioned by the fact that Amrut Rao had conspired with Sindhia against Baji Rao for many 
years ‘to render the Peishwa a pageant of State’, according to the Resident William Palmer.24 
                                                     
21 James Grant Duff, A history of the Mahrattas (London, 1826), p. 124.  
22 Ibid., p. 127.  
23 Ibid., p. 131.  
24 William Palmer to Marquess Wellesley, 21 Mar. 1800, Correspondence of William Palmer, HM, 
IOR/H/576, OIOC, p. 2.  
159 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, when Baji Rao reclaimed the throne with the aid of the Company, 
relationships between the brothers were strained, and Amrut Rao withdrew from Poona to live 
a life of exile under the close supervision of the Company.  
To avoid this kind of political instability, Residents tended to throw their weight 
behind older siblings on point of principle; the result, it would seem, was the weakening of 
Indian monarchies. In the past, succession crises had amounted to a kind of natural selection 
favouring the candidate with the strongest support base. Company interference, however, 
meant that potentially more suitable successors were bypassed, forced to give way to siblings 
who did not necessarily share the same interest or ability. Understandably, this policy 
generated significant resentment at court. Suddenly, age hierarchies and ideas of legitimacy 
which had previously been negotiable were rendered rigid and unbending. Some younger 
brothers did try to use Company intervention to their advantage and win the Company to their 
side, conciliating with the Resident rather than opposing him.25 More often, however, princes 
aligned themselves against the Company, often to the point of violence. The most famous 
instance of this was when the exiled former Nawab Vizier Ali, assisted by a few close 
retainers, murdered the senior judge at Benares and his four guests on 15 January 1799, 
shortly after breakfast. Evading British forces, Vizier Ali fled the city to unite with his 
supporters and mount a full-scale rebellion to reclaim the throne of Awadh. Over the course 
of the following months, Vizier Ali joined with bands of marauders to plague the British 
troops, before finally surrendering to capture and living out his days in exile, imprisoned in 
the British fortress at Vellore.26   
Though the account of George Cherry’s tragic death made Vizier Ali a villain of the 
highest order in British public opinion, the events leading up to that armed confrontation over 
the breakfast table were not so very unusual. There is a pattern of bypassed younger princes 
becoming rallying points for disaffected individuals looking to act out their resentments and 
sense of disempowerment. During the reign of Sikander Jah, Nizam Ali’s successor, British 
onlookers complained that his sons, ‘after the manner of Moosulman princes all over the 
world, collected about them all the dissolute vagabonds of the city, by whose agency they 
prosecuted a regular system of insult and extortion’.27 Mubariz ud-Daula, one of Nizam 
Sikandar Jah’s younger sons, described as ‘headstrong, obstinate and rapacious’, was 
                                                     
25 Henry Russell, ‘The condition and resources of the Nizam’s government’, Russell Papers, MS. Eng. 
misc. c. 324, Bodl. Oxf., p. 47.  
26 John Neave to George Barlow, 15 Jan. 1799, Letters issued by the agent to the Governor General at 
Benares, Benares Residency Records, basta no. 1, register no. 3, UPSAA, p. 220.  
27 Henry T. Prinsep, History of the political and military transactions in India during the 
administration of the Marquess of Hastings 1813-1823 (London, 1825), p. 262.  
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particularly known to have ‘always hated the English’. According to the Resident at 
Hyderabad Henry Russell, ‘when the Nizam insisted on posting a guard from Captain Hare’s 
brigade at Moobariz ood Dowlah’s house, the latter declared “that he would lose his Life 
rather than suffer a Guard to be posted over him from any Corps commanded by a 
European”.’28 After a long period of escalating tensions, the crisis came to a point when 
Mubariz ud-Daula and his brothers seized an attendant of the British Resident, looking to 
extort money from him; a military confrontation seemed imminent, as the Residency’s 
infantry attempted to take the prince’s houses. Afraid of a general insurrection, the Resident’s 
men backed down and waited for reinforcements; in the end the ferment in the city subsided 
of itself and the princes surrendered to the Nizam, who acceded to the Resident’s request to 
have them imprisoned in the nearby fortress of Golconda.29  
A similar and perhaps even more notorious incident occurred in Delhi when Prince 
Mirza Jahangir, the third and favoured son of the King, briefly took control of the Red Fort. 
Irritated and resentful at the Resident’s attempt to control his drinking by prohibiting wine 
vendors from selling their wares in the palace precincts, the young prince barred the gates of 
the fort against the Resident. Shots were fired, but in the end, the revolt proved short-lived; 
Mirza Jahangir surrendered to the Resident and was confined in the fortress at Agra.30 One of 
the Resident’s secretaries attributed Mirza Jahangir’s attempted insurrection to his association 
with European gentlemen, through which he ‘had imbibed notions of liberty very inimical to 
the policy of our Government respecting native princes’.31 Also clearly at issue, however, was 
the Resident’s persistent opposition to Mirza Jahangir’s status as favoured son and heir 
apparent, much to the dismay of the Emperor Akbar II and his favourite wife, Mumtaz 
Mahal.32  
In response to crises like these, rooted in what they perceived to be the unruliness of 
the Indian family, British Residents and their superiors hardened their commitment to strict 
principles of primogeniture. Not only did they place an unprecedented emphasis on a narrow 
understanding of blood and legitimacy, they adhered to a hierarchy of birth order which 
favoured eldest sons. Historians have interpreted the Company’s management of succession 
disputes as a sign of their growing power over Indian kingdoms, but the Company’s influence 
in this regard did not go unchallenged.33 Although the Company sought to preclude violent 
                                                     
28 Notes and intelligence of Mountstuart Elphinstone regarding the Peshwa and Trimbuckjee, 
Elphinstone Collection, Mss Eur F88/60, p. 35.  
29 Prinsep, History, p. 263-265.  
30 Extract of Letter from Bengal, 19 Oct. 1809, BC, IOR/F/4/334/7657, OIOC, p. 2-4.  
31 Alexander Fraser to his mother, 23 Dec. 1810, Fraser of Reelig Papers, vol. 33, NRAS, p. 219.  
32 For the long-running dispute over the appointment of the heir apparent, see Panikkar, British 
diplomacy in North India, p. 20-42.  
33 Fisher, Indirect rule in India, p. 144; Ramusack, The Indian princes and their states, p. 138.  
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succession crises by intervening in support of elder sons, in practice this policy merely served 
to foment the ambitions of younger brothers who knew well that they had historical precedent 
on their side. Vizier Ali was only the most notorious instance of the kind of trouble that could 
erupt in consequence of the simmering resentments of male relatives. These insurrections 
proved brief and easily stamped out, but they were nevertheless recurring. Aggrieved royals 
could almost always find supporters to rally to their cause, suggesting that many people 
refused to accept the legitimacy of the rules imposed by the Company.  
2. Bad blood: arbitrating fraternal conflict  
 Violent uprisings exemplify opposition between siblings in its most extreme form, 
but even in the absence of such acts of rebellion, the fluidity of the rules governing royal 
succession soured relations between royal brothers whose shared heredity made them rival 
claimants. Siblings Baji Rao, Chimnaji Appa, and Amrut Rao were apparently very close 
during their long imprisonment in an isolated fortress, but their intimacy was quickly and 
irredeemably dispelled when the musnud came into play.34 Even after Amrut Rao had 
willingly withdrawn to the Company’s dominions, for a long time the Peshwa continued to 
hold Amrut Rao’s adherents, as well as their family and servants, in confinement.35 Male 
relatives of the ruler were usually subject to suspicion and surveillance, and not infrequently 
to imprisonment or exile.36 By comparison, the ruler’s closest friends and counsellors 
generally seem to have been slaves or individuals of lowly origins. In a context where the 
ruler’s kin posed a threat through their own potential claims to the musnud, vulnerable rulers 
were perhaps understandably prone to attach themselves to people who presented no such 
challenge.37 
British administrators certainly recognized the logic behind this pattern, but the 
ruler’s preference for slaves and servants above members of their own family was 
nevertheless a tendency the Residents and their superiors found perplexing and disagreeable; 
unsurprising, perhaps, given the centrality of kinship networks to the pursuit of the economic 
                                                     
34 Henry Russell to John Monckton, 23 Sept. 1810, enclosed in John Monckton to W.A. Brooke, 10 
Nov. 1810, Letters received by the agent to the Governor-General at Benares, basta no. 11, book no. 
51, 1810, UPSAA, p. 245.  
35 Arthur Wellesley to Barry Close, 14 Dec. 1804, Arthur Wellesley Papers, Mss Eur E216, OIOC, p. 
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36 Henry Russell notes that the brothers of the Nizam ‘live in an easy kind of restraint, and never appear 
in public.’ Notes and intelligence of Mountstuart Elphinstone regarding the Peshwa and Trimbuckjee, 
Elphinstone Collection, Mss Eur F88/60, OIOC, p. 37.  
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and political aspirations of the gentry in Britain and the empire.38 Baji Rao was criticized for 
his ‘habits of suspicion & vigilance’ as well his fondness for ‘the Company of low 
dependents’, ‘too low to be feared’ and ‘too servile to irritate’.39 The Governor-General-in-
Council similarly belittled the Nawab Vizier Saadat Ali Khan’s suspicious conduct towards 
his brother and officially expressed their concern that ‘His Excellency should condescend to 
distinguish by his public favour men notorious for the depravity of their lives and the infamy 
of their characters’, who were ‘calumniators of the most respectable subjects of his 
Government’.40 Likewise, when the Nizam Sikander Jah approached the Resident about 
rumours regarding a plan on the part of the Company to depose him and place his brother on 
the throne, Thomas Sydenham, in his own words, ‘treated the Nizam’s Fears with ridicule.’41 
The Residents, regularly inundated with questions and concerns regarding the threat posed by 
royal brothers, resented the manner in which they were called on to arbitrate family 
differences and begrudged the extent to which the investigation of these conspiracy theories 
sapped their time and resources.42  
Though Residents often expressed frustration at what they perceived to be the petty 
squabbles dividing male members of the royal family, these recurring tensions sometimes 
worked to the Company’s benefit. Royal brothers were often inclined to seek a 
rapprochement with the Resident as a counterpoint to the ill will of the ruler.43 In return for 
the Company’s protection and support, they could provide vital political intelligence. This 
was a recurring pattern at the court of Nagpur, where the relatives of the Rajah Raghoji 
Bhonsla were the Resident’s most prized allies and informants, at the same time as they were 
the Rajah’s most committed enemies, rebelling openly, plotting against his life, and intriguing 
to divide and undermine his government.44 Vincaji Bhonsla, for instance, the brother of 
Raghoji, looked to the Company as a crucial safeguard at a time when his brother kept him 
detained at the capital with his life on the line. As the Resident interpreted it, ‘if the influence 
                                                     
38 Will Coster, Family and kinship in England 1450-1800 (Harlow, 2001), p. 44; Julia Adams, The 
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39 Mountstuart Elphinstone to Marquess of Hastings, 20 Nov. 1815, Cleveland Public Library Papers, 
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40 Extract Political Letter to Bengal, 14 Sept. 1808, BC, IOR/F/4/311/7097, OIOC, p. 2, 5. See also 
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of the British Government were established at this Court he naturally judged that it would be 
restraint on Raja Raghojee Bhonsla sufficient to prevent any gross injustice or act of 
violence’, and therefore ‘showed himself zealous to promote the measure’.45 This zeal was 
manifest in Vincaji’s willingness to pass on important information regarding the activities of 
his brother, including Raghoji’s endeavours to unite the Marathas in a confederacy against the 
British in the prelude to the Second Maratha War.46 
Similarly, in 1817 Gujaba Dada, a cousin of the reigning Rajah of Nagpur Appah 
Sahib, took refuge at the British Residency for fear of assassination at the hands of his jealous 
cousin, and even went so far as to seek asylum in Company territory for a few years.47 
Richard Jenkins, Resident at Nagpur, recognised the use which alienated relatives like Gujaba 
could have. ‘In the discontents […] of his Nephew, and of the old adherents of that branch of 
the family, means of no inconsiderable force to shake the foundations of the state of Nagpore, 
might be found.’48 Jenkins’ observations proved prescient; Gujaba Dada subsequently repaid 
his debt to the Company in the days leading up to the final Maratha War, when he and his 
family provided invaluable support. ‘To them,’ Jenkins claimed, ‘I owe much of the 
intelligence which has enabled me to defeat the Rajah’s treacherous designs’.49 
Though royal family members could be helpful if so inclined, calling on their support 
was not without hazard. By becoming too intimate with royal family members, the Resident 
risked exciting the resentment of the ruler himself, who was, after all, the person who had it 
most in his power to advance, or thwart, the designs of the Company at court.  If the Resident 
wanted to cultivate both sides at once, he had to do so deftly and discreetly, without making 
too many promises. To revert to a previous example, when Vincaji Bhonsla desired to meet 
with the Resident’s munshi to establish communications with the Residency, the two arranged 
to rendezvous ‘as if by accident at a place of worship’.50 Later, when Vincaji Bhonsla 
dispatched confidential agents to the Residency with secret information, Colebrooke was 
careful to ensure that, though he expressed his gratitude for Vincaji’s communications, he at 
the same time ‘neither flattered his hopes, nor excited his expectations’, and in fact displayed 
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a decided ‘aversion from intrigue’. Colebrooke’s objective in so doing was to guarantee that 
he could claim plausible deniability if these exchanges ever came to light; not only was the 
information unsolicited, but Colebrooke could say that he had discouraged Vincaji’s secretive 
conduct (nominally, at least).51  
Sometimes, in the interests of keeping relations with the ruler on a solid footing, 
Residents did have to reject the assistance of male relatives altogether. The risk was that, by 
accepting their help, Residents might upset the uneasy equilibrium at court by empowering 
the relative concerned at the expense of the ruler in power. For instance, while the Company 
enthusiastically accepted a sizeable loan from the Nawab Vizier Ghazi-ud-din Haidar to fund 
their war with the Gurkhas, they deemed it ‘inexpeditious’ to accept such a loan from his 
brother the nabob Shums ud-Daula, who had enjoyed the support and favour of the deceased 
Nawab Saadat Ali Khan and was therefore perceived as a rival by the reigning Nawab.52 By 
accepting this loan, the Company would have conferred a degree of prestige on Shums ud-
Daula which would have attracted the jealousy of the ruling Nawab Vizier, since it would, by 
implication, have placed them on an equal footing in terms of their respective relations with 
the Company.  
Despite the Residents’ best efforts, however, sometimes the rift between brothers 
proved irremediable. When the Company failed to maintain good relations between male 
relatives, they usually took it upon themselves to arrange for their exile. Rebels like Vizier Ali 
or the young Mirza Jahangir, for instance, were accorded the status of state prisoners, and sent 
to live in Company territory, to be supervised by Company agents. Banishment of political 
rivals or vanquished rebels had a long tradition in Europe as in India; the underlying rationale 
was that once out of sight, the individual in question could no longer act as a rallying point for 
resistance. His absence would ideally put him out of mind and eventually allow him to be 
conveniently forgotten, whereas his execution might have rendered him a martyr.53 Exile was 
a particularly attractive option given powerful taboos against flogging or executing Brahmins; 
banishment was a way of punishing high-status individuals without social stigma.54  
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The conditions of exile depended upon the extent of the individual’s misconduct; 
rebellious relatives were usually confined in military fortresses far from the land of their birth 
and kept separate from their wives and children, while relatives who were merely perceived to 
pose an existential threat to the ruler in power were generally allowed to live more or less 
independently in establishments of their own in places of their choosing.55 Male relatives 
sometimes even chose exile of their own volition, preferring to escape the jealous gaze of 
their royal siblings, and to retire to the relative calm of the country, or to religious and cultural 
centres like Benares. The brother of the Peshwa, Amrut Rao, retreated from Poona seemingly 
of his own will; he claimed to have ‘laid aside all worldly concerns,’ and to have ‘nothing to 
do with the contentions of Princes.’56  
Though relatives in these settings could no longer act as informants, or at least not in 
the same way as they had when positioned at the very heart of courtly politics, sometimes 
Company officials preferred to keep these dynastic powder-kegs out of the way. When Amrut 
Rao passed through Berar on his way to reside at Benares, the Resident at Nagpur, 
‘considering the passion for intrigue which so often infatuates the natives and the discontent 
which Amrut Rao might be supposed to feel at the Peshwa’s treatment of him,[…] thought it 
prudent to endeavour to keep him out of all situations where he might be tempted to engage in 
plots and political speculations’.57 Elphinstone’s caution proved well-founded when 
information later emerged that Amrut Rao was making preparations to effect an insurrection 
within the Company’s provinces, apparently in collaboration with Nana Sahib, the brother of 
the Raja of Berar.58 Officials no doubt breathed something of a sigh of relief when Amrut Rao 
finally settled down at a distance from centres of political intrigue. The isolation of royal 
brothers does seem to have helped diminish incidences of conspiracy and collusion at court, 
though the Governor-General-in-Council were nevertheless still keen to ensure that these 
royal exiles were situated at a point where they were within easy reach of a military 
cantonment and could be monitored by a Company commissioner.59  
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Exile to British territories could also represent a useful means of developing ties with 
Indian royals and conciliating them to British habits. These men could make attractive 
claimants when succession crises broke out, given their perceived attachment to the 
Company. Saadat Ali Khan (a member of the ruling family of Awadh), after many years 
living in exile in Benares, was said to have acquired ‘a fondness for every thing European’. 
He was excessively devoted to hunting and horse-racing in the English style, and was even 
known to dress in English riding kit.60 When the Company decided to dethrone his nephew, 
Vizier Ali, Saadat was the obvious choice to replace him as Nawab Vizier of Awadh. 
Similarly, when Vincaji Bhonsla and his family sought refuge in Company territory, the 
family’s resulting attachment to the British was viewed as an asset which could be deployed 
to the Company’s advantage. When Vincaji’s son Appah Sahib made his bid for power, 
acting as regent for his young cousin Parsoji, the Resident supported his claim because his 
personal history was believed to have made him sympathetic to the British. In Jenkins’ view, 
Appah Sahib’s time in Benares, ‘combined with the lessons of his father, who looked up to us 
for support against the Rajah’, rendered him ‘superior to the vulgar prejudices of the dangers 
of a connection with us,’ leading him ‘to trust implicitly to our honor and good faith’.61  
Despite their roseate expectations, however, in both cases British officials 
overestimated the exiles’ attachment to the Company; neither Saadat Ali nor Appah Sahib 
were in fact so very devoted to British interests, and the latter openly revolted against the 
Company in 1817. Moreover, whatever benefits might accrue to the Company through the 
development of closer links with these royal personalities, even when safely in exile male 
relatives were an onerous burden for the British officials responsible for managing their 
interests and concerns.62 For one thing, the Company was charged with paying out stipends, 
and often took on the additional task of overseeing budgets as a means of precluding financial 
embarrassments; Residents seem to have feared that royal relatives might incur debts and find 
themselves in the shameful position of being put on public trial.63 After all, the behaviour and 
lifestyle of brothers could have implications for family honour, meaning that male relatives 
had it within their power to besmirch the prestige of the ruler concerned if they did not adhere 
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to certain standards of respectability. Tellingly, Akbar Jah threatened his brother the Nizam 
that if he did not receive land revenues said to have been granted to him by their late father, 
he would ‘retire to a holy Hill in the neighbourhood of the city, called Mowlah Ally, and 
assuming the Dress and Habits of a Fakeer’, or Muslim religious mendicant.64 Even the 
Nawab Vizier Saadat Ali Khan was keen to ensure that Vizier Ali, the exiled nephew whom 
he had replaced on the throne, continued to be attended by a chobdar, or stick-bearer, to 
signal his noble-status.65 By failing to calibrate their own conduct or the conduct of their 
charges according to fine gradations of status, Company officials were thus at risk of 
undermining the whole system of hereditary power upon which their influence rested.  
Officials were therefore keen to pay the recognition due to these royal family 
members, carefully regulating ritual practices including the exchange of nazr and khilat, and 
the frequency of visits, for example.66 At the same time, their rights and status meant that 
male relatives could make a real nuisance of themselves. Magistrates regularly complained 
that the followers and attendants of royal exiles clashed with local inhabitants and perpetrated 
acts of violence and ‘outrage’. 67 This was particularly true of Muslim royals who sought 
asylum in Benares, and offended the locals with what were considered to be immoderate 
celebrations of Muslim religious holidays.68 Given their rank and stores of treasure, however, 
royal exiles could justify large numbers of soldiers and attendants ‘for the Purposes of Parade 
and the protection of […] property’, as the Resident at Benares affirmed, even though the 
followers of Amrut Rao, at least, were described as having the appearance ‘more of a colony 
than an army’.69 Royal exiles, in sum, were a drain on the time and energy of local officials, 
as well as a source of recurring friction with local townspeople.  
Moreover, even while living comfortably abroad, some royal elites found it difficult 
to put their political careers behind them. Though Amrut Rao purported to be perfectly 
content to live a life of peaceful reflection, his son, Benaik Rao, who had been briefly 
installed as Peshwa under Amrut Rao’s tutelage, proved more restless. Having become 
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‘impatient of the inactive state in which he is compelled to remain at this place’, as the 
magistrate of Benares described it, Benaik Rao ‘fell into the hands of associates equally 
restless, and ill disposed with himself’. Together with his friends, Benaik Rao planned to flee 
the city and seek his fortune, before his intentions were discovered and aborted by his father. 
For a young man like Benaik Rao, being forced to live a quiet life far from the stage of war 
and politics on which he might otherwise have distinguished himself was punishment indeed. 
Having had a brief taste of power, his exile was even more galling. The Company had to be 
careful of men like these; while Benaik Rao could certainly not take down the Company 
singlehanded, he was clearly capable of assembling a body of military men to his cause, and 
could give the Company significant embarrassment and trouble, as the magistrate at Benares 
recognized.70 
All in all, male relatives were considered by the Residents as a necessary evil to be 
managed with delicacy and care. On the one hand, fraternal conflicts, though distasteful to the 
Resident, could be exploited for valuable political intelligence; moreover, suitably Anglicized 
royal family members were attractive claimants to the throne when succession crises did 
break out. At the same time, an alliance with a royal family member could expose the 
Resident to distrust and suspicion from the ruler in question, nor could the attachment of royal 
brothers and cousins necessarily be relied upon. To the contrary, male relatives regularly 
proved unruly and irrepressible, even when supposedly tucked away safely in Company 
territory. Still, despite the problems posed by male relatives, the Residents’ greatest censure 
was nevertheless usually reserved for women of the royal household. These wives, mothers, 
and grandmothers raised unique difficulties and will therefore be the subject of the final half 
of this chapter.  
3. Petticoat influence from behind the purdah 
‘A nasty Dame & Bitch’: this is how an East India Company soldier stationed in 
Delhi described the favourite wife of the Mughal Emperor Akbar II.71 The language is crude, 
but the sentiment was not unusual; British commentators commonly described royal wives, 
grandmothers, and concubines as evil harridans exercising undue influence over emasculated 
Indian rulers. The stereotype had deep roots; in published accounts of the first British 
embassy to the court of the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan almost two hundred years before in 
1616, Thomas Roe depicted the Emperor’s romance with his favourite wife, famously 
memorialised by the Taj Mahal, in similar terms. ‘His motion is inward among women,’ Roe 
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observed, ‘of which sort, though he keepe a thousand, yet one governs him, and wynds him 
up at her pleasure’.72  
Despite the prevalence of these defamatory portraits of ambitious Indian women in 
British accounts of Indian courtly life, female agency has nevertheless been pushed to the 
margins in recent scholarship on the Residency system. To the extent that historians have 
discussed the women in the Residents’ lives, the focus has been on their Indian wives and 
concubines.73 This tendency seems to reflect a broader development within the field of 
imperial history wherein the history of intimacy between colonizer and colonized (usually 
conjugal relations between European men and non-European women) has emerged as a 
popular way to demonstrate the entanglement of the personal and the political, of private lives 
and larger patterns of imperial rule. 74 In this view, intimate relationships were a key theatre 
for the construction and consolidation of racial and gender hierarchies, as well as the 
development of colonial knowledge.75  
Still, James Achilles Kirkpatrick’s notorious relationship with the Hyderabadi 
noblewoman Khair un-Nissa is the exception, rather than the rule. While many of the 
Residents did cohabitate with Indian women, those we know of were for the most part not 
local, but had accompanied the Resident from a previous posting. The Residents’ domestic 
arrangements were, on principle, kept rigidly separate from their public life; the women were 
confined to the Resident’s private quarters and even, in some cases, lived at a distance from 
the Residency building itself, while neither the Residents’ Indian concubines nor their 
European wives figure in surviving letters and papers.76 On the other hand, the Resident’s 
relationships with the women of the royal zenana, though they could hardly be classed as 
intimate, could be emotionally fraught and politically significant. Whereas Durba Ghosh had 
to carefully sift through baptismal records to bring her ‘nameless’ subjects to light, Indian 
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royal women are by contrast almost inescapable from the historian’s perspective, their names 
scattered liberally through the records and correspondence of the Residents.77 These were 
women who made themselves heard, sometimes to the exasperation of the Company officials 
responsible for managing their concerns. 
Attitudes towards these royal women were powerfully shaped by contemporary 
preconceptions about the Muslim harem.  Harems were usually portrayed in European art and 
literature as spaces of chaos and disorder, of material and sexual excess, while harem women 
themselves tended to be caricatured as immoral and lascivious. Given these preconceptions, 
stereotypes of Indian women were roughly divided along sectarian lines; Hindu women were 
commonly lauded as plain-speaking and practical, even when in purdah, while Muslim 
women, it was said, ‘do nothing but adorn their persons, study deception, and smoke their 
hookahs’.7879 Some British commentators decried what they perceived to be the oppressive 
conditions of the zenana.80 The tone of the Residents, however, was sharply censorious; the 
Nizam’s chief consort Jahan Parwar Begum, for instance, was disparaged for her addiction ‘to 
all the disgusting vices which prevail among many of the women of Indian seraglios’.81  
The basis for this cloud of fear and fantasy encircling the zenana was its 
inaccessibility, which made it a site of gossip and speculation, of imagined theft, slavery, 
infanticide, and murder. To quote modern historian Janaki Nair, ‘by its very unknowability, it 
was a seat of sedition of intrigue, as much as it was a site of ambiguous sexuality.’82 As one 
nineteenth-century historian imagined it, ‘there were things done within the precincts of that 
vast privileged asylum, and duly reported to the Resident, in violation of all laws human and 
divine’.83 In addition to its secrecy and mystique, the polygamous household also created an 
avenue for women of lowly origins to access the springs of power. The most politically active 
women within the Nizam of Hyderabad’s zenana were former slaves who had come to 
exercise influence through the favours of the monarch, for example. These were women who, 
in the view of the Residents, were ‘strongly marked with those characteristicks which 
frequently attend a great and sudden elevation,’ being ‘haughty, tyrannical, rapacious and 
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officious’.84 In other words, these women seemingly differed in every respect from British 
models of aristocratic, feminine gentility.  
However condescendingly or disapprovingly Residents might describe the women of 
the zenana, it is apparent that these individuals were nevertheless a force to be reckoned with. 
Behind most ambitious young princes were powerful royal women, normally mothers and 
grandmothers who espoused their cause. In the uncertain days following Asaf-ud Daulah’s 
death, for example, it was the deceased Nawab’s mother who provided crucial support to the 
young Vizier Ali by publicly presenting him with the khilat of investiture, a gesture which, 
the Governor-General judged, ‘will perhaps by the native princes of Hindostan, be deemed 
the most satisfactory refutation of the Reports which have been propagated to the prejudice of 
his birth.’85 General opinion, so far as the Resident could learn, was that the young Nawab 
attracted many followers thanks to the begum’s influence.86 Similarly, it was widely believed 
at the time that the rebellious princes at Hyderabad were emboldened by the support of the 
Nizam’s mother, Tinat un-Nissa Begum, and the Nizam’s first wife, Jahan Parwar Begam, 
who exercised great influence within the zenana.87  
Women could also be important patrons to men outside their family circle. There was 
at almost all courts a general pattern of royal women advancing the careers of favoured 
ministers, a fact which the Residents noted with dismay. The Rajah of Berar’s mother, for 
instance, supported one of the Rajah’s chief ministers ‘Buckshee Bhowanni’, who was 
apparently ‘more feared than liked’, thus giving prominence to a man who might otherwise 
have gone unremarked or suffered royal disfavour.88 At Hyderabad, the Resident noted that 
‘the Nizam’s Mahal is the channel thro’ which Mooneer ool Moolk principally conducts his 
Intrigues’, and regretted that ‘the Tuhnent oo Nissa Begum is so much under the influence of 
Mooneer ool Moolk, as the Nizam seldom adopts any measure without her Advice and 
Concurrence’.89 Munir ul-Mulk’s rival in government, Chandu Lal (whom the Company 
supported in opposition to Munir ul-Mulk), certainly thought the begum’s favour worth 
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cultivating; when Tinat un-Nissa Begum visited a garden belonging to him in the vicinity of 
Hyderabad, Chandu Lal ‘paid her great Attention, gave her valuable Presents, represented his 
condition to her, expressed the most cordial Attachment to her Interests, and those of her 
Family, and sent her Home very much gratified with her reception.’90 The extent to which 
courtiers sought to secure the influence and support of the zenana more generally is made 
evident by the bribes they offered to female attendants in their efforts to establish a channel of 
communication with the royal women; Mama Barun, the principal female attendant in the 
Nizam’s family, was said to have accumulated a massive fortune in presents and bribes from 
courtiers anxious to acquire her services.91 It seems clear that the women of the zenana were 
recognized to be an effective alternative or counterpoint to the patronage of the Resident at 
court.  
The power of royal women was partly a product of proximity and access. Even 
though Residents might have used viciously moralizing language to depreciate the zenana, 
they simultaneously recognized its importance as a political space. Power in Islamic political 
systems flowed out from the ruler; accordingly, proximity to the ruler was a source of 
influence. The head of the harem had the kind of access to the monarch that the Resident, who 
corresponded with him largely by way of munshis and written communiqués, could only 
envy.92 This was a recognized obstacle to the transaction of Residency business. All the key 
European diplomatic manuals emphasized the importance of sociability in an informal 
context, observing that ‘when people begin to be a little warmed with wine, they often 
discover secrets of importance’, yet the Residents were excluded from the spaces of leisure 
and conversation where the ruler and his friends and family congregated.93 Henry Russell 
openly begrudged the manner in which the Hyderabadi habit of retiring to the zenana in the 
evenings precluded homosocial activities, noting that ‘they never meet together, but upon 
occasions of ceremony or business, and every man passes his hours of relaxation and 
retirement in the secluded privacy of his female apartments’.94 William Palmer bemoaned his 
infrequent communications with the Peshwa of Poona and ‘the Forms and reserve with which 
his Intercourse is clogged’, while Mountstuart Elphinstone similarly opined that the Peshwa 
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was ‘very difficult of access’, preferring to enjoy the company of ‘his favorites in large 
assemblies of women, where he enjoys the coarsest ribaldry and buffoonery’.95  
Elphinstone’s complaint is typical; Indian rulers were commonly denounced for 
spending too much time with the women of their household, or for taking their counsel too 
seriously. In this, the Residents’ attitudes were informed by British assumptions about 
masculinity and authority. The language used to describe Indian rulers reflected the charges 
of ‘effeminacy’ which were so common in eighteenth-century British political discourse and 
everyday parlance. To be ‘effeminate’ was to be unmanly or self-indulgent, to associate too 
much with women or to have sex with men; these were private vices which threatened to seep 
into public life, impeding a man’s ability to act rationally and independently on the public 
stage.96 T.D. Broughton was quite clear that the temptations of the zenana had clouded 
Sindhia’s judgement and disrupted his reign; in Broughton’s own words, ‘women and low 
company have been his bane; and appear to have quite corrupted a heart and mind originally 
meant for better things’.97 Similarly, when a contemporary book authored by an officer in the 
Indian army described the Nizam of Hyderabad Sikander Jah’s unfitness for office, a key 
justification was that ‘he lives almost entirely with women; his business is chiefly transacted 
by verbal messages communicated by female attendants, and he never goes from one chamber 
to another, without being followed by four or five women slaves.’98 The Residents, too, 
belittled the Nizam for his dependence on the women of his household. When the begums of 
Hyderabad communicated a rumour to the Nizam regarding the Company’s intention to 
depose him in favour of his brother, the Resident Thomas Sydenham condescendingly, in his 
words, ‘expressed my compassion only that his Highness should seriously entertain such 
unmanly and absurd suspicions upon the base assertions of ignorant Women’.99 The 
Resident’s  belittling remarks bely the serious frustration he felt at his inability to repress or 
control the influence which women could exercise in the privacy of the zenana. At 
Travancore, the Resident Colin Macaulay even resorted to the extreme measure of banishing 
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the Rajah’s favourite wife Arumenah Mah as a means of insulating the ruler from faction and 
intrigue.100  
 It was not only their perceived influence over the ruler which made the women of the 
zenana such sought-after allies, however; they had other assets which could tilt the balance in 
a courtier’s favour. For one thing, the zenana was a crucial site for the diffusion of news. In 
the emperor’s private quarters, newsletters were read out and agents examined in the 
women’s presence.101 Royal women corresponded widely and maintained links with 
geographically distant kin; consequently, they were sometimes the first to hear of events at 
rival courts. All this made them attractive informants. The Jahan Parwar Begam, niece to the 
minister Munir ul-Mulk, was apparently especially ‘useful in communicating Intelligence to 
him and conveying his private notes and messages to the Nizam’, while Chandu Lal appealed 
to the female attendants of Tinat un-Nissa Begum to confirm reports about the intentions of 
the rebel Mohipat Ram.102 In addition to their information, in some cases the zenanas 
represented immense repositories of wealth.103 Historians of the early modern Islamic world 
have long observed the range of activities engaged in by elite women, contrary to what we 
might expect of individuals who were supposed to have spent the bulk of their lives at home 
in the seclusion of the harem. Women collected tax, invested in inland and overseas trade, and 
profited from the sale of textiles, minerals, and agricultural goods, as well as the duties 
collected from merchants travelling through their dominions.104 In consequence, royal women 
had the financial resources, as well as the charisma, to marshal wider support when necessary. 
For example, the women of Sindhia’s zenana, considering ‘their Safety & Interests as 
inseparable from those of [Balloo] Tantia’ (one of Sindhia’s chief ministers), were able to 
bring to bear troops of five or six thousand men in their efforts to coerce Sindhia to release 
the minister from confinement and return him to his privileged position within Sindhia’s 
counsel.105 
The example of the Sindhia’s zenana, in addition to illustrating the financial and 
military resources that women could muster, also suggests that female honour could be a 
                                                     
100 John Munro, ‘Observations on a petition delivered to the Government,’ 16 Sept. 1813, BC, 
IOR/F/4/445/10674, OIOC, p. 114. See also a letter from the vakils of the Rajah of Travancore to 
Minto, 21 Dec. 1809, In-letters, Persian Correspondence, Minto Papers, MS 11582, NLS, p. 102.  
101 Bayly, Empire and information, p. 18.  
102 Henry Russell, ‘The condition and resources of the Nizam’s government,’ Russell Papers, MS. Eng. 
misc. c. 324, Bodl. Oxf., p. 50; Thomas Sydenham to Minto, 17 Apr.1808, Foreign Secret Department 
Records, no. 1, NAI, p. 38.  
103 The mother of Raghoji Bhonsla was rumoured to have died very rich; see Richard Jenkins to Barry 
Close, 23 Dec. 1809, Nagpur records, vol. II, p. 21.  
104 Ellison Banks Findly, Nur Jahan: Empress of Mughal India (New York, NY, 1993), p. 110.  
105 William Palmer to Marquess Wellesley, 28 Apr. 1800, Correspondence of William Palmer, HM, 
IOR/H/576, OIOC, p. 72.  
 
175 
 
 
powerful instrument through which women could rally broad-based support. When Mahadji 
Sindhia passed away, he left his three widows (referred to by contemporaries as ‘the bais’) in 
the care of his nephew, adopted son and successor, Daulat Rao. Daulat Rao had promised to 
provide for the women, but as time passed he failed to settle them in their own permanent 
establishment, and denied them many of the creature comforts to which they had been 
habituated. At this point, the elder widows charged Daulat Rao with engaging in a ‘criminal 
intercourse’ with the young widow Bhagirathi Bai, ‘at which they openly expressed their 
abhorrence, and declared they could no longer consider as a son the incestuous defiler of his 
father’s bed.’106 The bais tried to use this language of shame and disgrace as a means of 
securing an independent livelihood, separate from Daulat Rao’s household. The allegations, 
however, only seem to have provoked Sindhia; the women were subsequently seized and 
flogged. Their treatment, however, drew some of Sindhia’s chief Brahmin officers to their 
cause. The women, assisted by a number of powerful Maratha sirdars, escaped Sindhia’s 
clutches and assembled a large body of troops, refusing to negotiate with Sindhia until he had 
met their demands for their future security and subsistence.107  
Though the bais’ forces were initially small, they benefited from the support of 
Sindhia’s army, many of whom expressed resentment at Sindhia’s treatment of the ladies and 
even deserted to the bais’ cause.108 As the number of the bais’ supporters grew, Sindia found 
himself paralysed; he was humiliated by his inability to control dissensions within his family 
but at the same time unwilling to resort to the use of force, particularly since he seems to have 
doubted whether his troops would have backed him up in the event of a violent confrontation 
with the bais.109 In the end, after nearly a year’s stalemate in which the dissension constituted 
the chief subject of discussion in Maratha political circles, Sindhia finally acceded to the 
demands of the bais, restoring their favoured minister to power, granting them the city of 
Burhanpore and its dependencies, and a fort at Asseer for their future security.110 In this 
instance, the bais’ negotiating power rested on their affiliation with the royal dynasty and 
their share in Sindhia’s inherited charisma; individual honour was closely bound up with 
lineage, and the honour of families was reflected in the conduct and treatment of its 
women.111 Consequently, women could, if necessary, essentially hold their family’s honour 
hostage. This was also a tactic employed by the widows of the deceased Nawab Vizier when 
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they objected to the eunuch who had been appointed to oversee their household and dispense 
their stipends. In this case, the ladies expressed their dissatisfaction by leaving their residence 
at Faizabad and taking the road to Lucknow in full view of the public, leading the distraught 
Nawab Vizier to bemoan that ‘disgrace and dishonour such as never before sullied our 
reputation have now been brought on my House and the circumstances have become 
notorious to all the world’.112 Thus, although caricatures of the Muslim harem portrayed royal 
women as spoiled and indolent, their position at the centre of power, their financial resources, 
and the charisma they enjoyed as members of the ruling dynasty, meant that women could 
exercise significant political clout. 
4. Bridging the gender frontier  
Despite the advantages enjoyed by royal women, Residents tended to belittle their 
political activities, ascribing their interventions to base avarice and slandering them in sexual 
terms.  These accusations paralleled the denunciations meted out to aristocratic women 
deemed to have taken an inappropriately active role in British public life. As Anna Clark has 
pointed out, allegations of sexual misconduct and prostitution were prominent motifs in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British politics. To take just one famous example, when 
Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire canvassed for Charles James Fox in the Westminster 
elections of 1784, contemporaries speculated that she was trying to pay off her gambling 
debts, and accused her of being sexually involved with the candidate; caricatures depicted her 
kissing butchers for votes.113 Similarly, Tinat un-Nissa Begum, the mother of the Nizam and 
an active opponent of the Resident at court, was said by him to be ‘not particularly attached to 
any Party, but takes bribes from all and for the time espouses that side which pays the 
highest’, with chastity ‘by no means unimpeached’.114  
This kind of dismissive attitude would seem to foreclose the possibility that the 
Resident and the women of the zenana could fruitfully act in concert. Yet, however much the 
Residents might appear on the surface to condemn the political activity of Indian women and 
their influence on Indian rulers, they also acknowledged that women had their particular uses. 
In part, the Residents were probably open to women’s political potential because, as members 
by birth of the political elite in Britain, they were aware of the important role which women 
often played there.  Although in theory British politics was conceived as belonging to the 
masculine domain, in practice politics in Britain, as in India, was familial and social.  As 
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such, women could and did participate, as hostesses, patronesses, socio-political ‘fixers’ and 
confidantes, as Elaine Chalus has illustrated.115 For women born into political families, it was 
almost expected that they would play their part to support their sons and husbands in their 
political pursuits. As Amanda Vickery has argued, at a time where so much of a propertied 
gentleman’s engagement with public life took place within the context of the home, the 
oppositions which historians have drawn between the public spheres occupied by men, and 
the private spheres occupied by women, do not make much sense.116 In European diplomatic 
culture, as well, the same rules and opportunities applied; de Callières advised diplomats to 
go to great lengths to endear themselves with the ladies of the court, arguing that ‘the power 
of their charms has often an influence over the most important resolutions, on which the 
greatest events depend’.117 Though some historians of the British empire in India have 
suggested that the harem’s political character would have broken with modern European 
concepts of public (and masculine) and private (and female) spaces, these distinctions were 
not in fact so clear-cut. 
Residents, therefore, were not necessarily averse to women exercising political 
agency, particularly within the bounds of what they considered to be more conventional 
feminine activities. Ideally, Residents wanted royal women to exercise a moralizing 
influence, paralleling an emergent model of female domestic influence which Anna Clark 
attributes to the rising tide of British evangelicalism and the philosophy of sensibility.118 For 
instance, from the Resident’s perspective royal women were valued as effective mediators, 
able to salve the resentments of fathers, brothers, and sons. Thomas Sydenham was explicitly 
instructed to cultivate a connection with the Bakshi Begum at Hyderabad and to use her as an 
instrument to conciliate the Nizam to the Company’s policies.119 The Rajah of Berar’s mother 
was particularly adept at managing the often fractious relations between her two sons, and 
was perceived to act as a positive influence on the Rajah’s administration as a result of his 
veneration for her.120 Rajah Ragoji himself observed that had it not been for his mother ‘the 
differences between him & Nana Sahib must ere this have led to a civil war’, and attributed 
her influence to the fact that he did not punish his brother for his armed depredations along 
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their shared territorial borders.121 After her death, the Resident anticipated ruptures between 
the brothers, and worried about the extortionate activities that the brothers might engage in 
without her moderating influence. As Jenkins noted, ‘there must be many who having 
formerly owed their safety from the Rajah’s exactions, to the Bai’s influence, now tremble for 
their persons and property’.122   
Another important ally of the Company was the Bahu Begum, the widow of Nawab 
Vizier of Awadh Shuja ud-Daula. Bahu Begum had been Shuja-ud Daula’s chief consort and 
had provided critical support to him at key points in his reign; as a sign of his gratitude and 
respect Shuja ud-Daula had entrusted the begum with much of his wealth.123 After Shuja ud-
Daula’s death this vast property gave the begum great clout in the politics of Awadh, but it 
also made her a target. Initially the Begum was a notorious opponent of the Company, and 
sought enthusiastically to defend her son Asaf ud-Daula from the Company’s encroachment; 
however, regime changes in the late eighteenth century also entailed dramatic shifts in the 
begum’s relationship with the Company, as she sought to secure her wealth and dependents 
from appropriation by her male relatives.124 When the Bahu Begum’s son Asaf ud-Daula was 
succeeded by his brother (and the Bahu Begum’s step-son) Saadat Ali Khan, the begum 
turned to the Company and initiated a rapprochement, enlisting their support as a guarantor of 
the promises made to her by Saadat Ali Khan that he would respect her position and property. 
Subsequently Bahu Begum claimed to regard herself as being entirely under the protection of 
the East India Company.125 She maintained a regular correspondence with the Governor-
General, sometimes passing on critical political intelligence.126 During her lifetime, the Bahu 
Begum promised to make the Company her legatee, and used this promise as leverage to 
secure the Company’s assistance in defending her financial interests, for instance by 
incentivizing the Governor-General to take her side in disputes over the inheritance of the 
wealthy aumil Almas Ali Khan.127 After Bahu Begum’s death, the Governor-General-in-
Council was indeed made the trustee of her considerable treasury, along with that of her 
daughter-in-law and the widow of Asaf-ud Daula, Shums un-Nissa Begum, who similarly 
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relied on the Company to defend her interests at court. This trusteeship enabled the Company 
to acquire a position of authority relative to the begums’ significant body of dependents, 
which included politically powerful eunuchs and other courtly adherents, as well as 
relatives.128  
By investing the Company with this trust, the begums were not necessarily seeking to 
empower the Company relative to the ruling Nawab Vizier of Awadh, who deeply resented 
the Company’s encroachment into this family affair. Rather, the begums were trying to 
provide for their households and supporters, to ensure that they would be looked after and 
sheltered from the ruler’s disfavour. Shums un-Nissa Begum early on placed her servants, 
adherents, and relatives under the care of the Governor-General so that, in her words, ‘they 
may be protected from all molestation and oppression’, passing on her lands, vessels of gold 
and silver, and the revenues of the bazaar attached to her palace, to be distributed among her 
dependents through the agency of the Company.129 While the actions of these women might 
have served to consolidate the power of the Company in Awadh by amassing wealth and 
patronage in the Resident’s hands, the begums’ primary intent was to secure the futures of 
those dear to them. As Durba Ghosh observed of women’s engagements with the East India 
Company more generally, although women sometimes exploited the possibilities made 
available to them in an imperial context, ‘this should not lead us to the facile conclusion that 
colonialism […] benefited native women.’ Rather, ‘the activities of the Company opened up 
limited social, material, and legal opportunities for native women, allowing them some 
mobility within positions of relative powerlessness.’130 Royal women, while enjoying all the 
privileges of wealth and even sometimes political influence, nevertheless had to contend with 
the fact that the conditions of their lives were still subject, at least to some extent, to the 
dictates of powerful men, be they blood relatives or strangers from across the sea.  
 At the same time as Residents sought to enlist royal women in their cause, royal 
women therefore sought to mobilize the Residents in their interests. It was not unusual for 
women, for instance, to ask for Company troops to quell disturbances in their dominions to 
facilitate the collection of tax.131 And, as the Company began to expand its political and 
commercial activities across the subcontinent, royal women were not averse to deploying 
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these networks in support of their personal enterprises, particularly by soliciting exemption 
from customs duties.132 Aside from their business concerns, royal women were also prime 
builders, particularly noted for the construction of mosques, tombs, and caravanserais which 
publicly expressed their piety and prestige, and contributed to the honour and good reputation 
of their family.133 Bala Bai, daughter of Mahadji Sindhia, adoptive sister of Daulat Rao and a 
prominent lady in his zenana, used the channel of the Resident to acquire the aid of the 
Commissioners for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces in Farrukhabad for planting an 
avenue of trees, constructing a road, and digging several wells between Muttra and 
Bindrabeen (Hindu sites of worship) for the convenience of pilgrims and travellers. Bala Bai 
forwarded a plan of the proposed work, and asked the commissioners to provide her agents 
with letters of reference that would assist them in the collection of the requisite labourers and 
materials.134 In so doing, she marshalled the local expertise of the Company’s agents to help 
her in a project which would materially manifest her piety as well as her benevolence. 
Women who enjoyed such status and connections were endowed with the leverage necessary 
to use the Company to facilitate projects designed to augment their financial and cultural 
capital. 
 In addition to the allure of their status and connections, one powerful way in which 
women could enlist the Company in their cause was to use the idiom of kinship. Historically, 
this was a political tool regularly used by royal women; as exemplified by the important role 
of Yessooda Bai in the dramatic struggle for the throne of Poona, adoption was a symbolic act 
through which women could imbue men with their power and status.135 In a colonial context, 
the same technique was applied to British officials. The Begum Mumtaz Mahal, as part of her 
project to have her son recognized as heir apparent, denominated the Resident Archibald 
Seton her son and invested him with a khilat. Despite his better judgement, the Resident 
agreed to proceed with the ceremony, yielding ‘to the solicitations of the Begum who 
expressed an anxious desire that the investiture should take place on the auspicious occasion 
of the anniversary of his Britannic majesty’s Birthday’. In the event, however, the khilat was 
presented by Mumtaz Mahal’s favourite son. This conduced to the prince’s prestige and 
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superior rank relative to his elder brothers, and was reported in the public newspapers as 
indicating that the Resident had been appointed ‘naib wallee ahud’ or Deputy heir 
apparent’.136 By forging a link between the Resident and her son, even if only in appearance, 
Mumtaz Mahal further strengthened her son’s claim in the eyes of the population.  
Related to the discourse of kinship was one of protection, through which women 
symbolically appealed to Company agents as male guardians. Although women were often 
characterized as the main instigators and abettors of family conflict, they were also 
considered to be its chief victims, leading the Company to position themselves as protectors 
even in relation to women whom they otherwise condemned for their scheming.137 At Delhi, 
Archibald Seton was convinced that ‘the Mother of the Heir Apparent was at the bottom of all 
the Disturbances in the Palace,’ while ‘he himself [the heir apparent], tho’ not the primary 
cause, took no pains to suppress them’.138 At the same time, though Mumtaz Mehal was 
reproached for her ongoing campaign to secure Company recognition for her son Mirza 
Jahangir as heir apparent, the Resident was shocked to witness how Mirza Jahangir repaid his 
mother’s indulgence with insult, and ‘carried his excesses to such a height, as frequently to 
strike his Mother; which unnatural conduct, through the misplaced affection of His Majesty, 
was always suffered to go unpunished’.139  The Resident’s stance relative to royal women was 
thus powerfully shaped by conflicting ideas about gender and the family, intersecting with 
British assumptions of civilizational superiority which postulated that British men had a 
responsibility to protect Indian women from Indian men. In consequence, royal women figure 
prominently in the Residents’ letters and papers in diametrically opposed roles, as victims as 
well as villains.  
This attitude was particularly important in helping women to counterbalance the 
influence of male relatives. In part this pattern reflected the nature of the zenana itself; when a 
ruler died, his successor was expected to provide for the women of his predecessor’s zenana. 
While rulers often venerated their own mothers and grandmothers, they were apt to resent the 
favourite wives of the fathers or brothers who had preceded them in power; these women, 
thrown upon the mercy of step-sons or brothers-in-law, sometimes paid a bitter price for the 
difficult relationships between male relatives. In such cases, particularly where a ruler was 
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inimical to the English, it was not unusual for his female relatives to seek closer ties with the 
Company in pursuit of honours and financial benefits which were perhaps denied them by the 
ruler in question. In so doing, Indian women exploited a contemporary ideology which 
posited British men as the protectors of Indian womanhood.140 For instance, Shums un-Nissa 
Begum, widow of the Nawab Asaf ud-Daula but subject to the authority of her brother-in-law 
Saadat Ali Khan, avowed that ‘the Almighty is my witness that I have no kind friend nor 
protector but the faithful English Gentlemen’.141 She called on the government to help her 
resolve disputes in her zemindaries and her bazaar, and to rectify the neglect and ill treatment 
which she believed herself to have been subject to from the Nawab Vizier.142 Eventually, 
Shums un-Nissa even decided to retire to Company territories, to spend the rest of her life 
living under their protection. Though unwilling to take on the burden of looking after her or 
risk the Vizier’s resentment, ‘the Begums sufferings under the Viziers most discreditable 
persecution and enmity and under the pressure of a severe malady however were considered 
to be sufficient to over balance those motives’.143 
By claiming the identity of ‘the weaker vessel,’ women had an argument for 
Company support which Residents and other officials found extremely difficult to gainsay. 
This sometimes put Company officials in a difficult position and seems to have effectually 
limited their sphere of action; to revert to the previous example, Company officials did not 
really want to provide asylum to Shums un-Nissa Begum, but felt compelled to do so in light 
of her complaints against the Vizier and her appeal to their protection. Similarly, after the 
rebellion of Vizier Ali, British officials sought, without success, to convince his wives to 
return to their family homes at Lucknow. The head wife Banu Begum expressed her 
unwillingness to leave Benares, justifying her decision with reference to the apparent coldness 
shown her by her father, a Lucknow courtier.144 After the Resident’s repeated attempts to 
ensure her return, the begum responded in dramatic terms. ‘As I regard the English 
Gentlemen as my father & guardians, and they have resolved to abandon me, surely death is 
to be preferred to life’, she is reported to have said. ‘All I want is a single loaf of Bread and to 
live under the shadow of the Protection of the English.’ When further pressed, she responded, 
‘why do you talk to a person who is completely in your power, do whatever you please, I will 
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not go to Lucknow to be disgraced […] The English Gentlemen gave me honor, they ought to 
be the guardians of it.’145 Here she used the unequal power dynamic as leverage, emphasizing 
her own powerlessness and, in so doing, placing responsibility for her fate in the Company’s 
hands. 
 Ultimately Banu Begum returned to Lucknow to visit her mother, who was ill; 
otherwise, nothing the Company did, including cutting off her stipend, succeeded in 
convincing her.146 While deeply unwilling to use force against a woman of status, the 
Resident was beginning to consider employing violent methods, worried that her present 
condition of penury, ‘tho it is induced by her own disobedience of orders, may possibly, 
however erroneously, be ascribed to motives the very reverse of those which would govern 
your Lordship upon such occasions as the present.’147 By holding her ground, Banu Begum 
had forced the Company to resort to unflattering methods, subverting their claims to 
civilizational superiority. Undoubtedly the Company would have prevailed against the 
Begum, if pressed, but it is telling that for many months the Begum was able to successfully 
fend off the attempts of the British to displace her, all the while claiming the moral high 
ground. In this context, basic similarities across the ‘gender frontier’ gave Indian women the 
tools to mobilize the British political elite in their interests. 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has shown, the political Residents of the East India Company 
regularly found themselves immersed in the most intimate details of royal family life. The 
endeavour to consolidate control at Indian courts required the Residents to confront the 
complex and changeable form of Indian royal families, as well as the highly adaptable rules 
governing succession. This lack of definition could work to the Resident’s advantage, giving 
them the flexibility to throw their weight behind their chosen claimants while eliminating 
others, but then it could also be deployed by court factions and rebellious brothers and uncles 
for the same purpose. The indeterminacy of succession was what made relations between 
male relatives so antagonistic, much to the chagrin of the Residents largely responsible for 
arbitrating these disputes. Fraternal squabbles could be used to serve the Company’s interests, 
since brothers were motivated to supply the Company with information in return for 
protection against the resentments of the ruler. Still, this tactic had its risks, and Residents had 
to be discreet. Exile could be a useful means of getting troublesome relatives out of the way 
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as well as potentially cultivating more amenable heirs to the throne who could be deployed 
further down the line, but royal exiles represented a considerable drain on time and resources.  
 Women were not only often active participants in the schemes of their male relatives, 
they were in many cases recognized to be the brains behind the operations. Residents resented 
the way these women exercised influence from the seclusion of the zenana, a space which 
allowed them intimate access to the ear of the ruler as well as ideally positioning them at a 
key node in the Indian information network. These advantages, in addition to their sometimes 
sizeable financial resources, enabled royal women to act as important political patrons, 
belying the belittling terms in which Residents usually alluded to them. The Residents’ 
occasional condescension, however, did not mean that they dismissed royal women outright. 
In accordance with British ideas about the role of women in politics, Indian women were 
particularly valued for their moderating influence and their ability to smooth rivalrous 
relations between relatives. 
Even when the Resident did not particularly seek the support of royal women, he 
recognized the danger of appearing to ignore or disrespect them. Royal women used their 
status and prestige to call on the support of the Resident in fulfilment of personal projects. 
Women further strengthened their claims on the Resident’s services through the idiom of 
kinship and protection. This language was used to invoke the Company as a counterbalance to 
hostile male relatives. In so doing, women often placed a moral imperative on Company 
officials, demanding that they support the weak and powerless; because of this moralising 
discourse, the Company sometimes found themselves implicated in family dramas against 
their will, given their desire to appear in the guise of protectors of Indian womanhood. 
Although women sometimes affiliated themselves with the Company in this way, 
occasionally to the Company’s material advantage, this pattern should not be taken to suggest 
that these women were somehow collaborators. Rather, women, along with sons and brothers, 
merely took the opportunities available to them to defend their own interests in a context of 
courtly intrigue where their life and well-being was often at stake.  
 Although the Company could thus benefit from the vulnerable position of relatives, 
their control over the situation was still far from absolute. In this respect the Resident’s 
relationship with the ruling elite paralleled his relationship with his munshis; the assistance of 
royal family members was often necessary to the successful operations of the Residency, but 
it was not regarded as reliable. The very social and cultural capital which rendered these men 
and women valuable also made them threatening. As the preceding two chapters have tried to 
demonstrate, this was a core paradox at the heart of the Company’s developing system of 
imperial influence. The very notion of indirect rule required the imperial power to be able to 
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place their trust in a competent and capable body of administrators and elites, but by shoring 
up their authority there was always the possibility that these local powers were being invested 
with precisely the tools necessary to resist and undermine the imperial project.  
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Conclusion 
The Shrimant, brought up in the delicacies of the palace, 
Is now roaming through forests; 
Under the blazing sun he seeks his path through thorns and brambles; 
He tends and tethers his own horse;  
He spreads his thin scarf on rough ground and uses it as a bed during the night. 
He eats his rice from a wooden bowl one day before sunset, another day late after midnight; 
At every stage his favourite servants drop out;  
Never, oh never, has such a fate fallen on any of Balaji Vishvanath’s house; 
Elephants, horses, camels, treasure all are being left behind;  
What a fate has Bajirao to bear now in life;  
As he journeys on, he addresses to each with tears in his eyes, the words:  
‘This is our last visit, be kind, and meet us if you live.’1 
 
 This Marathi ballad evocatively captures the flight of Peshwa Baji Rao II following 
his defeat at the hands of the British East India Company in 1817. Driven from his capital, 
separated from his allies, he roamed from place to place, eluding the tireless pursuit of the 
Company’s armed forces. Over time, the number of his followers thinned, encouraged 
perhaps by the proclamation issued by Mountstuart Elphinstone on 11 February which 
promised that those who deserted Baji Rao’s cause would be allowed to return home 
unmolested, while the properties and rights of those who continued to support him would be 
forfeit. Finally, on 3 June, after a brief negotiation, Baji Rao surrendered. Accompanied by an 
armed retinue, he proceeded to Bithur, a holy site near Cawnpore where he lived out the 
remainder of his days on a Company pension, his activities closely supervised by a Company 
commissioner. Though Baji Rao showed some signs of aspiring to restoration, an ambition 
greedily taken advantage of by the Company officials eventually convicted for extorting 
money from him, the former Peshwa would never again act on the political stage.2 The 
symbolic leader of the Marathas, one of the final major obstacles to the Company’s expansion 
in the subcontinent, had been decisively suppressed. 
Baji Rao, along with the other men and women who figure in this dissertation – 
Residents, munshis, kings, concubines - witnessed important changes in his lifetime. In the 
year 1798, the East India Company was still just one regional power among many (albeit a 
dominant one), its territories relatively limited, its Residents functioning like diplomatic 
representatives. The Court of Directors and Board of Control in London had clearly expressed 
their aversion to schemes of conquest and their desire to avoid political entanglements in 
India, emphasizing above all the Company’s commercial origins and function. To the extent 
that Residents engaged with Indian politics, therefore, it was largely to exclude European 
powers and military expertise from Indian courts, with the aim of maintaining the status quo 
                                                     
1 G.S. Sardesai, The new history of the Marathas, 3 vols. (Bombay, 1968), vol. III, p. 496.  
2 Pratul C. Gupta, Baji Rao II and the East India Company, 1796-1818 (Oxford, p. 1939), p. 202-203.  
187 
 
 
in the subcontinent. Residents negotiated loans, subsidies, and war reparations, and carefully 
oversaw royal successions, but their intervention in Indian administrations was generally 
limited; in the Maratha states, Residents exercised very little control at all, and maintained 
only uneasy diplomatic relations interspersed with periods of war. By 1818, however, the 
scene had changed significantly. The Company had concluded key subsidiary treaties which 
brought previously recalcitrant Indian rulers under their influence, most notably Sindhia and 
the Rajah of Berar. In Awadh, the Company had annexed extensive tracts of territory and, 
despite the promises made in the treaty of 1801, continued to exercise significant influence 
over the nominally independent king. Most dramatically, the Company took direct control 
over considerable portions of central India which had previously belonged to the Peshwa. By 
the end of the period under study, British military and political pre-eminence in India was 
conclusively established, and the Company enjoyed direct or indirect control over most of the 
subcontinent.  
Amid these transformations, the Residents developed strategies to build their credit 
within the Company and to cement their influence at Indian courts. Not only did Residents 
endeavour to control the public image of the Company at royal capitals by closely monitoring 
the flow of letters and rumours, they also used their position as the exclusive channel of 
communication with the Governor-General to cast their activities in a flattering light and to 
consolidate their credibility in Calcutta at the expense of the rulers to whom they were 
attached. Recognizing the power of coercive measures, Residents also asserted their rights to 
employ force or the threat of force, and justified this stance in their letters to Calcutta by 
portraying the Indian kingdoms in which they were stationed as lawless zones of perpetual 
warfare. Residents surrounded themselves with material finery which reinforced their status at 
court, as well as exchanging lavish presents which established relations of obligation with the 
ruler and his ministers at the same time as they concealed the growing asymmetry of the 
subsidiary alliance system with a veneer of reciprocity. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, Residents sought with varying degrees of success to harness the influence and 
expertise of munshis and royal family members to their cause.  
 Yet, as this dissertation has demonstrated, the establishment and consolidation of the 
Resident’s influence at these major Indian courts was far from smooth or straightforward. To 
the contrary, the changing nature of the Residency system was a major source of conflict, 
even within the Company itself. Lacking clear precedents, the Residents and their superiors in 
London and Calcutta debated how the Company’s influence over Indian courts should be 
exercised, and what it should look like. To what extent should Residents embrace the use of 
exemplary violence, supposedly such a vital aspect of Indian sovereignty? Should Residents 
engage in the same acts of pageantry and benevolence as the rulers whose authority they were 
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increasingly seeking to supplant? The controversies surrounding these questions reveal 
conflicting visions about the basis and legitimacy of Company power in the subcontinent, 
namely, whether the Company should present themselves as successors to the Mughals, or 
whether it was in fact their civilizational superiority, as Europeans, which undergirded their 
right to rule. Thanks to the work of historians like Robert Travers and Thomas Metcalf, it is 
well known that the eighteenth and early nineteenth century Company was shaken by these 
ideological sea changes; this thesis, however, has shown how these questions manifested 
themselves in the routine business of empire.3 Uncertainty about the Company’s role in India 
was not simply an abstract concern; it permeated every aspect of the Resident’s day-to-day 
life, including the clothes they wore, the house they lived in, whether they flogged criminals 
or shot them from a cannon. The recurring controversies within the political line were in large 
part a reflection of this underlying irresolution.  
 Even where Company policy was clear, translating these policies into practice could 
prove problematic. For instance, though the Residents were instructed to exchange political 
gifts according to a strict principle of reciprocity, in practice this principle proved difficult to 
enforce given that Residents could neither anticipate or control the presents they were given 
in return. Similarly, though the members of the political line were chosen for their fluency in 
Indian languages, to most Residents it quickly became apparent that knowing the language 
was hardly sufficient for them to be able to act independently on the political stage, given the 
many different rules and considerations which framed Indian courtly politics. This gap 
between ideals and reality produced recurring tensions between the Governor-General-in-
Council, who issued the instructions, and the Resident, who was responsible for making them 
happen.  
These disputes are equally revealing of the issues connected with a rapidly expanding 
empire. As the Company’s sphere of control encompassed ever greater expanses of territory, 
officials in Calcutta as well as in London were faced with the problem of how to ensure the 
good conduct of the men who acted in their name at distant imperial outposts. The 
Company’s inability to closely supervise its own agents produced anxieties about what these 
young men might be getting up to, an uneasiness which the ever-increasing stream of official 
reports from Indian capitals could never quite allay; after all, administrators in Company 
centres were keenly aware of the powers of representation which Residents in distant courts 
enjoyed and their ability to whitewash their misdeeds in carefully worded letters, as Chapter 1 
has shown. Suspicions centred around the question of where the Resident’s loyalties lay: were 
his British virtues intact, or had he become ‘Indianized,’ his habits, dispositions and 
                                                     
3 Travers, Ideology and empire, p. 207; Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, p. 28.  
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attachments shaped by his long sojourn at Indian courts? The very feature which has made the 
Residents so attractive in the eyes of modern historians like William Dalrymple or Maya 
Jasanoff was thus precisely the aspect of their work which most concerned some of their 
contemporaries, that is, their embeddedness in Indian political life.4  
More troubling even than the issue of ‘Indianization’ was the question of whether the 
Residents were motivated by public benefits, or personal gains. Although there was a 
developing discourse of transparency and merit in Britain in the early nineteenth century, 
public and private interests had long been intertwined and in practise proved difficult to 
disentangle. Building on the work of historians of nineteenth-century British politics, this 
thesis has examined how broader concerns about governance and public accountability 
acquired particular urgency in a context of indirect rule.5 Here, the vicissitudes of distance 
and the representative function of the Residents made the boundaries between public and 
private particularly difficult to demarcate. Because the actions of the Resident were perceived 
to reflect on the Company as a whole, the intermingling of the personal and the public was a 
prominent feature of the Residency system, as every aspect of the Residents’ activities and 
lifestyle was subject to Company scrutiny, from his expense claims to his patronage of Indian 
scribes.  
These concerns relating to the dissolving boundaries between public and private, 
Briton and Indian, both came particularly to the fore in contemporary anxieties surrounding 
the munshi, the subject of Chapter 4. From the perspective of men in London and Calcutta, 
the Residents were in danger of becoming entangled in relations of dependency with Indians 
which not only threatened to tarnish their image of superiority but also to impede their ability 
to act independently. Worryingly, the obligations entailed by these relationships had the 
potential to outweigh the primary duty which the Resident owed to the Company; there was 
even a possibility that the Company’s resources and authority would be misused to fulfil these 
private obligations. From the Resident’s perspective, too, an intimate connection with one’s 
munshi could prove risky, investing the munshi with influence which he might use to pursue 
his own agenda at the expense of the Resident’s authority and credibility at court. At the same 
time, Residents were reliant on munshis to compose and interpret letters, to negotiate 
elaborate courtly ceremonial, and to help broker deals. The munshi had in his possession 
crucial knowledge, experience, and connections which the Residency, if it was to operate 
successfully, could not do without. For the same reason, Residents worked hard to cultivate 
                                                     
4 Jasanoff, Edge of empire, p. 9; a similar sentiment is expressed in Dalrymple, White Mughals, p. xlix.  
5 Harling and Mandler, ‘From “fiscal-military” state to laissez-faire state’, p. 54-55; Hilton, A mad, 
bad, and dangerous people, p. 120-124; Harling, The waning of Old Corruption, p. 22; Jupp, ‘The 
landed elite and political authority in Britain’, p. 64.  
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relationships with royal family members who could provide vital support to the Resident’s 
projects through the application of influence and the provision of political intelligence, as 
Chapter 5 has shown. While Residents were often dubious of the motives of their courtly 
allies, they had little option but to trust them, given their own position as an outsider and their 
concomitant lack of social and cultural capital.   
Because of their influence and cultural competence, Indian political actors therefore 
had the leverage necessary to make the Residency system work for them, to some extent. 
Company networks were used to make claims to property, secure jobs, expedite building 
projects, and serve a variety of other purposes conducive to the social, cultural, and economic 
capital of the individuals concerned. The Resident could be a valuable counterpoint to rival 
factions at court, protecting administrators from the disfavour of the ruler; he could also 
shield brothers and cousins from the resentments of the ruler, and side with royal women 
against the interventions of male relatives. Previous studies of the Residencies have tended to 
present a rather romantic portrait of cross-cultural engagement by focusing on emotional 
attachments (friendships, marriages), or else have devoted their attention to ritual encounters 
circumscribed in space and time.6 This thesis has sought instead to bring to light the quotidian 
substance of the confrontation between British Residents and the Indian court, the stream of 
letters, petitions, gifts, and services which made up Anglo-Indian exchange and formed the 
bedrock of the Company’s developing system of imperial influence.  
These interactions were facilitated by broad similarities between British and Indian 
political and family culture. Britain and India were clearly distinct in the early nineteenth 
century, and there were certainly prominent differences which led the Residents to take a 
negative view of Indian society; for instance, a conflict in military cultures spawned 
accusations of tyrannical and inhuman behaviour, while the fraternal conflicts characteristic 
of Indian royal families were sharply censured given the importance of family solidarity to 
social, political, and economic advancement in Britain. At the same time, social and political 
life in both places was still structured in ways that were not starkly different, and which 
therefore provided a common ground on which British and Indian political actors could 
cooperate. Both the British Residents and their Indian munshis, for instance, would have had 
roughly similar expectations of the benefits and obligations entailed by their patron-client 
relationships, given that these vertical relationships of dependency were the basic fabric of 
which both societies were composed. Similarly, while British and Indian family structures 
differed in many respects, common assumptions about kinship and gender gave Indian royal 
women the tools to form alliances and mobilize the Residents in their interests through the 
                                                     
6 For relationships of intimacy, see Dalrymple, White Mughals and Durba Gosh, Sex and the family in 
colonial India; for ceremonial, see special issue on ‘Civil ritual in India’, MAS, 24:3 (1990).   
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imposition of compelling moral imperatives of protection and guardianship. By examining the 
Resident’s day-to-day work, other commonalities also emerge, suggesting why Residents 
could cement their position at Indian courts so quickly. Many features of Indian courtly life 
would have resonated with the Residents, who came from a society which similarly 
emphasized the intermingling of the social and the material in the form of gift-giving and 
grandeur, and which also had a sophisticated epistolary culture where readers and writers 
attended carefully to language and format.  
While the Residencies were thus prominent sites of cooperation between British 
officials and Indian administrators and elites, they also inspired opposition. British letters 
were forged, stolen, or waylaid; misinformation was industriously spread. Princes and 
ministers organized violent uprisings, while rebels and marauders plundered in the 
Company’s domains. These acts of overt resistance might on the surface seem radically 
different from the practical support provided by the Resident’s Indian allies, who we might be 
tempted to label as collaborators; this dissertation, however, has tried to upset these binaries. 
Life at Indian courts was complicated and occasionally cut-throat; to the extent that munshis, 
ministers, or royal women assisted the Resident, it was usually in pursuit of their own 
objectives, and sometimes even for fear of their life. The Resident was only one player in a 
diverse field of interests and factions, and it was these configurations of power which usually 
determined the activities of the Indian political actors described in this thesis, from ministers 
and queen mothers to informants and intelligencers of lowly origins. To draw too sharp a line 
between the Company’s allies and adversaries is also reductive because many people acted in 
both capacities, most famously the Bahu Begum who went from being the Company’s most 
committed enemy to their most devoted supporter, as discussed in Chapter 5. Loyalties were 
rarely set in stone, and individuals who had previously shown an unwillingness to work with 
the Resident were apt to change tactics if the stakes were high enough, while those who had 
previously supported the Company could and did revolt if the opportunity presented itself. All 
this is to say that the Resident was reliant on people whose commitments, and consequently 
the assistance which they provided, were often partial and contingent.   
 Although the Company had achieved relative paramountcy by 1818, making it a 
logical stopping-point for this dissertation, 1818 is still by no means the end of this process of 
negotiation and resistance. The final Maratha War certainly transformed the political 
landscape, but many of the Indian kingdoms described in this study nevertheless lingered on. 
The Rajah of Nagpur Appah Sahib may have fled into exile following the 1817-18 war, but 
unlike the Peshwa he was succeeded by a nephew whose successors retained control over 
Nagpur until the kingdom was annexed per the Doctrine of Lapse in 1854. Awadh would 
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likewise remain independent until it was annexed for maladministration in 1856. Meanwhile, 
given his non-intervention in the conflict of 1817-18, Sindhia retained relative independence 
for some time, even mounting a violent resistance to Company encroachment in 1843. 
Thereafter Sindhia was militarily reduced, but Gwalior, like Hyderabad, remained ostensibly 
independent until 1947. For these kingdoms, the confrontation with the Company continued, 
albeit under different conditions and in different forms. The Company’s so-called 
‘paramountcy’ remained uneven and ill-defined, leaving room for rulers and ministers to 
negotiate the terms of that relationship, for instance by blocking the development of roads and 
postal routes which would have integrated the princely states more thoroughly into British 
India.  
 This thesis has focused on events at royal capitals, but, looking away from the court, 
towards the forests and hill-tracts, also suggests a different, longer time-line. While the 
Company might have successfully installed themselves in urban political centres, power in 
eighteenth-century India consisted, as scholars like Farhat Hasan and Stewart Gordon have 
shown, of relationships; of a shifting, negotiated sharing of sovereignty between rulers and 
local power-holders.7 Establishing control over these armed lineages was a longer process, 
particularly where the terrain was inhospitable. Though the communities inhabiting the 
forests and mountain passes had occasionally proven useful allies in rounding up resistant 
rulers and nobles, they also represented a threat to stability in the region. While the Company 
initially concluded treaties with groups like the Bhils and the Gonds, recognizing the 
independence of their ‘little kings’ as a means of controlling otherwise inaccessible territory 
by proxy, these groups ultimately proved resistant to the rules laid down for them by the 
British. Their continuing raids of nearby lowland villages provoked Company attempts to 
pacify and settle them, which in turn incited open revolt. Though firmly ensconced in large 
capitals, the Company’s grasp over the countryside, particularly ‘zones of anomaly’ which 
they perceived as ‘wild,’ remained tenuous.8 The intertwined processes of pacification, 
settlement, and deforestation intended to subdue unruly populations would continue into the 
twentieth century.9  
 The findings of this dissertation could therefore be enriched by a more detailed 
analysis of events in the countryside.  Although the Residents’ activities were mostly 
restricted to the royal court, the development of the subsidiary alliance system had 
                                                     
7 Farhat Hasan, State and locality in Mughal India: Power relations in Western India, c. 1572-1730 
(Cambridge, 2004), p. 126-127; Stewart Gordon, The Marathas 1600-1818 (Cambridge, 1993), p. 179.  
8 K. Sivaramakrishnan, Modern forests: Statemaking and environmental change in colonial Eastern 
India (Stanford, CA, 1999), p. 34-35.  
9 Sumit Guha, Environment and ethnicity in India, 1200-1991 (Cambridge, 1999), p. 200.  
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ramifications beyond the city limits. Outside the capitals, the story was less one of negotiation 
and political intrigue than it was of flight and famine in the wake of pillaging and warfare.10 
For the general population, the traditional strategies for combatting this kind of deprivation 
were migration and marauding. These activities had repercussions for the ill-defined and 
shifting borders between princely states and British-administered country, producing 
recurring disputes over law, order, and extraterritoriality which in turn suggest a great deal 
about changing ideas about sovereignty and interstate relations. The movement of people 
required Company officials and their Indian counterparts to clarify their relationship to one 
another and their obligations to their subjects; indeed, it required them to theorise about how 
the idea of subjecthood itself should be defined. Future work on the princely states might 
therefore fruitfully focus on the borders. This approach would foreground the agency of the 
broader population, showing how practices in the peripheries informed diplomatic activities at 
the capital, where courtiers and colonial officials found themselves debating the legal status 
of peasants, mercenaries, and merchants. 
 Although there remains much more to be said about the relations between Indian 
kingdoms and the Company, by focusing on activities at court and the dynamics between 
Residents and the ruling administrations this thesis has nevertheless tracked a crucial shift: the 
emergence of a doctrine of paramountcy. Assumptions about the Company’s right to 
intervene in and even control Indian politics gathered force during this period, with the 
disturbances of 1817 and 1818 acting (from a British perspective) as a powerful confirmation 
of what the Residents had long begun to suspect, namely, that the neighbouring Indian 
kingdoms would never make trustworthy allies. The Company’s influence would have to be 
imposed if their objectives in the subcontinent were to be achieved. The Resident at Nagpur 
described the events of 1817-1818 as ‘a violation of every principle on which faith between 
nations or Individuals is founded’, concluding that ‘all confidence hereafter in any thing but a 
system of the strictest control is out of the question.’11  
The impact of the Peshwa of Poona Baji Rao’s decision to rebel against the Company 
was especially profound. Baji Rao had been indebted to the Company for his place on the 
throne, and had consequently been considered a malleable instrument in the hands of the 
Residents.12 Though not totally blind to his resentment of Company encroachment, from the 
perspective of British administrators the Peshwa had seemed to exemplify the potential utility 
                                                     
10 John Macdonald Kinneir to J.A. Graham, 18 Feb. 1806, Sir John Macdonald Kinneir Papers, Mss 
Eur D1086, OIOC, np; Henry Russell to Henry Russell Sr., 4 Mar. 1811, Russell Papers, MS. Eng. lett. 
c. 151, Bodl. Oxf., p. 9; Henry Russell to Henry Russell Sr., 3 Apr. 1811, Russell Papers, MS. Eng. lett. 
c. 151, Bodl. Oxf., p. 20.  
11 Richard Jenkins to Marquess Hastings, 7 Dec. 1817, Mss Eur F311/10, OIOC, p. 34.  
12 Memorandum of Colonel Barry Close, Minto Papers, MS 11323, NLS, p. 33.  
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of the subsidiary alliance system. The Peshwa of Poona tended to be presented as the model 
of how an allied ruler might behave, and what his relationship with the Resident might be. In 
1815, assessing the state of the political landscape in India, Colebrooke declared ‘the court of 
Poona is a very satisfactory instance that a perfectly good understanding is to be maintained 
even in very delicate circumstances, when the turn and character of the Resident are suited to 
his station; and the native sovereign is not indisposed to the alliance, and his temper not 
entirely impracticable.’13 These perceptions of the Peshwa as the ideal monarch are what 
made his eventual resistance to the Company’s regime so shocking.  
 Indeed, Henry Russell had retained such a good impression of the Peshwa’s character 
after his brief time as Acting Resident at Poona that even after the events of 1818 he couldn’t 
shake the idea that ultimately it was the Resident Mountstuart Elphinstone’s ‘austere and 
irritating’ conduct that drove Baji Rao to rebel.14 Even after 1818, then, British 
contemporaries were still apt to wonder, ‘what if?’ What if things had been done differently? 
This thesis has sought to recapture these feelings of uncertainty and equivocation, along with 
other emotions (fear, frustration, suspicion, anger) which feature so prominently in the 
Residents’ surviving papers. The Residents’ testimony reminds us that, though in retrospect 
the nineteenth century would seem to be one long march towards the empire on which the sun 
never set, the reality, as it was experienced on the ground, was less straightforward. For the 
Residents, at least, Britain’s expanding imperial influence was instead made up of a series of 
messy and protracted practical experiments, based on many competing visions of what 
relationships with non-European polities could, or should, be.   
                                                     
13 Report appended to H.T. Colebrooke to Marquess of Hastings, 15 Oct. 1814, Cleveland Public 
Library Papers, IOR Neg 4226, wq091.92 Ea77p5, OIOC, p. 22-23.  
14 Henry Russell to his father, 7 Jun. 1817, Russell Papers, MS. Eng. lett. c. 151, Bodl. Oxf., p. 188.  
See also Henry Russell to his father, 22 Aug. 1818, Ibid., p. 241.  
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